Piquet given immunity amid crash-gate

The little twirp should be just as responsible and should be driving a taxi in Sao Paulo. Biggest Arrogant little jerk in F1. And his buddy Mosley for giving him immunity. I guess Piquet and his Daddy (the other jerk who was in F1) really are sticking it to Renault and Flav.

By the way his Dad was a creep as well, with his comments when he raced in F1, about Mansell, Enzo, Prost, and Senna.

 

Quoted for posterity. I can't add a thing to that....

 

Quoted for truth.

 

There was a really well written article by Racefax on Piquet and the Renault thing. The person I think that is really creapy is Flavio... he just smells smarmy... I think Piquet Sr. and Jr, were just fighting fire with fire...Its clear to me that Flav, and Pat Symmons conspired to use Piquet Jr to help Alonso...

I find it hard to knock Nelson Sr. for anything... 3x World Champ, very outspoken, knows the business... as for the kid, he may not be the fastest guy out there, but he clearly can handle a racing car, I think he was not given the opportunity by Renault / Flav...

as for Renault, I think this will just give them reason to leave F-1... so stupid on all accounts!

Sorry I had to cut and paste from PDF....

A Fit of Piquet Proves to
Be Far More Than That
In reaction to being fired by the Renault team, Nelson Piquet has admitted
to the FIA that he intentionally crashed at Singapore last year, in a successful
attempt to move teammate Fernando Alonso from a lowly grid position to
victory. Worse, Piquet has charged that he was instructed to crash — and
where and when — by the team’s Flavio Briatore and Pat Symonds. The FIA
has investigated, and its World Motors Sport Council will pass judgment
on September 21st. We examine the evidence collected so far and the events.
During the Belgian Grand Prix, Brazil’s TV Globo broke
the story that Renault driver Nelson Piquet had followed
team orders by intentionally crashing early in last year’s
Singapore race, to benefit teammate Fernando Alonso, who
then won the race, the team’s first victory of the season.
It seemed only reasonable to conclude that either
Piquet or his father was the source of the story. Young
Piquet had just been released by Renault, and in reaction
had, among other things, charged that Flavio Briatore
had, in addition to being his team principal and his
manager, become his “executioner.”
Unlike his father before him, Piquet had failed to
impress, but charged that he’d been given inferior
equipment and treatment compared to Alonso, and had
been set up to fail.
Given the level of Piquet’s outrage, and the fact that
his very public comments had probably burned his bridge
to F1 for the future, it seemed he had nothing to lose by
then charging that he’d been instructed to crash in
Singapore, in order to force the introduction of the safety
car to Alonso’s benefit.
In addition, we found it difficult to believe that a driver
would take the chances inherent in any accident, and
particularly on a concrete-lined street circuit. We also
considered that, self-preservation aside, intentionally
crashing would go against instinct and years of
conditioning, and the reflexive actions to which they lead.
On balance, the story seemed rather unlikely, and
besides, it was just a story. After all these years, we’ve
found that there’s plenty of time to get excited after
rumor turns to fact, and that it often does not.
And then someone gifted us with the dossier which is
the product of an FIA investigation into the matter.
Collectively, it constitutes evidence and a prosecutor’s
argument in a hearing to be conducted on September
21st by the FIA’s World Motor Sport Council.
(For clarity, in what follows, all references to ‘Piquet’
are to Nelson the younger, unless otherwise indicated.)
Piquet’s Allegations
While the Renault race-fixing story became public
during the Belgian GP at the end of August, it had actually
begun to unfold much earlier. On August 3rd, Piquet
issued a statement confirming he’d been sacked by
Renault, but he’d obviously known earlier. On July 26th,
Piquet senior had informed the FIA that his son wanted
to make a statement regarding the Singapore Grand Prix
incidents. Thus, five days before Piquet announced he’d
been released, he provided the FIA with a signed
statement in which he alleged
• he was asked by Briatore and team technical director
Pat Symonds “to deliberately crash my car” in Singapore
to benefit Alonso
• Symonds, “in the presence of Mr. Briatore, asked me if
I would be willing to sacrifice my race for the team by
‘causing a safety car’ “
• he “agreed to this proposal and caused my car to hit a
wall and crash during lap 13/14 of the race;”
• that after meeting with Briatore and Symonds, the latter
“took me aside to a quiet corner and, using a map,
pointed me to the exact corner of the track where I should
crash,” because “it did not have any cranes that would
allow a damaged car to be swiftly lifted off the track,
nor did it have any side entrances to the track” which
would allow a damaged car to be rolled off the track.
Crashing where Symonds indicated “would thus
necessitate the deployment of a safety car.”
• Symonds told Piquet that the strategy to be employed
for Alonso, who would start 15th, would have him very
light on fuel, and that Alonso would thus pit before the
Piquet crash while others would not, allowing Alonso to
gain track position
• he was in a “very fragile and emotional state of mind”
because of “intense stress due to the fact that Mr. Briatore
had refused” to tell him whether or not he would be retained
in 2009, and “repeatedly put pressure on me” to prolong
an option that precluded him talking to other teams
• that he agreed to crash because he thought it would
help him keep his drive, though no promises were made
• he repeatedly asked the team to confirm the lap he
was on, “which I would not normally do”
• after the race, “Mr. Briatore discreetly said ‘thank you’
after the end of the race” but the deliberate crash was
not discussed with him by anyone after the initial
meeting and agreement.
On August 17th, Piquet provided the FIA with a
supplemental statement, to summarize the points made
in the course of a second interview held in London,
during which he reviewed “preliminary telemetry data”
which the FIA Technical Department had obtained from
the Renault team.
Page 2
Page 3
In the statement, Piquet explained how he had crashed.
“After ensuring I was on the designated lap of the race,
I deliberately lost control of my car” on the exit to turn
17, the second part of a right-left chicane. “I did this by
pressing hard and early on the throttle. As I felt the back
end of the car drifting out, I continued to press hard on
the throttle, in the knowledge that this would lead to
my car making heavy contact with the concrete wall....”
Having reviewed the telemetry, Piquet stated that the
data “clearly demonstrates that I pressed significantly
harder and earlier on the throttle on the exit to turn 17
on the lap in question than on previous laps. Once the
back end of the car had begun to drift out, the only way
of recovering control of the car and avoiding
contact...would have been to back off on the throttle.
However, I did not back off the throttle to any material
extent. Rather, I pressed hard on the throttle beyond
the moment at which the back end started to drift out
and, indeed, right up to and beyond the point of impact
with the concrete wall. Again, the fact that I did not back
off the throttle is apparent from the (standard data
recorder) telemetry readings of the incident.”
In both statements, Piquet acknowledged that he had
“a duty...to ensure the fairness and legitimacy” of the F1
championship.
The Inquiry in Belgium
From the outset, the FIA had involved the investigative
firm Quest, and by the time of Piquet’s second statement,
at least, had also involved the law firm of Sidley Austin
LLP. Both companies had representatives present at
Quest’s London offices when Piquet was interviewed, and
again when the stewards of the Belgian GP (Lars
Osterlind, Vassilis Despotopoulos and Yves Bacquelaine)
were charged with investigating the Piquet allegations,
and interviewing a number of people from the Renault
team two week later. (Osterlind and Despotopoulos are
members of the World Motor Sport Council, which will
ultimately determine guilt of innocence.) In addition,
Herbie Blash, the FIA observer was present in Belgium.
The inquiry was conducted over August 27th and 28th,
and on the 28th, the stewards received a hard disc said
to contain the team’s entire data file (except car data)
from the Singapore Grand Prix. Briatore provided
additional information and documents.
The stewards “were reminded” that, in 2008,
deployment of the safety car resulted in the pits being
closed until the field was aligned properly behind the
safety car, and that over the 14 races preceding Singapore,
Alonso and Piquet had respectively scored just 18 and 13
driver point, and Renault was tied for fourth place with
Toyota in the constructors’ championship.
The stewards also had reference to video from the
Singapore event, and to printouts from the Renault
telemetry, provided by the FIA technical department. The
stewards concluded that the telemetry supported
Piquet’s version of what he had done to cause the
accident. The FIA techies affirmed that his actions were
“unusual for the particular situation.”
Also made available to the stewards was the telemetry
printout from Alonso’s car, illustrating when he had also
experienced wheelspin at turn 17 during the race. The
data traces showed him easing off the throttle, the
opposite of what Piquet had done on lap 14.
At the time of the Belgian interviews, the stewards did
not have access to the transcript of the Renault radio
transmissions (the FIA had not retained their recording),
but the team subsequently provided the recording and
the stewards reviewed them before making their report
to the FIA.
Alonso was interviewed first, but merely confirmed
that his reaction to wheelspin in turn 17 was
conventional.
Next up was Symonds, and as the partial transcript in
the stewards report showed, he proved notably shy in
critical areas:
FIA adviser: (With respect to the Singapore meeting
involving Briatore, Symonds and Piquet) In your own words,
Mr. Symonds, what do you recall being said to Nelson Piquet
Jr. at that meeting? This is shortly before the race.
Symonds: I don’t really remember
FIA adviser: You don’t remember?
Symonds: No
FIA adviser: Nelson Piquet Jr. says that he was asked by
you to cause a deliberate crash. Is that true?
Symonds: Nelson had spoken to me the day before and
suggested that. That’s all I’d really like to say.
FIA adviser: Mr. Symonds, were you aware that there
was going to be a crash at Lap 14?
Symonds: I don’t want to answer that question.
Later, there was this exchange.
FIA adviser: There is just one thing that I ought to ask
you, and put it to you so you can think about it, at least.
Mr. Piquet Jr. says that having had the initial meeting
with you and Flavio Briatore, you then met with him
individually with the map of the circuit. Do you
remember that?
Symonds: I won’t answer. Rather not answer that. I don’t
recall it, but it sounds like Nelson’s talked a lot more
about it.
FIA adviser: Mr. Piquet Jr. also says that at that meeting,
you pointed out a specific place on the circuit where he
was to have the accident and said it was because it was
the furthest away from any of the safety or lifting
equipment, and gave the most likely chance of a safety
car being deployed.
Symonds: I don’t...I don’t want to answer that question.
Still later, the questioning of Symonds concluded with
the FIA adviser asking whether Symonds or Briatore had
done most of the talking during the meeting involving
them and Piquet.
FIA adviser: Because, just to be absolutely clear here,
what Nelson Piquet Jr. has said is that at that meeting it
was you that asked him to have the crash deliberately.
Page 4
The FiA technical department provided the Belgian GP stewards with annotated telemetry traces
from Piquet’s Singapore accident, and other data. Typical, and damning, is the section shown here.
This shows Piquet’s use of throttle and wheelspin up to and through the accident. The throttle trace
shows early application of full throttle on the exit of turn 17 to induce wheelspin, then a probably
instinctive throttle lift in reaction to the induced power oversteer (at ‘A&#8217, and finally an immediate
return to full throttle to increase the oversteer to, through and beyond the point of impact (at ‘B&#8217.
Comparison traces from earlier laps show that Piquet indeed applied more throttle, and sooner, on
exiting turn 17 to induce the spin.
Page 5
Symonds: I can’t answer you.
FIA adviser: Can I say that if, Mr. Symonds, you’d been put
in the position where you were made to ask Mr. Piquet Jr.
to crash, it’s much better. It would be much better for you
in the long term to tell these stewards, to hear that today.
Symonds: I fully understand that.
FIA adviser: Yes.
Symonds: I have no intention of lying to you. I have not
lied to you, but I have reserved my position just a little.
FIA adviser: And you’re aware that the stewards may
draw conclusions from your unwillingness to assist them
in relation to what went on in that meeting?
Symonds: I would expect them to. I would absolutely
expect that.
FIA adviser: I think I haven’t got any further questions.
Symonds was also questioned about the telemetry
printout from Alonso’s wheelspin incident and from
Piquet’s car, copies of which was shown to him.
FIA adviser: I think you’ll anticipate what I’m going to
ask you here.
Symonds: I think I will.
FIA adviser: There’s quite.... There’s a more significant
wheelspin recorded here (in Piquet’s traces than Alonso
had experienced earlier in the race). You’ll see what has
been marked by the (FIA) technical department as a rapid
increase in throttle pedal (application).
Symonds: Mmm hmm.
FIA adviser: There, is on the throttle. There’s a slight
releasing of the throttle as the wheels start to spin, but
when the (wheel)spin is at its greatest, there appears to
be a reapplication of the throttle at almost 100 percent.
Symonds: Yes.
FIA adviser: I put it to you, Mr. Symonds, that that’s a
very unusual piece of telemetry that would suggest that
this may have been a deliberate crash.
Symonds: I would agree it’s unusual.
FIA adviser: Would it suggest to you a deliberate crash?
Symonds: I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a deliberate crash,
so I.... It’s very unusual data.
FIA adviser: Counter-intuitive for a driver to put his foot
full on the throttle when he’s in a deep (wheel)spin like
that, Mr. Symonds?
Symonds: It is. yes, when he has that much wheelspin,
it’s counter-intuitive.
Largely on the basis of Symonds’ failure to answer key
questions, the stewards concluded that the meeting in
Briatore’s office took place, that a deliberate crash was
discussed, and that afterward, Symonds had indicated
to Piquet where to have his ‘accident’ in order to ensure
that the safety car would be deployed. The stewards
noted in their report that, “had there been no substance
to the allegations made by (Piquet) and put to Mr.
Symonds, it would have been straightforward for Mr.
Symonds to deny them.”
When interviewed on the 27th, Symonds said he might
have additional information for the stewards subsequently,
including responses to the questions he’d declined to
answer. Called in again the follow day, however, he again
declined to answer the questions. He did add that Alonso
had been pitted earlier than planned to avoid him losing
time behind Kazuki Nakajima’s Williams.
Briatore didn’t arrive at Spa until the morning of the
28th, and was immediately summoned by the stewards.
He acknowledged the meeting with Symonds and Piquet,
but said it was to get Piquet to focus on his racing, rather
than his contract. He denied any discussion about a
deliberate crash, and denied having said ‘thank you’ to
Piquet afterward, then said he might have said it “as a
joke, maybe.”
The stewards said one quote summed up Briatore’s
position: “I never talk with Nelsinho. I never talk about
to crashing the car. He’s never coming to me tell me
‘Flavio, Jesus Christ, I crash the car, you won the race,
can you renew my contract?’ You know, if somebody do
you a favor like that, I just.... You renew the contract.”
Silence for a Ride
Briatore also supplied the stewards with
documentation concerning an exchange with Piquet
Senior, and the stewards included a July 28 letter Briatore
had sent him in their report.
Briatore told Piquet Senior that he had been “extremely
shocked” to learn from a member of his management
company (and then had it confirmed by Bernie
Ecclestone) that he was charging that his son had been
asked to cause the accident in Singapore, and that he
was threatening to disclose this to the FIA unless Piquet
Junior retained his drive with the Renault team.
Briatore denied the conspiracy, charged blackmail and
extortion “by way of threats and outrageous lies on the
basis of an alleged hear-say.” He concluded by saying
that any attempt to “make any declaration in connection
thereof” would result in criminal and civil court action
against Piquet Senior “on the ground of defamation, false
accusation extortion.”
Considering that, the stewards noted that, despite the
seriousness of the allegations, Briatore “carried out no
internal investigation before sending the letter.”
The Singapore Race Strategy
Only after the interviews had been conducted on the
27th and 28th did the stewards have access to the
Renault radio transmission tapes and the information
from the Renault-supplied data disc. And therein lay
perhaps the best evidence of a conspiracy.
On the disc was a document titled “Singapore GP 2008
Pre race sheet,” which detailed computer-generated one-,
two- and three-stop strategies for each driver. The twoand
three-stop Alonso strategies both called for him to
start very light on fuel and to make his first stop on lap
Page 6
14. Piquet, starting one position behind (16th) would be
carrying a conventional fuel load, and stopping on laps
28 and 44. The document suggests, and the radio traffic
confirms, that the plan for Alonso was a three-stop race.
Another document shows that Alonso had 8.49 kg of
fuel when he actually stopped on lap-12, validating that
he had been intended to stop on lap 14, the lap on which
Piquet says he had agreed to crash.
During the race, Symonds made the decision to pit
Alonso two laps early, and the radio transcript
documents how the decision was made, or at least sold
to the other engineers, who the stewards concluded had
no knowledge of the deliberate crash arrangement.
The imperative for Alonso’s strategy was to make up
places in the first, short stint, and while he’d gone from
16th to 12 on the first lap, thereafter he was stuck behind
Nakajima. For the first eight laps, Alonso stayed within
less than a second of the Williams driver, and Symonds
is heard on the tape to observe that “While we’re behind
Nakajima we’re ****ed. We’re not going anywhere.” An
engineer agrees, saying “It’s ****ing our three-stop, isn’t
it, completely.”
Symonds replies “I can tell you now we’re not threestopping,”
but according to the strategy, that would still
have left Alonso pitting on lap 14.
At the end of lap five, an engineer notes that Alonso’s
fuel consumption means he could potentially
go to lap 15 “and maybe we get to 16.”
Symonds responds, “don’t worry about fuel,
because I’m going to get him out of this traffic
earlier than that.”
Another engineer reports that the computer
program working strategy variations on an
ongoing basis is not working.
Piquet is then heard, on lap 8, asking “What
lap are we in.” One engineer believes he is
asking what lap he’s to come in for fuel, but
Symonds says “No. Just tell him he is
about...he’s completing...he is about to
complete lap 8.”
Given that Piquet’s first stop is not planned
until lap 28, the question is highly unusual.
Told he’s on lap 8, Piquet says he cannot see
the pit sign board. Piquet then says “It’s better
to count through the laps because I cannot
see (the pit sign board).”
Symonds says “Right. What have we got?
****ing hell; we’ve got seven seconds
(between Alonso and) Nakajima.” In fact, the
gap is less than a second, and Symonds is
actually complaining about a problem with
their computers.
On lap eight, Nakajima finally passed the
fuel-heavy Jarno Trulli, as Alonso would on
the following lap, but lost four seconds
behind and getting around Trulli. He then
begins to reduce the gap, to 3.692 on lap 10,
and 3.122 on lap 11.
An engineer reports that Alonso has run 1.5
seconds quicker than the Japanese, and
Symonds responds “One and a half. So we’re
going to catch him in about three laps, yeah?”
and that is confirmed by another engineer.
“Right. I’m going to... I think we’re going to
stop him just before we catch (Nakajima) and get him
out of (the traffic) the reason being we’ve still got this
worry on the...on the fuel pump. It’s only a couple of
laps short. We’re going to be stopping him early and
we’re going to go to lap 40" for the second stop.
In reality, however, Symonds had been told that the
fuel pump problem in the first laps had cleared up, has
been reminded that Alonso has plenty of fuel to go to a
scheduled stop on lap 14, and told that the gap to the
Williams is over three seconds and coming down at the
rate of only half a second or so per lap.
Nevertheless, after Alonso reports a lack of grip on
the lesser of the two tires compounds, Briatore responds
that there is “no way we’re overtaking Nakajima with
these tires.” In fact, Alonso wasn’t going to so much as
catch up to Nakajima before the planned stop on lap 14.
Symonds again said he would stop Alonso on lap 12,
“that looks like it’s all going to work out.” Symonds then
repeats his decision, twice. Inexplicably, given the gap
and closing rate, Symonds somehow concludes that,
“with a good lap, we’re going to be within a second and
a half of him, which is right.”
An engineer then questions Symonds’ decision to stop
two laps early, asking “Pat, do you still not think that
this is a bit early? We only (closed the gap by) six tenths
on that lap,” to which Symonds responded “No, no, it’s
Combined with timing data from the race, Renault radio transcripts from
Singapore show that Pat Symonds pitted Fernando Alonso two laps
earlier than planned or required by his position in traffic, presumably in
furtherance of a secret plan to have Nelson Piquet cause a safety car
period, and did so despite logical objections raised another engineer
Page 7
going to be alright.”
The engineer then points out that the gap to Nakajima
is 3.1 seconds, to which Symonds replied “Yeah. I mean,
we might be able to get one more lap (without being
delayed by proximity to Nakajima) but I’m not gonna
risk missing anything.” Alonso is then called in for fuel
and tires, and after he acknowledges the instruction,
Briatore is heard to say “Anyway, we had nothing to lose,”
to which Symonds replies, “Exactly,” as Alonso rejoins
20th, and last.
Immediately, Symonds says “Right. Now let’s
concentrate on Nelson”. Informed by an engineer that
Piquet has a significant speed advantage over Rubens
Barrichello, Symonds replies “Just hang on,” but Briatore
says “Tell him to push.” Symonds then says he wants to
look at the lap time at the end of the lap. “Just one
minute, please. I just want to see where he is.”
Some 30 seconds elapse, and then, as Piquet begins the
fateful lap 14, Symonds tells the engineer communicating
with Piquet “you’ve gotta push him really bloody hard
now. If he doesn’t get past Barrichello, he’s a...he’s going
nowhere. He’s got to get past Barrichello this lap.” Briatore
adds, “Tell him, push.” The engineer so instructs Piquet,
and seconds later he’s in the wall at turn 17.
Evidently seeing the video of Piquet’s accident, one
engineer is heard observing “****ing hell, that was a big
shunt.” Briatore then says “****ing hell. My every ****ing
disgrace. ****ing.... He’s not a driver.” In November,
Briatore will nevertheless do a deal with Piquet for 2009,
though dropping his salary from $1.5 to $1 million and
obtaining an option that will eventually allow them to
drop him from the team after the Hungarian GP.
The Stewards’ Conclusions
The Belgian GP stewards drew several conclusions
which led them to refer the matter to the World Council.
They were unable to ask Piquet about Symonds’
contention that it was the driver who raised the
possibility of an intentional crash, but considered that
Symonds’ admission that a discussion of the possibility
had taken place to be “substantial support” of Piquet’s
allegation that the crash was deliberate.
“Taken together,” the stewards concluded, Symonds’
admission of the discussion with Piquet, his refusal on
the 27th and again on the 28th to answer question about
what was discussed when he, Piquet and Briatore met
prior to the race, and Symonds’ refusal to deny that he
indicated where and on which lap Piquet should have
his crash led them to “consider it reasonable, on balance,
to conclude that the allegations made by (Piquet) are, in
large part, true.
The stewards did not consider the telemetry alone to
be conclusive evidence that Piquet intentionally crashed,
but taken together with his admission caused them to
find support for the admission and how he had caused
the crash.
The allegations by Piquet and Symonds answers and
refusals to answer “appear to the stewards to indicate
that there may have been some discussion in Mr.
Briatore’s presence of the possibility of causing a
deliberate crash. However, they did not consider
themselves to be in a position “to draw any definitive
conclusion regarding Mr. Briatore’s knowledge or
involvement. They did, however, observe that Briatore’s
“reaction to being told by the stewards in interview that
his executive director of engineering had admitted to
discussing a deliberate crash with (Piquet) did not appear
to be one of shock and/or anger,” and that Briatore’s
letter to the senior Piquet “was a strange reaction to such
a serious allegation” of extortion. “The more logical
response from a position of innocence might have been
either to launch an internal investigation or to report
the allegations to the FIA and take all necessary steps to
confirm they were unfounded, thereby removing the
alleged threat of extortion.”
In their report’s final paragraph, the stewards wrote
that “there is evidence which, on balance, suggests that
NPJ’s crash was deliberate and formed part of a plan
aimed at securing a benefit for the team in which at least
one senior Renault team member was complicit,” leading
them to refer the matter to the World Council.
The View from Here
We are prepared to go a bit farther than the stewards,
but not across the board.
A lot of drivers have struggled with Briatore’s rather
unique approach to driver management and his conflict
of interest arising from being both a driver’s manager/
agent and his employer. And countless drivers new to
F1 have faced not only the prospect but the reality of
falling out of Formula 1 due to inferior equipment and a
failure to deliver on contracted promises. Only Piquet,
so far as we know, has deemed it acceptable in those
circumstances to put himself and potentially others at
risk by deliberately causing a high-speed accident. That
he did, and judging by the video that was available on
YouTube (until the commercial rights holder/Bernie
Ecclestone had it removed), he actually practiced the
incident on the formation lap. His decision cannot be
excused by his admission, particularly as it was born
out of his animosity for Briatore rather than contrition,
nor by his age.
Symonds is at the least guilty of conspiracy, by his
own admission. His statement that he and Piquet
discussed an intentional crash means that, under the
most favorable scenario, he and Piquet were coconspirators
once the crash took place. Even if one
assumes Symonds told Piquet not to do it, given the crash
and his failure to report the conversation to Briatore and
the FIA, he entered into a conspiracy with Piquet. If, under
those circumstances, he told Briatore, then the team
principal became a co-conspirator for also failing to
inform the sanctioning body. Rather, given what
Symonds, at least, knew, Piquet was re-hired for 2009,
and on terms more favorable to the team.
In reading the radio transcript, we were reminded of
President Richard Nixon and Watergate. In an Oval Office
conversation with John Dean, Nixon told Dean to get hushmoney
to the burglars. Then — knowing as only he did
that the conversation was being recorded — Nixon added
the self-serving comment for posterity, “But it would be
wrong.” We here echoes of that in Briatore’s post-accident
comment about Piquet not being a driver, and in his and
Symonds admonishing Piquet to push harder at the
beginning of the lap on which he would crash.
The radio comments can, however, be viewed two ways,
but given the questions to which Symonds refused
answers, and the answers he did provide, we strongly
suspect that Symonds was attempting to avoid the
additional burden of lying while shifting the blame for
Page 8
the crash to Piquet and shielding Briatore.
One of the most significant statements made in
defense has potentially ominous implications. Symonds
told the Belgian stewards that he had not lied, but had
“reserved my position just a little.” Clearly the
reservation was accomplished by not answering the more
important questions put to him. By failing to provide
those answers, Symonds appears largely to have been
shielding Briatore from accusations of complicity. We
find it more than difficult to avoid concluding that
Symonds believed in the stewards’ meeting that he was
toast in any event and that he shielded Briatore with
silence pending cutting a deal that will take care of him
after he, like Mike Coughlin and Nigel Stepney not long
ago, will be banned from the sport.
Unless Symonds corroborates Piquet’s contention that
Briatore was involved in a discussion about deliberately
crashing, what we’ve seen is not sufficient to convict the
team principal, even under the largely undefined and highly
individual standards of evidence and proof that apply in
the World Council. The evidence, and Briatore’s own actions
and statements, justify a high level of suspicion — and for
us, based also on his history, a belief that he was a
conspirator — they do not constitute what would be a court
requirement: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Briatore spoke to the Belgian stewards at length about
Piquet’s emotional state — the ‘rogue employee’ defense
— though he neglected to mention that he’d created it
and repeatedly exacerbated it. What no one seems to have
noted is the emotional state of Briatore and Symonds,
among others in the team. At the time, there were serious
questions about whether Renault president Carlos Ghosn
would keep the team alive in 2009, having previously
stated that the team had to perform. Both drivers were
out of contention for the championship, but Piquet’s
intentional crash was decisive in Alonso beating Nick
Heidfeld to fifth, and it significantly helped Renault beat
Toyota to fourth in the constructors’ championship. That’s
motivation, and juries consider motivation.
On the other hand, we’ve not yet heard from Renault,
beyond what little Briatore and Symonds told the Belgian
stewards, and any pre-hearing response from the team
is not due until September 14th. It therefore seems
prudent to withhold final judgment, despite what
appears to us to be damning evidence in hand, and even
more prudent to avoid predicting how the World Council
members will view all this on the 21st.
Assuming a guilty verdict, as most who are privy to all
or part of the evidence seem to be doing, the question
shifts to the penalty. Our view is that what evidently
was done in Singapore was as serious as what was done
in the McLaren spying case, given the safety implications,
that a race was fixed, and the fact that, absent the Piquet
crash, it is not difficult to see last year’s championship
having gone to Felipe Massa, rather than Lewis Hamilton.
We therefore believe that the precedent has been set,
and should be followed, which would mean another $100
million fine, and the banning from the sport of Piquet,
Symonds and, quite possibly, Briatore.
If it comes to that, FIA president Max Mosley will have
had quite a final year in office, driving from the sport
not only his old arch enemy Ron Dennis but Briatore as
well, and, we would then assume, obtaining as a knockon
benefit the departure of another of the dwindling
number of manufacturers participating in Formula 1

 

immunity from what? what can FIA do, yank his superlicense?

 

Yes. Or void all points he scored (not that there would be much to void..)..

 

Wow, quite a read. Thanks much for posting that. I hope they fry Flabio as well....

 

Could anyone explain how the Piquet crash affected the championship? I can't recall.

 

I take it with your healthy dislike for jerks and arrigance that you are not really a fan of Senna, as your username might lead one to believe?

But of course you are right. Piquet should pay as well. But this is apparently how it works today. Hamilton and Alonso also got away with murder 2 years ago.

 

+1 no class nose Piquets (Sr. & Jr.!

 

I'm a little lost also but....

If Piquet's points alone were taken away due to the charade, Massa would have received 2 additional points in Germany (moving up from third to second) and one point in Japan (moving up from seventh to sixth), Hamilton's point total would not have changed.

If the team was dqed, Massa would have gained a total of 4 points, the two in Germany and two more from Japan, as both Alonso and Piquet finished ahead of Phil, thereby bumping him to fifth.....

HOWEVER,
Hamilton's point total would also have risen by four, gaining 1 point in Hungary by moving from fifth to fourth, 2 points in Singapore, moving up from third to second, and gaining 1 additional point in Brazil by moving from fifth to fourth yet again.

Unless Renault is absolved completely, Hamilton remains the rightful WDC.

 

Exactly.
By taking this action Jr. has been granted immunity by the FIA not by the legal authorities.By his own admission he has admitted to fixing a race on which there was legal betting. This is a serious offense.
Renault has stated that they are bringing criminal charges against him.
In this light immunity from the FIA is small comfort.
Seems Jr. has shown his typical lack of judgement.

 

my point exactly ... FIA immunity is meaningless.

 

I think you give the PKs far too much credit. What they did was done out of blind spite and nothing more.

 

What would be truly classic is that if Renault and crew walk because of reasonable doubt but Jr hangs in public court because of his admission of altering the race results.

 

You'd like to think so but expertise behind the wheel does not always translate to good judgement off the track.

 

If memory serves me well, Piquet Sr, then with Bernie's Brabham-BMW, won the 1983 driver's championship by cheating on the fuel, and Renault declined to press charges "for the greater goods of the F1 sport".

O tempora, o mores...

 

It seems that this action taken by Piquet is a no win for all involved. There is no way another team will hire Piquet now, not that they were lining up anyway. I doubt anyone in racing would touch him now. He outs Renault, they get banned or leave, bad for the sport in general. He outs himself, his career is effectively over. Maybe he does wanna sue FB for breach or contract siting the supposed perfomance clause? If the win is taken away from Alonso then I think he'd be within the terms of the clause. I really have no idea what the kid is thinking.

 

Neither does he.

 

I concur.

I dont' believe he fully thought this through with the repercussions this will have not only for his enemy but also for himself. This action pretty makes him untouchable at this point with his disloyalty combined with his lack of star talent.

Sometimes it's just better to cut your losses and live and learn instead of publicly airing your laundry and ruining your name in the process. Like the 1918 Black Sox scandal, that stain never goes away...

 

To me, he'd be lucky to be racing anything, anytime soon.