447 Report

I have read the complete report on the findings from the data recorders (took hours) recovered from the Air France Fl 447 crash. Again, the pilots are at fault and they caused the loss of the airplane and 200 people because they did not fly the airplane correctly. Without a visible Angle of Attack indicator and fluctuating airspeed readings they stalled the airplane At the same time they were manhandling the airplane, the pitot system had frozen up and had become inoperative and air data info had not only confused the pilots but also the computers that shut down. So, the fix is to retrain the pilots to fly at high altitude when they have no instruments, no AoA indicators, and no feel in the side sticks.
No mention of fixing the pitot heads.

 

I appears airline pilots are trained to minimize altitude loss by increasing pitch angle and thrust to power out of a stall so they maintain their altitude separation. In this case, they stalled the aircraft by exceeding the angle of attack for CL max and did not have enough thrust and lift to overcome the increased drag and thus descended. They increased angle of attack even more. This is contrary to basic airmanship rules of maintaining aircraft control and returning to level flight.

Since the aircraft is statically stable, the aircraft would have recovered on its own if the stick was released and the trim was neutral, especially with 35,000 feet to work with. In a Cessna 172 that is true and I believe the flight control system was in a mode where the pilot had full control authority with no limiters.

The Buffalo accident is similar to this, where the pilot pulled the stick back in a stall rather than releasing the stick. It was closer to the ground, around 5,000 feet, but more than enough altitude to recover if the nose was pushed down. They were not as experienced as the AirFrance crew but why are any pilots pulling back on the stick when they are falling out of the sky? That would be the natural reaction of a student that does not known much about aerodynamics, lift coefficient versus angle of attack and the knowledge that more thrust cannot overcome all forces. After all, an airliner is not a F-22 with a high thrust to weight ratio to stand on its tail. Training must be improved and basic airmanship skills reinforced.

 

Well, mon dieu, of course, vhat do you vahnt......??

The multi-national taxpayer funded consortium called Airbus Industrie is ever to blame for anything. It's a sacred cow.

Had they had fewer computers, as well as different flight control systems and software this would have never happened. Of course, you only train today's pilots to use what you want them to use.........right ?

 

That's part of the issue... both, at least partially state owned.

 

When I took my Private Check Ride, we spent more time concentrating on stalls than any other aspect of flight, including the ground stage. Stall recovery is one of the most concentrated upon aspects of flight training, but once pilots make it to the big leagues it seems that focus on the basics goes away. I think it is time that we all reorganize our priorities when it comes to our recurring training curriculums.

 

I suppose the good news is that we can now get to fixing the problem(s). Ridiculous that pilots aren't trained to fly planes, though, at altitude in poor conditions. I'm no expert, but it seems this was a completely avoidable incident.

CW

 

A bIg part of the problem was situational awareness. The consequences from losing altitude to maintain flying speed are completely different for an aircraft flying near Paris or NY with heavy traffic, and one flying over the Atlantic with the nearest aircraft probably at least 200 nm away. First rule of aviation is to fly the aircraft. They did not do that.

Departing a high performance aircraft at high altitude bears no resemblance to stalls practiced at lower altitude. It is possible to be in a stable attitude with sink rates approaching 50,000 fpm. You can die fat, dumb and happy if you do not use all the cues available to you.

Would not have happened if Air France had accomplished Airbus' safety TO, or if the crew had been better trained. A tragedy of major proportions. The aircraft commander/captain would have been better served waiting until gross weight decreased and the weather abated before leaving the cockpit.

This is just about as bad as the Russian pilot who let his son fly an Airbus unrecoverably out of control. Wrong person in control.

Taz
Terry Phillips

 

Depressing, and comforting...all at the same time....R.I.P.