Dreamliner already having CF problems?

I also heard that AA 'made money' on the airframe replacement... they had it insured for 'replacement value' which was significantly more than they had originally paid for the lost airframe.

 

IIRC wasn't there also a power reduction on the Rt engine (probably to attempt to reduce the yaw), or the captain reduced airspeed to the book number. Problem was the airplane wouldn't fly at the book airspeed due the the slats being gone (some were retracted, but the ones near the engine were ripped off to IIRC)....

You are probably more aware of the exact sequence of events, but I remember reading the NTSB report and it was something along those lines... Bottom line being that if you don't have a book spec airpane, you need to appreciate that it won't fly by the book.

 

No power reduction the #2 engine was actually increased gradually from 101% to a max value of 107. The DC-10 commands V2+10 normally and then V2 with an engine failure.

The F/O was flying faster than the commanded V2 at liftoff. V2+6 to be exact and accelerated to 172 KIAS while maintaing a "relatively stable pitch attitude and heading" wings level while climbing at 1100 fpm.

when the Captain took the airplane the rudder went to zero and he pitched up and started to decelerate at 1 knot per second. This was not good! The asymetric lift situation along with the captains poor stick and rudder skills played a factor for obvious reasons.

The airplane hit with full aft elevator and nearly full right aileron. Tragic and avoidable.

Speed is your friend with an engine out in heavy jets.

The resultant c.g. with the loss of the engine and pylon was within the forward (16.4 percent MAC) and aft (30.8 percent MAC) c.g. limits. The lateral c.g. shift was 11.9 inches to the right. The Powerful segmented and articulating DAC rudder had plenty of authority to overcome the rolling moments had it not been deflected to zero for several seconds.

Hope this clears it up.

As in any crash there are many contributing factors. Had American Airlines bought the upgraded dual stall warning system perhaps things would have been different? They typically bought "bare bones" airplanes but subsequent the FAA's AD mandated a dual stall warning system eventhough this crash was not the DC-10's fault. The Stick shaker goes off at 1.05 VS in the DC-10. The 1-3 RMP would have done its job in supplying "pressure" to the respective slats had the hydraulic lines not been ripped off the airplane due to an unapproved maintenance procedure causing premature failure of the pylon.

Decades later people still bash a great plane based on total ignorance.

Cheers

 

Just heard on the radio...

"about 55 of the 787's have a flaw in the CF fuselege, but they are still safe to fly. This will delay production of planes"...

Have not been able (yet) to find additional detail.

 

Do you fly the MD-11? I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on its safety record.

 

Yes I have flown the MD-11 and I base my findings on factual interpretation of Flight Test Data and over 10,000 flight hours in the DC-10 and MD-11.

That being said, the problems for the MD-11 are numerous. Here is a summation of some of my findings.

The MD-11 is prone to uncontrollable pitch oscillations in the landing phase and several have crashed as a result of this. The design of the horizontal stabilizer is such that stall buffet produces a dynamic load on the outboard elevators that has resulted in structural overload and failure of portions of the outboard elevators.

There have been 3 other incidents where MD-11's had suffered damage to their composite elevators, following stall buffets. It also has had 5 high altitude upsets! It has a very high max landing weight and it is not untypical to have approach speeds over 200 mph at max landing weight.

It is unstable in the landing phase! Unlike both the DC-10 and KC-10!

The terms stability, stable, and unstable have specific meanings with respect to the flying qualities of an airplane. Those meanings are confined to "static stability" and "maneuvering stability" and refer to control force gradients vs. speed, and vs. normal acceleration ('g') respectively.

Unfortunately, in common practice the terms are used indiscriminately by "aviation experts". Some of which post on this board as claimed experts in airplanes they never flew, but nevertheless are experts .

The software changes (implementation of the -908 FCS load, and some subsequent set mandated by the FAA to allow certification of the MD-10 on the same type cert) improved the predictability of the MD-11 in the landing phase;

However, they did nothing to correct the omission of a simple lead-lag pitch SCAS (à la F-4) which was designed into the Rate Command CWS of the LSAS (which is there, but set to zero gain, making it non-functional)

This would have compensated for the extremely low short period natural frequency of the airplane in the landing configuration (making the airplane prone to APC). The change in geometry from DC-10 to MD-11 made this item a required addition from a handling qualities standpoint, yet the FAA still certified the airplane!!!

They also did nothing to correct the gross elevator load feel (force vs. displacement) gradients in the landing configuration, which make it virtually impossible for a normal pilot (and in particular a soft-handed airline pilot) to access the necessary deflections for control of the airplane!

Nor did they compensate for the inadequate bandwidth of the elevator hydraulic actuators, which incur significant lags when rapid elevator control inputs are required (as in turbulence and/or gusty crosswind conditions). Combine this with an aft CG and Max Landing and you have an accident waiting to happen.

Add some crew fatigue to the equation and the stakes go up substantially!

The DC-10 and MD-10 do not suffer from the above problems for several reasons: it has a lower max landing weight, and thus much reduced pitch inertia (Iyy), the elevator throws required for adequate control are significantly reduced as a result of greater elevator control power (area) along with correspondingly lower required control forces.

Additionally, the DC-10 (as employed at most airlines) does not employ RCWS, a ludicrous, parallel roll control "enhancement" on most MD-11's; FedEx, incidentally, ordered its airplanes to have RCWS turned off; a wise decision!

What happened In Narita is the same as what happened in Hong Kong (to a China Airlines MD-11) and Newark NJ (to another FedEx MD-11) some years ago.

The hard landings, which resulted in ALL cases from failure of the aircraft to respond appropriately to pilot control inputs, resulted in rupture of the wing spar by the main gear oleo strut, breaking the wing; the lift from the wing not yet broken then caused the aircraft to roll, and turn upside down.

In Narita, both wings broke - first the left, and then as the roll angle reached about 80° LWD, the right wing also broke. this can be seen clearly on the video.

The failure of the aircraft to respond appropriately to pilot control inputs is the result of certification of the aircraft despite the omission of a vital part of the aircraft flight control system: namely the rate command function of the LSAS system.

This omission leads, under certain circumstances, to what can be described as a "cliff-like" APC* as a result of the extremely slow response of the airplane to elevator control inputs at high gross landing weights.

Despite protestations by the Douglas Aircraft Co. that the aircraft flies "just like a DC-10" (which are blatant untruths) the airplane is inherently dangerous and extremely difficult to handle in gusty wind conditions, especially at high landing weights.

I have had many discussions with FedEx , Delta, American, Alitalia, Korean and many other Check Airmen and Instructors about the MD-11, and have invariably heard horror stories about landings. My advice to them was to keep it coupled or go around when the 1st onset of any APC occurs.

Airplane-Pilot-Coupling - the phenomenon used to be called PIO, but the name was changed so to avoid the implication of pilot causality.


Cheers

 

Turbo, Thanks for the great firsthand input!

 

Turbo, thanks for that post.

I knew the captain on the Narita accident many years before-- we did a bit of flying together when I was flying a Merlin III and he was flying Metroliners. If I remember correctly, he was a Marine F-18 guy, and clearly not a weak stick. I always figured if it could happen to him, it could happen to anyone.

 

My pleasure sir. RIP for your friend. He was well liked I know that. Sadly often the crew is blamed for the MD-11 inherent design flaws.

 

My pleasure sir.

 

....to the original thread;

Boeing Co. tapped the leader of its thriving 777 airplane program to oversee production of its much-delayed 787 Dreamliner jet as another airline said it would seek compensation for delivery delays.

The aerospace company named Larry Loftis vice president and general manager for the Dreamliner program. The current head of the program, Scott Fancher, takes over as vice president and general manager of the 777 project.

Jim Albaugh, head of Boeing's commercial-airliner unit, said the move is designed "to better align our organization for the challenges ahead." Boeing declined further comment on the appointments.

 

Hello, I know virtually nothing about airplanes, but yet I find all these tech articles extremely interesting. You all seem to put them in a context that I can somewhat comprehend. Thanks Norm