375+ # 0384

Some actual Ohio law, discovered in 60 seconds by an insurance attorney from California, but apparently unknown to Kristi Lawson's expert Ohio probate super attorneys:

"Ohio Revised Statutes section 2109.32 Hearing on fiduciary's account.

"(A) Every fiduciary's account required by section 2109.301, 2109.302, or 2109.303 of the Revised Code shall be set for hearing before the probate court. . . .

"At the hearing upon an account . . . , the court shall inquire into, consider, and determine all matters relative to the account . . . , and may order the account approved and settled or make any other order that the court considers proper. If, at the hearing upon an account, the court finds that the fiduciary has fully and lawfully administered the estate or trust . . . , the court shall order the account approved and settled and may order the fiduciary discharged. . . .

"(B). . . .

"(4) If an administrator or executor learns of the existence of newly discovered assets after the filing of the final account or otherwise comes into possession of assets belonging to the estate after the filing of the final account, the executor or administrator shall file a supplemental final account with respect to the disposition of the assets . . . ."

Link: Lawriter - ORC - 2109.32 Hearing on fiduciary's account.

It would be good to see the the Supplemental Final Account that Kristi Lawson and her expert super lawyer Joseph Rouse filed in or before October 2006, which properly brought under the probate court's jurisdiction Karl Kleve's contingent claim to ownership of #0384. But let's not hold our breath waiting for this to happen.

 

Bill,

You misread my post. If you are going to understand a post, you must read the post's surrounding sentences for context. There is a difference between ownership claims, recovery claims, etc.

In Ohio Case A1001370, the record is that on March 1, 1994, after "having heard applicant", an Ohio Court ordered the issuance of the Ohio title while the car was stolen. On October 27, 2006, while still stolen and with the aid of counsel, an Ohio Probate Court sanctioned the transfer of those ownership claims to the heirs by issuance of an Ohio title in their names.

It is utter nonsense to argue, as you do, that because one does not possess property that has been stolen, one loses the right to claim title (ownership) to it, or to pass title (ownership) to his heirs upon his death. It is also utter nonsense to argue that an Ohio Court cannot order the issuance as was done in 1994 or the transfer as was done in 2006. The fact is that Kleve and Kleve's heirs (with the aid of counsel) took official steps in the Ohio Courts to maintain their title (ownership) claims to their stolen property, and thus I think they are on solid footing.

In Ohio Case A1001370, Plaintiff Swaters placed the Probate Court issues squarely before the Ohio Court. Ohio law on that issue is that the Swaters failed to bring their claims on a timely basis and the statute of limitations ran. (You are free to confirm this for the board with your research.)

FYI, states have developed a tracking system for vehicle ownership to combat theft and to reduce disputes - they issue "Titles" (paper certificates). That way, when someone shows up with a vehicle to sell, there is a secondary requirement that the Title (paper certificate) to that vehicle accompany the sale, and it must be signed by the OWNER to indicate that the OWNER is consenting to the sale of his property. OWNER CONSENT is key. Consideration for that OWNER CONSENT is still required (meaning if the owner signs the back of the Title but is not paid as agreed, then the transaction fails). This happens so often that some states have forms for it.

FYI, as for some older cars in which there may not be a paper Title (paper certificate) but there is title (ownership). In such instances, the conveyance must meet the standard of reasonableness (due diligence) by a bona fides purchaser. If the vehicle VIN has been altered, or is VIN is missing, or if the vehicle is being offered below market value, then the purchaser is deemed to be on notice, not in bona fides (good faith), and title (ownership) will not pass because it likely does not involve the OWNER.

FYI, states have specific required forms to use in the event an Owner wishes to have an agent signoff on the vehicle's Title (paper certificate). There are many state cases about flawed, unauthorized attempts to sell, and they typically focus on OWNER CONSENT and adherance to the requisite formalities (due diligence, etc.). If a rogue agent is involved in a purported conveyance with a Title (paper certificate), an Owner may be liable to reimburse a bona fides buyer who relied upon the rogue agent. Bona fides means the reliance was reasonable and the buyer had no notice of defect - but, title (ownership) does not pass, only a possible reimbursement to the bona fides buyer.

This reminds me of lawschool . . . plus I once owned and operated motor vehicle dealerships in LA and FLA.

Joe

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Conveniently forgetting that despite your attempts to conceal the original application and telling us Kleve was only applying for a copy, we now know that Kleve gave a false statement to the court and actually said he had the car in his possession.

Conveniently forgetting that we have now seen the application with the false declaration that Lawson was "in possession" of 0384AM. Please confirm that the Probate Court was made aware the car had actually been exported fifteen years earlier, legally sold by a Belgium dealer and was the subject to the 1999 settlement agreement before they "sanctioned" the transfer from the estate.

Conveniently forgetting that Swaters had purchased "good marketable title" with the 1999 settlement agreement and had an authorised letter certifying the release of the theft. You may dispute this but this has yet to be proved and eleven years elapsed with no legal challenge to recover the car until Swaters issued proceedings in 2010 in response to Lawson trying to sell the title with the parts.

Conveniently forgetting that the plaintiff, Swaters was actually responding to your use of the Probate Court in your defence and would not have been aware of probate issues given that they were not on notice and that 0384AM was not even listed in the estate. What reason did they have to bring a claim given they had already paid $625,000 in 1999 to settle any.

 

Joe Ford, you have written a War and Peace of deceptions, half-truths, and falsehoods. I expect that you were breaking the rule against drinking and posting when you wrote this. Let's see how far we can go to untangle this web before I run out of energy.

Please do explain the difference between a contingent claim to ownership of a thing, a contingent claim to restoring possession of the thing, and a contingent claim to "etc." Following your excellent advice to keep your response in context, the operative context would be the filing by Kristi Lawson, and her super lawyer Chris Skufca, of an inventory which failed to bring Karl Kleve's contingent claim to #0384 under the jurisdiction of the Ohio probate court; the perjured application filed by Lawson and her other super lawyer Joe Rouse, falsely representing that the Kleve estate included ownership of the car (not, as you admit, mere ownership of a contingent claim to ownership of the car); the further perjury that Lawson was in actual possession of the car; and the federal and state tax fraud committed by Lawson, Rouse, and Skufca when they chose not to include Kleve's contingent claim, and an IRS-ready appraisal of that claim, in the assets of the probate estate.

Also part of the context is the requirement of subd. (B)(4) of ORS 2109.32, that Lawson and her super expert attorneys “shall file a supplemental final account with respect to the disposition of the assets” of the Kleve estate, in order to bring under the probate court’s jurisdiction any “newly discovered assets after the filing of the final account.” Regardless of any statute of limitations running against the defalcations and perjuries that Joe Ford has already admitted, this requirement has no time limit. It therefore continues to be in effect, to the present day. I correctly predicted that we should not hold our breath waiting for Joe Ford to share a copy of Lawson’s Supplemental Final Account, because no such document has ever existed.

[URL="http://www.courtclerk.org/case_summary.asp?sec=history&casenumber=A1001370”] Here is the on-line docket in Swaters v. Lawson[/url]. Please point to the court paper or the hearing in which a party put on the record a copy of Karl Kleve’s perjured October 28, 1993 Application for Order Directing Issuance of Certificate of Title to Motor Vehicle, and/or the Court’s March 1, 1994 Entry Ordering Issuance of a Certificate of Title, in which Karl Kleve fraudulently induced Judge William Stewart Mathews to grant that Application. (Copies are attached.) I thought you had been denying that these documents existed, for many years, until copies were posted to this thread. Yet now you claim that they were part of “the record” in Swaters v. Lawson. Unless you can point to something in the docket showing that a copy of this March 1, 1994 Entry, containing the language you expressly quote (“having heard the applicant&#8221, was put on the record in Swaters v. Lawson, your friend The Board should conclude that this is yet another Joe Ford whopper.

Now that you have reminded us of Karl Kleve’s perjured express and implied representations — that “I now plan to use the car on public highways”; that the car had an odometer; that this non-existent odometer had a reading of 4,340 miles; and that Kleve had actual possession of a car located in Ohio, not a contingent claim to ownership of a car located in Europe (a claim to which no valid Certificate of Title could possibly be issued) — I wonder what you and Lawson contend to have been Karl Kleve’s testimony at the hearing giving rise to the Court’s statement, “having heard the applicant.” At a minimum I would expect the Court to have asked Kleve, is the car located in Hamilton County? Is your representation of 4,340 miles on the odometer true and correct? Do you intend to use the car on public highways? It necessarily follows, from the fact that the Court would not have granted the application without satisfactory answers to this bare minimum set of questions, and the fact that the Court did grant the application, that Kleve lied to the Court with respect to each one.

Put another way, when the Court “heard the applicant,” what words, exactly, do you contend it was, that were heard by the Court? What true words could Kleve have uttered, which would not have required the Court to deny his application?

Second question: is a Court order, induced by a tissue of lies, not subject to a revisit by the Court and a vacation of the order as null and void ab initio? I have less experience with filing false statements with the courts than you and Lawson – none, to be exact – so I defer to your expertise in this area.

Oh come on now, I have never argued any such thing. The difference between a probate asset consisting of actual possession of a thing, and an asset consisting of a contingent claim to possession of the thing, is not a subtle one.

By contrast, you admit that “At the time of Kleve's death there was no physical car in the estate, only the uncertain legal claim to 0384AM plus the original parts.” This is a true statement. Yet Lawson and her expert probate attorney Joe Roush adopted the “utter nonsense” that this contingent claim was the same thing as they described in their perjured October 2006 representation to the Court, “that s/he is in possession of the following described motor vehicle belonging to the estate: 1955 . . . Ferrari . . . No. 0384AM."

The Ohio statute which provides for the issuance of Certificates of Title speaks in terms of “motor vehicles,” not random collections of parts, and not contingent claims to the ownership of a motor vehicle located on another continent, a motor vehicle which is then legally registered to a third party pursuant to the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is located. It is utter nonsense to contend that, in the absence of the objective existence of any of the key statutory prerequisites for the issuance of a Certificate of Title, and based solely on an unbroken chain of perjured representations to the courts, that an Ohio Court can order the issuance of a Certificate of Title as was done in 1994, or the transfer as was done in 2006. Unless you can show me Ohio authority to the contrary, it is utter nonsense to contend that the Kleve family’s fraudulently induced 1994 and 2006 Certificates of Title do not remain open to attack, and to orders to vacate, even to the present day.

Sorry, you are the one representing that a statute of limitations has run on Swaters’s ability to challenge the validity of the Kleve family’s fraudulently induced 1994 and 2006 Certificates of Title. The burden is on you to cite to your friend The Board the operative statute of limitations.

In general, a statute of limitation does not begin to run, against a party’s claim for relief from the false representation of another, until that claim has “accrued.” A claim for relief from the false representation does not “accrue” until the party acquires actual or constructive knowledge of the representation. The Swaterses filed their action in February 2010. If the statute of limitations is one year, their action would be time barred if they acquired knowledge prior to February 2009. If the statute is four years, the operative cutoff would be February 2006. When do you and Lawson contend that the Swaters acquired the knowledge, required to begin the running of the statute of limitations?

And again, please point to the pleading, [URL="http://www.courtclerk.org/case_summary.asp?sec=history&casenumber=A1001370”] in the on-line docket in Swaters v. Lawson[/url], in which “plaintiff Swaters placed the Probate Court issues squarely before the Ohio Court.” Better yet, post up a copy of the moving paper and Judge Nadel’s entry.

I know you won’t, because I know that no such paper or entry exists. I expect your friend The Board follows the same rule as I do, that when Joe Ford makes a representation and declines to back it up with anything but his own words – ALL CAPS and triple exclamation points!!! – it is certainly false.

So what you’re saying is that, in law school -- as well as the used car lot -- you acquired the habit to make it up as you go along, and you have never thought to change. There is so much nonsense in these three “FYI” paragraphs, that I have run out of energy to respond. You must have been on your fourth or fifth cocktail when you got to these FYIs.

I’ll stop now and wait for your responses to the things I have covered in more detail. Or, in the absence of responses, we’ll conclude that you have none; anyway, none that are truthful.

 

the previous post should be titled "the world according to 180 out" a crude attempt to rewrite history... or parsing history of 0384 to fit a narrative with Justice sans blindfold and a hand on the scales :=)

 

Thanks for the suggestion. Is it OK if I use that in the future?

 

Please do Bill. That and $.02 is about what it is worth. How did that endless blathering about the Ohio appeal line up with your analysis?

The courts got fancy?

 

Sorry, if the topic is going to be endless blathering you'll have to be more specific.

Good news, Sean, reading my posts costs *less* than $.02. They're free!

 

Bill,

Learn to read, then learn to think. READ, then THINK.

Do that and you will stop cluttering this Board with your nonsense.

The application we are discussing is not an aplication to the Ohio BMV, it is to an application to an Ohio Court in case A9308915 in the circumstances of the theft of part of the Kleve's Ferrari.

Re: Case A9308915, why do you think Kleve had to go to the Ohio Court (as opposed to simply applying to the Ohio BMV) to get a title issued? Again, READ the case A9308915 Ohio Court application, and then THINK why.

It is well known that part of Kleve's Ferrari was stolen from him ("Stolen Portion") while a significant part of Kleve's Ferrari remained in his possession ("Ohio Portion").

The case A9308915 Order states "having heard applicant and having reviewed the sworn application filed in this matter," so, irrefutably the Court is stating that it relied upon what it heard from Kleve and the review of the affidavit.

Apparently (and also irrefutably), in 1994 Kleve proved ownership of his Ferrari to the Ohio court in case A9308915 sufficient to satisfy the Court. Accordingly, on March 1, 1994 the Court ordered the Ohio BMV to issue him a certificate of title to evidence Kleve's ownership. That is what certificates of title are - evidence of ownership. READ the statutes and THINK before releasing your clutch LOL.

FYI, this is the second time Kleve proved OWNERSHIP of his 1954 Ferrari 375 Plus VIN 0384AM to a Court, the first time being in criminal case 89-137 A held in 1989 in Federal Court in Atlanta, Georgia.

FYI, A1001370 is the fourth Ohio lawsuit regarding 0384AM, not counting A1306451 and not counting A1404305. That totals six Ohio State Court cases and one Federal Criminal Court Case in Atlanta, Georgia.

So, unfortunately, your "analysis" is incomplete, misdirected, incorrect, and rather desperate.

To overcome Kleve's claim of ownership, one must show that they acquired the item from an owner prior to Kleve. The world of collectibles, including cars, revolves around provenance - i.e. chain of ownership FROM OWNERS!!!

Was it you who also made a similar misguided attack on Kleve's Ohio certificate of title by claiming that the Ohio certificate of title was (or should have been) cancelled by the export in 1989? Again, if one READS the full statute and then THINKS, one will see that the Ohio statute requires an OWNER to be the exporter. To argue otherwise is utter nonsense as if to condone theft and immediate export of stolen property as a means to cancel a certificate of title. What a crock!

Again, the law on ownership of property, regardless of the type, is built upon conveyance from an OWNER with owner CONSENT. Without OWNER consent, there is no conveyance.

Case A1001370, Swaters Complaint, p.6 para. 28 - 32 and the referenced exhibits R, S, T, and U. A few of those are below. There are many more pages of T and then U which I will not bother posting to save you from more embarassment. As I said, and will repeat just for you -- “plaintiff Swaters placed the Probate Court issues squarely before the Ohio Court.”

OK. Olive branch?

Joe

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And that's what your opinion is worth.

 

2014 post 2637

Today

You have taken the words right out of my mouth

 

Kim can you provide me with ANY request for summary judgement from Swatters camp? Any?
In the lawsuit filed by Swatters. Said he paid all the money US courts like proof. What happened to Swatters case?
Swatters filed suit. What happened. Why did it turn into a lets split the car profits?

 

Sean, take a look at the Swaters website for a copy of the application for summary judgement on 24th June 2010. It was a simple claim for breach of contract and a classic case of the defendant throwing up enough chaff to send it to trial.

The Case of ?0384AM? | Jacques Swaters

What happened, was that Jaques Swaters died six months later in December 2010 leaving his daughter to settle the matter, and after enduring three years of defamation of her father name she did by agreeing to sell the car at auction and split the proceeds

It is interesting to read the early posts from people who knew Jaques Swaters and now choose to avoid this thread. The calculated assassination of his character may have been effective but it leaves an unpleasant taste in my mouth and what regard I had for Lawson and Joe evaporated when they walked away from 50% of the proceeds out of what only can be described as greed.

What do you think is a fair outcome ?

 

Swish this around in your mouth a little: on June 27, 2014, Ford could have had for the asking a check for $9 million, less whatever Zanotti would have been able to extort. $900,000 of that (less the Zanotti mordida) would have gone to Lawson and her sisters, and $8.1 million would have gone to Ford, subject to the arbitration with Gardner. Clear title would have gone to Wexner and #0384 would be wearing New York -- sorry, Ohio -- tags today. Everyone goes home happy.

Compare that to the situation to which Ford and Ford alone has brought everyone today: years more of litigation in prospect, with the most likely outcome to be Ford consigned to a penniless old age and Lawson with abstracts of judgment and writs of execution recorded against her real properties. I sometimes wonder how much less than $9 million Ford and Lawson were willing to accept at mediation. Every dollar below $9 million that they were willing to accept is a dollar they might as well have put in a pile and torched.

Truly a mystery, what is Ford's goal in all this.

 

It's no mystery. This case is like a bad divorce. Joe is a scorned woman in a man's body. Since, Chris defunded him, Joe has been getting even by filing tons of frivolous lawsuits in a vicious attempt to damage Chris by draining his bank accounts. And Joe is an expert at it.
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The goal of any motion is to persuade the court to cause a disturbance in the status quo. Any given judge is — and should be — predisposed not to disturb the status quo. The moving party undertakes the burden to overcome this predisposition. One way to do this is to make a showing that the law leaves the court with no other option. But where the court has many options, including the option to do nothing, the moving party must convince the court that the option proposed by the moving party is preferable to all the others.

The latter is the course that the Lawson and Ford lawyers, Smith and Rinear, have chosen to pursue. Their argument is, essentially, that appellate courts in three non-Ohio jurisdictions have held that Court A was justified to enjoin one of the parties in Court A from adjudicating an issue in Court B. Good practice would have been to show how the facts of the non-Ohio authorities compared with the facts in Swaters v. Lawson. Smith and Rinear contend that the pivotal fact is, that it was Swaters who chose to file her claims to ownership of #0384 in Ohio, and that this is dispositive. But they fail to show that this was the dispositive fact in the non-Ohio cases. Rather, in characteristic Ford-Smith-Rinear fashion, they merely wave their arms around and repeat -- ALL CAPS and triple exclamation points!!! -- that the court should do as it's told and like it.

A review of their motion (copy attached) will show that Smith and Rinear merely throw two case citations out there, with no discussion at all. They merely contend that these two cases affirmed orders to enjoin a party from litigating an issue, and fail to show how the facts in these two cases are analogous to the facts in Swaters v. Lawson. (Smith and Rinear don’t even cite the case from the third jurisdiction (the federal 5th Circuit Court of Appeals), which they represent to be favorable to their motion.)

Of greater damage to their clients’ interests is the negligent failure of Smith and Rinear even to mention the disabling threshold issue, that the March 11, 2015 opinion of the Ohio First District Court of Appeals has essentially ordered the Hamilton County trial court not to hear the motion at all:

"{¶16} . . . ecause the parties have, for all practical purposes, prevented the trial court from taking any further action in this matter until the validity of the Heads of Agreement is resolved by the London court, we order the trial court to stay all proceedings once reinstated. With the exception of vacating its contempt order and staying the proceedings, the trial court is to take no further action in this matter. The litigation is to remain stayed until such time as the London court determines that the Heads of Agreement is not a valid and enforceable document, or until such time as the London court enforces the Heads of Agreement and directs the parties to dismiss by agreement the action in Hamilton County. A certified entry from the London court is necessary to trigger further action in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas."

Smith and Rinear do quote from the ¶ 15 of the March 2015 Court of Appeals opinion. In ¶ 15, the Court rules that the parties defined and limited the role of the Ohio courts with respect to the present litigation, when they entered into the Heads of Agreement; specifically, when they agreed to the HoA’s choice of law/forum selection clause. This clause is therefore the touchstone of the motion. If you are surprised that Smith and Rinear do not cite the operative language of the HoA, you have not been paying attention. Here it is:

“12. This Agreement shall be governed by English law and any dispute in relation to it will be determined by the High Court of Justice in London.”

We should next note that Judge Nadel included, in the Judgment Entry and Order and Entry of Dismissal with Prejudice that he entered on August 19, 2013 — the order which gave rise to the first Ford-Lawson appeal — the following ruling:

“The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECRESS that the March 12, 2013 Heads of Agreement is binding upon the parties to this action and is enforceable.”

Ford and Lawson did not appeal from this ruling, and it has long since become final. In short, when Ford and Lawson waived and released their substantive claims to ownership of #0384, this waiver and release was and is binding and enforceable.

Judge Nadel also included this ruling:

“It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Heads of Agreement, that any action, suit or proceeding brought by any party to this action to construe, to interpret or to enforce the Heads of Agreement, or any provision of it, must be brought and prosecuted in the High Court of Justice in London, England.”

Ford and Lawson did not appeal from this ruling either. To the contrary, its May 29, 2014 opinion — issued in the first Ford-Lawson appeal — the Court of Appeal found and ruled as follows:

“{¶13} In this case, the parties do not dispute the validity of the forum-selection clause. The clause unambiguously requires any dispute arising under the Heads of Agreement to be resolved in the High Court of Justice in London. Thus, the trial court erred in enforcing the terms of the Heads of Agreement, because the forum-selection clause divested it of any authority to implement the agreement. And because the trial court’s dismissal of all claims was based on the erroneous premise that the court had the authority to enforce the agreement, the granting of the motion to dismiss was also improper.”

These rulings are final and binding on both the parties and the Hamilton County trial court. Notice what they have in common: that it is the parties’ voluntary agreement that English law shall govern the construction, performance, and enforcement of the HoA, and that the London High Court is the only venue available to them for the determination of “any dispute in relation to” the HoA. Any contention that the Court of Appeals’ order to stay further proceedings, or to reserve jurisdiction in the event that the London Court ruled that the HoA was void or unenforceable, e.g., on the ground of fraud in the inducement, arises from any Ohio statute or public policy, is mistaken. Rather, the sole source of these rulings is the HoA itself.

The Court of Appeal said just that in the paragraph quoted by Smith and Rinear:

“{¶15} We are faced with an unusual procedural posture in this case. By entering into the Heads of Agreement, which purported to extinguish all claims and counterclaims in this action, the parties have essentially prevented the trial court from taking any further action. The Heads of Agreement provided that the High Court of Justice in London would govern any disputes arising under the agreement. Ford and Lawson are currently contesting the validity of the Heads of Agreement. If that agreement is found by the London court to be valid and enforceable, its terms require eventual dismissal of the underlying action in this case. But if the London court determines that the agreement is not enforceable, then the parties are free to proceed in Hamilton County on the underlying claims. For these reasons, the trial court's entry of final judgment was in error.”

Note that the next to last sentence of ¶ 15 is “dicta.” Dicta is defined as a judicial statement with respect to an issue which the parties did not put before the court, and/or which is not a necessary link in the reasoning giving rise to the court’s ruling on the issue which the parties did put before the court. This next to last sentence — regarding what would happen next if the London Court ruled that the HoA is void or unenforceable, e.g., on the ground of fraud in the inducement — is a judicial statement regarding an issue that Ford and Lawson did not put before the Court of Appeals. Rather, the sole issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the terms of the forum selection clause had stripped the Hamilton County Court of the ability to dismiss the case. The question of what might happen next, if the London court were to rule that the HoA was null and void, was not put before the Court.

In fact, in addition to selecting the London Court as the sole venue for the determination of issues arising under the HoA, Ford and Lawson also agreed that only English law shall govern the Agreement. What do we know of English law, regarding what happens next, if the London Court rules that the HoA is void or unenforceable? Justice Flaux thinks he knows, and I defer to him. This is what Justice Flaux thinks to be the law in England:

“At the moment unless you can show me that there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Ohio courts to determine all of those issues, the fact that there have been proceedings in Ohio which have not resulted in any determination by the Ohio court on the merits to title, it seems to me that once the matter is before the English court — the idea that the English court should decide, as it were, an arid issued about the money and not an issue about the title to the car is not a course which seems to recommend itself frankly.

“There are now four sets of proceedings before this court and it seems to me that this needs to have finality as to all issues to do with title, all issues to do with who is entitled to the money and all issues to do with, as it were, unravelling agreements as to who gets what back once and for all. If you want to have a separate dispute between your Ms. Lawson. Mr. Ford and Mr. Gardner then bully for you, but unless you can demonstrate that there is some reason why the matter is before the Ohio court and cannot, as it were, come before the English court to determine these issues, but at the moment it seems to me that it is for the English court to decide all these things.”

Justice Flaux then solicited comment from Swaters’s attorney Mr. Hirst:

“MR. HIRST: . . . [T]he fact is the Ohio proceedings have got absolutely [nowhere].

“MR. JUSTICE FLAUX: Of course they have not.

“MR. HIRST: It has been five years of money wasted with (inaudible) wrangling. The sooner the matter is decided the better.

“MR. JUSTICE FLAUX: Precisely.

“MR. HIRST: The car is here, the money is here, the parties are here: the suggestion we should have a trial here, followed by a trial years later before a jury in Ohio is simply ridiculous.

“MR. JUSTICE FLAUX: It is grotesque.

“MR. HIRST: Thank you, my Lord.”

Finally, Justice Flaux had this exchange with Mr. Jones, the attorney for Ford and Lawson:

“MR. JONES: That is true, my Lord. Nevertheless, there have been proceedings in Ohio to which those four parties submitted jurisdiction in Ohio –

“MR. JUSTICE FLAUX: They may well have submitted to the jurisdiction in Ohio, but it does not mean that in an appropriate case the court cannot say that the matter is now before the English court and therefore it is more just and convenient it is decided by the English court.”

The importance of the comments of Justice Flaux, regarding the law in England with respect to what happens next, if it is determined that the HoA is void and unenforceable, is that Ford and Lawson agreed that “This Agreement” — the HoA — “shall be governed by English law.” It was certainly foreseeable to Lawson and Ford, when they entered into an agreement with the non-party Bonhams, that if they were to contend that the substantive merits of their claims to ownership of #0384 had been revived — i.e., that they were no longer bound to their release of these claims, as set forth in the HoA — and that if that contention caused an injury to Bonhams, that Bonhams would file an action in London to seek appropriate relief, including a declaration that Lawson and Ford have no ownership interest in #0384. This being an entirely foreseeable result of their desire, in the post-September 2013 era, to reopen the substantive merits, Justice Flaux’s belief that English law gives him jurisdiction to determine the substantive merits of ownership claims, is a result to which Ford and Lawson agreed when they signed the HoA.

Or such is The World According to 180 Out.

Whether this is also the world according to the Hamilton County judge who has the unfortunate duty to listen to Smith and Rinear at the hearing on their motion, remains to be seen. But right or wrong, these are the issues which are dispositive of their motion. First, how does the judge get past the unambiguous terms of the order of the Court of Appeals, that he or she shall do nothing in this case in the absence of an “entry” — an order — from the London court. Second, if a learned English judge is ruling that the law in England is, that he has sufficient jurisdiction over Ford and Lawson to hear the merits of their substantive claims to ownership, how is this not a result to which Ford and Lawson agreed, when they agreed that the HoA “shall be governed by English law”? As one would expect, Smith and Rinear fail even to mention these two things. They appear to contend that the Court of Appeals has expressed some sort of overriding Ohio public policy, that the Ohio courts alone have jurisdiction to decide the substantive ownership interests. Yet even with respect to that argument, Smith and Rinear do their characteristically pathetic job. They merely say, hey, Swaters is the one who brought suit in Ohio, and this alone shall be dispositive of the motion.

I will be very surprised if the trial judge even reaches the merits of the motion; that instead the judge will rule that the Court of Appeals’ order to stay means what it says. But if the judge does get past the stay, Smith and Rinear must show how Judge Flaux’s proposed application of English law falls outside the scope of the agreement of Ford and Lawson, that English law shall govern the HoA. I don’t think they can, and they appear to intend not even to try.

 

Bill

IMHO posters on both sides of this thread have moved into the twilight zone a long time ago.

That said I personally would NEVER attempt to import a car into the US much less Ohio if there was ANY question as to whether it had been stolen and removed from the US and which there was ANY question what so ever about it's clear title.

What a English court may or may not find in absence of a TOTAL GOLBAL SETTLEMENT with full releases from EVERYBODY would not be enough for me and even with that this one wouldn't interest me at any price after this fiasco.

Carry On

 

A car that can't be owned or even used in the US must be worth rather less than one that can.

 

Thanks Dave....

So to get down to brass tacks there should have been a value, on the "4' x 10' long piece of dirt, where the Ferrari used to reside.."

I think that would satisfy Kim's position.

 

Touché but you have forgotten to add the value of the lumber allegedly growing out of the chassis !

Dave's opinion on the value of the Kruse "Gold Mine" (excluding the 0384 AM parts) may well be correct but the actual proceeds realised from the auction before the estate was was settled in December 2006 would be an exact figure and there is silence on that question.

K

 

Hey Joey....
Ha! I bet you think it was CG. Wrong!

*notice the blue tarp in the background covering the infamous, inoperative, MGB.
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The Case Management Conference before Justice Flaux is due to take place....er....right now in the UK commercial court. I am looking forward to the next thrilling episode of this saga!


2014-836 Bonhams 1793 Limited v Ms Kristine Kleve Lawson & 3 Otrs

 

Morning session just ended. Highlights.

Justice Flaux has just dismissed the Ford application to retain jurisdiction in Ohio for the title and confirmed that everything will be tried in London. He will issue an anti suit injunction against the Ford/Lawson application for the Ohio injunction against Swaters/Gardner for what he describes as a Vexatious claim and attempt to "steal a march" on the proceedings in London.

The bombshell was Justice Flaux stating that if the title was proved to be Swaters and the HoA to be invalid then she will be entitled to ALL of the proceeds.

 

Hmm....that rather proves my point previously, about "once it leaves the country...."

The Belgium title work (#0394!!) seems to be over ruling the Interpol Theft Report, and FBI recovery efforts, mounted by Kleve before his death??

Justice Flaux is aware of that fact??