News News News

Police chase puts brakes on Lambo unveiling in NYC

The unveiling of the new Lamborghini Gallardo Spyder to a group of wealthy guests at Manhattan Motorcars was nearly put on hold by a police chase in New York. Gianluca Siciliano, a Lamborghini employee from Italy, was caught speeding 85 mph on Route 1 North. Siciliano accelerated past 100 mph, and police stopped their pursuit. Siciliano then stopped for a coffee at a nearby gas station, and was spotted by another group of officers. He was arrested and the car was impounded. Attorney Roy Macaluso said Siciliano is a good man in a foreign country who made a mistake, and should be treated as such. Macaluso, who is getting a Gallardo himself, said, “Officially, Lamborghini doesn’t condone unlawful behavior. But if this demonstrated the car’s performance capabilities, maybe it will help with sales.” Although the car never made it to Manhattan Motorcars, none of the wealthy guests noticed, because Lamborghini had another car flown in from Germany.

 

DETROIT -- The era of making engines bigger is over at BMW.

The German maker of high-performance vehicles will stop making engines bigger to boost performance. Instead, BMW will use turbochargers, more efficient valvetrains and advanced electronics to boost performance while increasing fuel economy.

"The time to increase horsepower by increasing displacement is over," said Klaus Borgmann, senior vice president of powertrain development for BMW, during an interview at the SAE World Congress here last week. "I am very convinced that the time to increase displacement will never come back because increasing displacement automatically increases fuel consumption."

The move is part of a growing industry trend to improve performance without increasing engine size or hurting fuel economy, said Bill Rinna, an analyst with CSM Worldwide, a consulting company in suburban Detroit. "You are seeing a lot more engines with variable valve timing, direct injection and either supercharging or turbocharging," he said.

Rinna said BMW buyers expect safety and technical advances that improve handling and performance, and boost fuel economy through technology.

General Motors and Ford Motor Co. also plan to build smaller but more powerful and fuel-efficient engines. Ford's new 3.5-liter V-6, for example, makes 40 more horsepower than its current 4.0-liter.

Borgmann outlined several ways BMW will boost fuel economy starting this fall.

>> BMW is spreading its Valvetronic system, which varies the duration and lift of the intake valves to maximize fuel economy, emissions and performance, to the 2007 Mini Cooper. The sporty S version of the British-made hatchback will use a turbocharger, instead of the supercharger in the current model, and have direct fuel injection, Borgmann said, for about a 10 percent fuel economy gain over the 2006 car. Instead of bigger engines, he said, turbochargers will be used on other BMWs to improve performance.

>> In 2007, European BMWs will be equipped with a stop-start feature that turns off the gasoline or diesel engine when the car comes to a stop. The engine restarts immediately when the driver lifts his or her foot off the brake pedal. Borgmann said the feature is being evaluated for North America. Stop-start may not be suitable for hot climates, he said, because the air conditioning compressor stops working when the engine is off. The stop-start system will use a specially modified starter, instead of a belt alternator system, and a heavier-duty battery. The Mini Cooper also will have the stop-start system.

>> A new alternator management system BMW calls Brake Energy Recuperation makes more efficient use of the car's charging system. The goal is to capture some of the energy normally lost when a car is braking. Borgmann said the system keeps the battery charged at 80 percent to reduce the load, or drag, that the alternator places on the engine while the vehicle is cruising. When the driver applies the brakes, a sensor commands the alternator to produce a short blast of electricity to bring the battery up to a 90 percent charge. When the driver accelerates, the alternator is allowed to spin freely so no drag is placed on the engine. BMW will begin installing the Brake Energy Recuperation systems in 2007 on European market vehicles, along with stop-start.

>> Hybrids: In 2009, BMW will use a version of GM's Two-Mode heavy-duty rear-wheel-drive transmission that enables large cars and rwd SUVs to get an estimated 25 percent fuel economy improvement in city and highway driving. GM, which developed the transmission, is selling it to BMW and DaimlerChrysler.

BMW has not said which of its vehicles will get the Two Mode transmission. About 60 BMW engineers are working alongside GM and DaimlerChrysler engineers in Troy, Mich., to adapt the GM transmission to the BMW engine.

The fuel economy gains from the stop-start and Brake Energy Recuperation systems are borne out of some of the first technical ideas to come from BMW's Department of Energy Management, a special team of 100 engineers that BMW formed in 2003.

"BER, together with the stop-start system, it's about an 8 percent fuel economy improvement, depending on the driving cycle," Borgmann said. "That's about half the value of a hybrid system with very simple systems. We will introduce this in Europe in a broad range of cars because it is not so expensive," he said.

BMW is also looking at ways to capture energy wasted in the exhaust system to create steam to reduce the load on the engine.

"The outcome of the thinking of Energy Management is how can we deal with all the energy flows in the car and what can we do so that the customer has the most benefit," Borgmann said.

Several BMW cars in the United States are considered gas guzzlers and are subject to a special tax by the government.

"The BMW brand is not known to be very fuel efficient," Borgmann said. "It is important for BMW to be good there as well."

 

During a speech to a Heritage Foundation conference in May 2004, National Nuclear Security
Administration Director Ambassador Linton F. Brooks assured the audience: “I’ve never met
anyone in the Administration who would even consider nuclear preemption in connection with
countering rogue state WMD threats.”1 His assurance must have excluded the White House,
STRATCOM, the Air Force, and the Navy, for during the past decade they have been busy
planning for precisely such a scenario.
One year after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001,
the Bush administration published the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America. Building on the events of 9/11 – and a decade of gradual expansion of nuclear doctrine
focused on Russian and China to one aimed increasingly at regional aggressors armed with
weapons of mass destruction – the new strategy wove together terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction proliferation in a plan for a more offensive U.S. military posture.
"We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they
are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States
and our allies and friends....We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries….The greater the threat, the
greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time
and place of our enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively....To support
preemptive actions, we will…continue to transform out military forces to ensure
our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results."2
Three and a half years later, the military product of that strategy is operational: Global Strike.
The operational embodiment of the Global Strike mission is Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
8022, a new strike plan developed by STRATCOM in coordination with the Air Force and Navy
to provide a prompt global strike options to the President with nuclear, conventional, space, and
information warfare capabilities.
It is important to understand that the Global Strike mission and CONPLAN 8022 are different
than previous missions and plans both in their intent and capabilities. Although promoted as a
way of increasing the President’s options for deterring lesser adversaries, Global Strike is first
and foremost offensive and preemptive in nature and deeply rooted in the expectation that
deterrence will fail sooner or later. Rather than waiting for the mushroom cloud to appear, phrase used several times by the Bush administration, the Global Strike mission is focused on
defeating the threat before it is unleashed. In its most extreme sense, Global Strike seeks to
create near-invulnerability for the United States by forcing utter vulnerability upon any potential
adversary. As a result, Global Strike is principally about warfighting rather than deterrence.
From Policy to Capability
Because of its unique duty to save America from damage inflicted by weapons of mass
destruction, Global Strike is an important new focus for the Pentagon’s offensive planning in the
post-9/11 era: It is the basis for the implementation of the New Triad described in the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR); the core of the transformation of U.S. Strategic Command into
the center of U.S. military planning; and the embodiment of the doctrinal and political shift in
how the United States views the role of its military forces after 9/11. Global Strike has emerged
in response to specific guidance issued by the While House and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) since 2001:
• Nuclear Posture Review (December 2001): Lays the foundation by articulating
requirements for forces and planning tools that reemphasized operations against regional
adversaries armed with weapons mass destruction.
• National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 14 (June 2002): Promulgates new
Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance in accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review.
• National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 (September 2002): Communicates a
new National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction as a comprehensive
approach to counter nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Reaffirms that
United States will use nuclear weapons – even preemptively – against anyone using
weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its forces abroad, and friends and
allies. Calls for a mix of nuclear and conventional forces.
• National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002): Publicly articulates a
preemption doctrine against weapons of mass destruction that requires transformation of
military forces to rapidly and precisely “stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and
our allies and friends.”
• Unified Command Plan, Change 2 (January 2003): Assigns four new missions to
STRATCOM: Global Strike, missile defense, information operations, and global C4ISR.
The directive defines global strike as "a capability to deliver rapid, extended range,
precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and
information operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives."
• Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan (March 2003): A 26-page list of specific
items from the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review that the military Services are ordered to
implement.
• Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) (April 2004): A detailed outline of the
countries that U.S. nuclear planning shall be directed against, including a breakdown of
the individual strike options (plans) and their target categories and objectives.

document states in part: "U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be
capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and
capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to
achieve its own objectives in a post-war world."
• Unified Command Plan 2004 (March 2005): Assigns to STRATCOM the mission of
coordinating the Pentagon’s efforts to combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.
In response to this (and probably other) guidance, STRATCOM planners went to work on a new
strike plan that could be used to implement Global Strike if ordered to do so. Only four months
after being assigned the Global Strike by Unified Command Plan (Change 2) in January 2003, a
strategic concept for CONPLAN 8022 had been developed. A second concept was readied in
June (CONPLAN 8022-02) and completed in November 2003.
As a concept plan, CONPLAN 8022 was not operational at this point but available for
implementation if so ordered by the Secretary of Defense. That happened in June 2004, when
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered the military to implement CONPLAN 8022 “which
provides the President a prompt, global strike capability." In response, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman General Richard Myers signed the Global Strike Alert Order (ALERTORD) on June
30, 2004, which ordered STRATCOM to put CONPLAN 8022 into effect in coordination with
the Air Force and Navy. Six weeks later, on August 17, STRATCOM published Global Strike
Interim Capability Operations Order (OPORD) which changed the nature of CONPLAN 8022
from a concept plan to a contingency plan. In response, selected bombers, ICBMs, SSBNs, and
information warfare units were tasked against specific high-value targets in adversary countries.
Finally, on November 18, 2005, Joint Functional Component Command Space and Global Strike
achieved Initial Operational capability after being thoroughly tested in the nuclear strike exercise
Global Lightning 06.
The Nuclear Option
Although Global Strike is primarily a non-nuclear mission based on advanced conventional
capabilities, space, and information warfare capabilities, this chronology illustrates that nuclear
weapons are surprisingly prominent in both the planning and command structure of Global
Strike.

What makes the nuclear option in CONPLAN 8022 particularly surprising is that Global Strike is
one of the pillars of the Bush administration’s vision of a “New Triad” where advanced
conventional weapons were supposed to permit a reduction of the number and role of nuclear
weapons. Instead, one of the first acts of the Pentagon appears to have been to include nuclear
weapons in the very plan that was supposed to reduce the nuclear role. Overall, the number of
nuclear weapons in the stockpile may be declining because there are simply too many of them.
But the nuclear option in CONPLAN 8022 suggests that the planners simultaneously have
created a new mission that reaffirms the importance and broadens the role of nuclear weapons
further by changing or lowering the perceived threshold or timing for when nuclear weapons
may be used in a conflict. That threshold must be different than in the past, otherwise why
include a nuclear option in CONPLAN 8022?
In contrast with the Bush administration’s claim to be reducing the role of nuclear weapons,
consider these remarks by JCS Chairman Gen. Richard Myers at the July 2004 retirement
ceremony of Adm. Ellis as STRATCOM commander in Omaha:
You reshaped “the roles and missions of that old command to better posture our
military forces to defeat existing and future threats against our nation [after
9/11]….You did this by expanding the options available to the President, both
from a strong nuclear deterrence standpoint and conventional and non-kinetic
response options.”4
The following year, General Myers repeated his description of the expansion of the options, this
time in his testimony before Congress:
“Within DOD, the SecDef has tasked the US Strategic Command to synchronize
our efforts to counter WMD and ensure the force structure and the resources are
in place to help all combatant commands defeat WMD.… STRATCOM has
revised our strategic deterrence and response plan that became effective in the fall
of 2004. This revised, detailed plan provides more flexible options to assure
allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of
contingencies.”5
The expansion of nuclear options to the President includes CONPLAN 8022. The new and
different nature of that plan is further underscored by the fact that STRATCOM for more than a
decade has maintained and modernized a robust nuclear posture directed against Russia and
China and, increasingly, also regional adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction.

 

STRATCOM told the Clinton administration’s Nuclear Posture Review in 1993: “Within the
context of a regional single or few warhead detonation, classical deterrence already allows for
adaptively planned missions to counter any use of WMD.”6 If STRATCOM has had the
capability to counter any use of weapons of mass destruction for more than a decade, then why
include a nuclear option in CONPLAN 8022?
The “New Triad” is frequently portrayed as an alternative to the Cold War strategy of nuclear
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Yet CONPLAN 8022 is premised on the preservation and
improvement of an assured destruction capability for nuclear weapons. The international nuclear
situation may be less “mutual” today compared with the Cold War, but “assured destruction”
very much continues to be is a key requirement for U.S. nuclear planning. In CONPLAN 8022
this assured destruction capability is intended not just in retaliation but in preemption.
Before it was exposed in public in 20057 and the Pentagon subsequently decided to cancel the
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12),8 the edits of the revision revealed some
of the thinking that underpins the offensive nature of CONPLAN 8022. The draft doctrine
described four conditions where preemptive use of nuclear weapons might occur:
• An adversary intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or
civilian populations;
• Imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear
weapons can safely destroy;
• Attacks on adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing
chemical or biological weapons or the command and control infrastructure required for
the adversary to execute a WMD attack against United States or its friends and allies;
• To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use
of WMD.
Preemption in and of itself is not a new phenomenon in U.S. nuclear strategy, which has relied
extensively on preemptive strike options against Russia and China for decades. In contrast, the
draft doctrine described preemptive scenarios that require a new mindset about the use of nuclear
weapons. It is no longer appropriate, STRATCOM argued, to use the terminology “war” when
describing the situations in which nuclear weapons might be used. Rather, “conflict” should be
used because it “emphasizes the nature of most conflicts resulting in use of a nuclear weapon.

Nuclear war implies the mutual exchange of nuclear weapons between warring parties – not fully
representative of the facts,”9 STRATCOM said.
The revision of the doctrine coincided with the Bush administration’s efforts to convince
Congress to authorize a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). European Command echoed
STRATCOM’s reading of the new situation by predicting that “the use of a bunker-buster ‘mininuke’
might not, in fact, be ‘provoked by some action, event, or perceived threat’ per se; rather,
it may be used simply because it is the only weapon that will destroy the target!”10
Deterrence seems almost absent from such considerations, which instead appear to see nuclear
weapons as simply another tool in the toolbox to destroy targets. Of cause the official
justification is very much deterrence, but in this case it seems to be a meaningless euphemism
that has automatically been attached to the mission.
Global Strike also appears to reverse the lowering of the strategic alert level that followed the
end of the Cold War. Long-range bombers are now “essentially on alert,” according to the Air
Force, to execute CONPLAN 8022, reversing the decision in 1991 to remove bombers from alert
status. To practice their skills, bombers wings now periodically practice launching their aircraft
in response to an emergency order from the President. In 2004, for example, 13 B-52 bombers
were launched simultaneously from Barksdale Air force Base in a minimum-interval take-off
with each bomber taking off within a minute or less of one another. Said the 8th Air Force
commander at the base: 8th Air Force is now “essentially on alert…to plan and execute Global
Strikes” on behalf of STRATCOM.
Global Strike incorporates not only strategic long-range weapons launched from the United
States, but also – potentially nuclear bombs deployed in Europe or weapons that could be moved
into a theater in case of a crisis. A preemptive strike could use a B61 nuclear bomb deployed in
Turkey or a strategic warhead launched from a Trident submarine off Japan. “Global” refers to
where the targets are, not the range of the weapons.
As it develops further in the years to come, Global Strike may even settle the decade-old battle
between STRATCOM and the regional combatant commanders over who owns regional nuclear
targeting. The objective of creating STRATCOM in 1992 was to create a single voice on nuclear
planning and policy, and the command has several times tried to broaden that authority to theater
nuclear planning. Up until now the regional combatant commanders have succeeded in
defending their turf with STRATCOM getting only authority to act in a supporting role. But after the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and warships and with the
increasing irrelevance of the remaining nuclear deployment in Europe, both the planning,
command, and execution of theater strikes could eventually become STRATCOM’s domain.
Ultimately, because it is different than OPLAN 8044, the credibility of the nuclear option in
CONPLAN 8022 will depend on the willingness of the National Command Authority to
authorize use of nuclear weapons differently than envisioned under OPLAN 8044. Otherwise,
why have a nuclear option in CONPLAN 8022?
Conventional Missions
In addition to the nuclear option, CONPLAN 8022 includes strike options with advanced
conventional weapons and information warfare capabilities. Some of these capabilities already
exist while others still need to be developed.
The Navy’s budget request for FY 2007 includes funding to replace the nuclear warheads on 24
Trident II D5 missiles with conventional warheads. Unlike the nuclear option in CONPLAN
8022, the conventional Trident seems more in tune with the vision for the “New Triad.” The
plan is to deploy 96 conventional warheads on 24 Trident II D5 missiles with an Initial
Operational Capability in December 2008 and Full Operational Capability in November 2010.
Converting 24 missiles to carry four conventional warheads each appears to cut 96 nuclear
warheads from the deployed force. Yet it is still unclear whether the conventional warheads will
replace the nuclear warheads or whether the nuclear warheads will simply be moved onto the
other 20 missiles on each SSBN. In other words, will the conventional Trident warheads be
targeted on the same targets or different targets? This is important for determining whether the
conventional Trident is a replacement for nuclear warheads or to complement them.
A senior defense official told Inside Defense earlier this month that potential targets may include
“an enemy nuclear weapons being prepared for launch or terrorist leaders in an underground
facility” located “below the equator” or “in the large land masses of Asia [or] the Middle East
[and] all the way up to the Baltics.”11 If the targets are different, then the conventional Trident
must be seen as an additional capability rather than a reduction of nuclear targeting.
The SSBNs completed a download of warheads in 2005 in an interim step toward
implementation of the Moscow Treaty warhead ceiling of 2,200 operationally deployed
warheads by 2012. At that time, if required under OPLAN 8044 or CONPLAN 8022, the 20
nuclear missiles on each SSBN will have more than enough room to accommodate the warheads
removed from the two missiles converted to a conventional mission.

The addition of conventional Trident adds to the mixed nuclear-conventional capability of the
bomber force. Yet whereas the dual-capability of the bomber force dates back to the Vietnam
War era, the conversion of ballistic missiles represent a significant new development. This
development has important implications for the nature and function of STRATCOM, which was
created to focus the nuclear mission in one command. Since 2003, however, STRATCOM has
been assigned six other missions that are predominantly or entirely non-nuclear. Global Strike
not only illustrates the increasing watering down of the nuclear-only function at STRATCOM,
but also the increasing mixing in general of nuclear and conventional planning, capabilities, and
operations. From a funding perspective this may make sense, but it also blurs the distinction
between the nuclear and non-nuclear mission and makes the nuclear option appear less unique.
Mixing nuclear and conventional capabilities in relatively slow bombers that can be recalled if
something goes wrong or if the situation changes is one thing. But how will STRATCOM solve
the considerable Command and Control issue created by mixing nuclear and conventional
warheads on highly offensive, forward deployed, first-strike-capable SSBNs where the missiles –
once launched – with flight-times of 12-24 minutes cannot be recalled?
STRATCOM insists that it has a strong and reliable Command and Control capability on the
SSBNs, and that submarines on Global Strike patrol will stand down the nuclear missiles when
the conventional missiles are on alert. But that explanation sounds like the Navy simply has too
many nuclear warheads deployed at sea. And since CONPLAN 8022 contains both nuclear and
conventional options, the same SSBN might be required to have both options ready, especially if
the Target Package includes both soft and deeply buried hardened targets.
Command and Control on the submarines is the kind of factor the U.S. – at least in theory – can
control. How other countries will interpret and react to a Trident launch in a crisis is quite
another matter. The scenario may not necessarily be the straightforward case of North Korea
planning to do something bad. Supposed the U.S. and China got bogged down in a tense crisis
or limited war over Taiwan and U.S. intelligence in the middle of it detects what appear to be
North Korean preparations to launch a long-range missile. The White House orders
STRATCOM to take out the missile preemptively with a conventional Trident, but the launch is
detected by China which misinterprets it – because Trident is what concerns them the most – as
the beginning of an attack on their nuclear forces and launches some or all of its nuclear missiles
against the United States. This and other scenarios must be thought through carefully before
mixing nuclear and conventional capabilities on offensive and forward-deployed platforms.
In the best of worlds, making consultation arrangements with Russia and China is good. But
accidents and unforeseen events have a nasty habit of happening when they’re least expected or
least wanted. And if relations deteriorate, as they often do in a crisis, consultation arrangements
may not be of much value. Besides, although the conventional Trident is promoted as a prompt
weapon against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, STRATCOM may chose to
incorporate the weapon into its main strike plans against Russia and China as well.

Conclusion
When the Cold War began and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was designed in
1960 and started shaping U.S. nuclear policy and international relations, very little information
was available in public to assist policy makers and the media in analyzing the benefits and
dangers of the plan. Only much later, after the SIOP had been in operation for years, did
information about some of its components and the assumptions it was based on gradually reach
the public. It soon became clear that “prudent military planning” with little or no oversight had
gotten out of hand and on several occasions almost started the nuclear war it was supposed to
prevent.
The Global Strike mission is still in its early stages, but it too promises to fundamentally shape
U.S. nuclear policy and international relations. Fortunately, as this chronology shows, a
considerable amount of information is already available that enables the public to ask questions
about Global Strike in a way they were never able to do with the SIOP. Yet because the plan
includes a nuclear option, some of the same secrecy that kept the SIOP in the dark for so many
years also threatens to impede a debate about the justifications used for incorporating nuclear
weapons into Global Strike. While the Pentagon has decided not to classify its plan to deploy 96
conventional warheads on 24 Trident missiles, consider these recent answers from STRATCOM
to questions about Global Strike:
Question: Is OPLAN 8044 included in the Global Strike mission?
Answer: As a matter of policy, we do not discuss the nature of any plans.
Question: Is CONPLAN 8022 included in the Global Strike mission?
Answer: As a matter of policy, we do not discuss the nature of any plans.
Question: What are the names and in-effect dates of the various OPLAN 8044 since 2002?
Answer: As a matter of policy, we do not discuss the nature of any plans.
Question: What are the names and in-effect dates of the various CONPLAN 8022 plans
issued since 2002?
Answer: As a matter of policy, we do not discuss the nature of any plans.
Because the question of the scope of and assumptions about nuclear weapons use in the Global
Strike mission has profound implications for U.S. military strategy and international affairs, it is
vital that the Congress, the media, and the public in general get better answers. It is the hope and
intention that this chronology will assist them in probing deep into the Global Strike mission.

 

So as the story goes, eight year old Shea was learning to write letters in her third grade class; Shea also happened to be really into her iPod nano. So she decided to hit up Stevie J. with a list of her ideas on how to improve the nano -- you know, standard stuff like "slip a little chip" in there to add support for lyrics, movies, etc. (what, don't you want to officially play Doom, too, or at least Pac-Man?).

After three months Shea received a reply from Cupertino... signed by Apple's Senior Counsel, Mark Aaker, who put the little girl in her place by stating "please do not send" suggestions, and letting her know Apple doesn't accept unsolicited ideas. Said Shea, who went running to her room, "It was kind of like they were saying, 'Oh, we don't want your idea -- it's not good or anything.'" (Hey, don't feel bad, whenever we write about improving Apple's products we tend to get harshed on too.)

While the story didn't exactly end happily, at least Aaker called the little girl to personally apologize, but not before holding a meeting to change policies regarding responses to letters from children. And just for that, all of our staff's children will be swarming Apple with letters on such varied topics from Apple's potentially increased market share with Boot Camp, to the mysterious video iPod -- replete with backwards Es and Ss.

 

Quite simply put, the Vantage is rubbish — you don’t want to own one. There’s no need to read further. Stop now and spend your £80,000 elsewhere.

If you have read on, sorry about the above. I was obviously talking tripe but I figure that’s as far as the average Premiership footballer will have read — limited attention span and all that — and the last thing we need is footballers spending a week’s wages on a Vantage.

In the real world the Vantage has a lot to recommend it. If you’re having one of those ultimate-car conversations over a pint, the Vantage is not going to get a look-in. It’s fast but it can’t break the sound barrier and it can’t do 0-60 before you’ve closed the door, like some supercars.

And as you know, in those pub conversations there is no place for compromise. But if you want a car you are going to drive every day and enjoy, rather than an impractical “top trump” card made flesh, then the Vantage is a brilliant motor.

This isn’t the lumbering heavy Aston of old. It’s a lithe machine with just two seats. The drive is exactly what you’d expect from a car designed to compete with the Porsche 911. It points beautifully into corners, feels sure-footed — it’s a joy.

I didn’t take the Vantage onto a track and put it through its paces, first because I’d have killed myself, and second because you won’t either. This car drives brilliantly on the road — which is where it belongs.

It is available only with a proper gearbox (I think that’s because if they put cool, flappy paddles on the car they’d have problems selling the DB9, the Vantage’s big brother). Initially I thought this was a limitation but in fact Aston Martin is giving you what you didn’t know you wanted. It’s a lovely, meaty gearchange and it forces you to interact with the car — to really drive it.

The Vantage actually has that rarest of things for a supercool car, a good boot. If you want to take your James Bond fantasies to their logical conclusion you could probably fit a rocket launcher in there.

This car is basically the ultimate hot hatch. And the hatchback has another less practical use; it enables anyone driving the car to sound incredibly nonchalant when asked: “What are you driving?” “A new hatchback,” you reply.

I loved every minute in the Vantage, but I wanted to see how it compared to the Daddy: the Vanquish S. The Vanquish S costs an eye-watering £97,000 more than the Vantage, which means you could buy a matching set of his ’n’ hers Vantages and still have £17,000 change.

But in the interests of objective and thorough journalism I wanted to see what you get for all that extra hard-earned cash.

The first thing you notice in the Vanquish S is the sound system. I’m not talking about the stereo, I’m talking about the sound of the car. It is properly amazing.

I took it on a road trip to see Little Britain in Birmingham with a friend. Half way through a conversation, mid-sentence, I’d go to overtake.


I’d kick the engine into third and floor it, and suddenly all the talking stopped. We’d listen to the engine until we were safely back in fifth gear, cruising, and then take up the conversation where we left off. It is jaw-droppingly amazing. I’m not saying the Vantage is quiet but it doesn’t sound like a Harrier jump jet landing in the driveway — the Vanquish does.

Apart from the huge power reserves the other obvious advantage the Vanquish has over the Vantage is it has back seats. I say it has back seats; in fact on closer inspection it has things that look like normal everyday back seats but viewed from a long way off.

Unless you’re planning to drive round with some midgets or Douglas Bader in the back, there’s no real point to them. The Vanquish is for all intents and purposes like every other Aston — a two-seater.

It is safe to assume that Bader would have despised the Vantage. Not because it didn’t have back seats but because for a car that claims to be as British as James Bond it carries with it the unmistakable whiff of Johnny Foreigner.

With an engine made in Cologne and a gearbox built in Italy all that’s missing is a Japanese sat nav and you’d have a car built by the Axis powers.

But at least these foreign-made parts work. Which is more than can be said for the Vanquish. The Vanquish is the last of the current crop of Astons to have been built at the firm’s original factory in Newport Pagnell, Buckinghamshire, before production moved to the new bells and whistles plant at Gaydon in Warwickshire.

And it shows. Granted there is something romantic about the old way of doing things: men with body odour beating panels, smoking Woodbines and hand-stitching leather. But do you really care about that when the piece of art they have created won’t start at 7am on a Tuesday morning and you have to get back to the wife and kids before they notice you didn’t come home last night? No. You don’t.

And wait a moment. Is the Vanquish really as thoroughly British as Harris tweed and game pie? On closer inspection the air vents appear to have been plucked from the parts bin at Volvo — another arm of Ford. How dreadfully common! The other consideration is the look of these two cars. Both Astons are attractive but there is no doubt in my mind the Vantage is better. Aston has promised a convertible version of the car before the end of the year and that looks set to be the sexiest soft top on the market.

Even in its present coupé form the Vantage is a perfectly proportioned supermodel — it’s Eva Herzigova. Standing next to it the Vanquish is like a big, busty, men’s mag model. Everything has been turned up to 11. It’s just too big for the road. Sure, it’s huge curves will turn heads, but just like with the most outstanding page 3 stunners, you can have too much of a good thing. If the Vanquish were a woman you’d think she was attractive but you’d worry about her making a move for fear she was actually a very convincing transvestite.

The Vantage is a dream car but not such an unobtainable one. How many times have you read or heard reviews of cars stating, “This is a great car, but I couldn’t live with it”?

Well, you certainly could live with the Vantage.

By comparison the Vanquish would be very high maintenance. Let’s say you cover 5,000 miles in the first year. The depreciation is £60,000, servicing £2,000, insurance at least £3,000, so the total cost of the first year’s ownership is £65,000. That’s even more than the cost of owning a Lamborghini Gallardo (around £44,500 in the first year) or a Bentley Continental GT (around £29,500 in the first year).

I realise David Beckham has more money than sense (let’s face facts, he passed that point with his first paper round) so these sort of sums are not going to influence him. But for anyone even on nodding terms with reality these are simply ridiculous amounts.

You may think that because I appear on television I am in this league. Well let me tell you I’m not. However, I can still afford to drive a Vanquish. That’s because I’m a member of a supercar club (P1, since you ask). Joining one is like getting your own harem of beautiful cars. The idea is catching on; Google “prestige car clubs” and you’ll find quite a few.

So now I own a VW Golf but I drive — well, whatever I choose. It’s a bit like drinking champagne and paying beer money.

VITAL STATISTICS

Model Aston Martin V8 Vantage
Engine 4300cc, eight cylinders
Power 380bhp @ 7300rpm
Torque 302 lb ft @ 5000rpm
Transmission Six-speed manual
Fuel/CO2 16.2mpg (combined cycle) / 406g/km
Performance 0-62mph: 5sec / Top speed: 175mph
Price £79,995
Rating 5/5
Verdict The best Aston in a generation

Model Aston Martin Vanquish S
Engine 5935cc, 12 cylinders
Power 520bhp @ 7000rpm
Torque 425 lb ft @ 5800rpm
Transmission Six-speed manual with auto shift
Fuel/CO2 14.9mpg (combined cycle) / 448g/km
Performance 0-62mph: 4.8sec / Top speed: 200mph
Price £177,100
Rating 3/5
Verdict Glorious but flawed

 

Before she got a Mercedes SLR McLaren, Hollywood personality Paris Hilton’s signature ride was a silver Bentley Continental. Although her boyfriend crashed her Bentley into a truck, she continued to have the car… until this week. According to a report by InTheNews UK, the hotel heiress bet the $160,000 car on an ill-fated hand in a poker game at her family’s casino in Vegas. Recently, Hilton was quoted as saying, “I’m obsessed with poker. It’s my favourite game. I’m really lucky in Vegas, I always win.” If you’re worried about poor Paris losing her SLR at the casino, never fear — her family has banned her from playing again.

 

http://www.audi.fr/actualite/teaserrs4/filmdef/film.htm

I like the engine, unfortunately much too old for an RS4, its too "improper"

 

We've heard reports before about the dangers of driving while under the influence of GPS, but it looks like drivers in the UK have taken trust of their navigation units to the extreme. Twice in the space of the last two weeks, we've seen reports of British drivers taking serious risks because they trust the info displayed on the small screen more than what they see through their windshield. In the most recent case, drivers passing through the village of Luckington have found themselves landing in the River Avon, by following a GPS-recommended route that pointed to a bridge that has been closed for a week. Despite warning signs on both sides of the road, and nothing but water straight ahead, local villagers have found themselves pulling an average of two cars a day out of the river for the past week. "When you ask what happened, they say, ‘My sat-nav told me it was this way,'" one resident told The Times. Meanwhile, the village of Crackpot (yes, that's really its name) has had to deal with drivers whose navigation systems have directed them to the edge of a cliff with a hundred-foot drop. So far, there have been no serious injuries, but drivers have found themselves stranded on a rocky path. "It's only a matter of time before something happens," said one resident. Listen, we like GPS as much as the next sense-of-direction-impaired driver. But we also do our best to use our eyes, as well. And if you don't, well, there's a village in England named for you, and it ain't Luckington.

 

We're always keen on technology that improves our beer consumption experience, whether it be coasters and pitchers that signal for help when you need a refill, or mugs that let you share a drink with distant friends. Obviously, then, we were understandably excited to learn that Miller will be the first domestic brewer to utilize Tempra's self-cooling cans for dropping your drink's temperature a minimum of 30º F on command. Self-cooling, and self-heating, technology have been around for awhile, but save for the homemade Peltier Beer personal beverage cooler, this is the first method we've seen to cool down your suds long after the ice in your cooler has melted. Tempra's I.C. Can works by drawing heat out of the beverage with a natural desiccant (drying agent), through a water gel coated evaporator, and into an insulated heat-sink container, once an internal vacuum-seal has been broken. Miller's self-cooled offerings should begin showing up in finer distributors nationwide starting sometime next year, and as you can probably imagine, a sixer of these high-tech brews isn't going to come cheap.

 

When initially drafting up Maserati's premier supercar, Ferrari made sure the MC12 fell below the coveted Enzo in terms of power and performance, however, one unique example has now smashed this barrier.

Edo Karabegovic is responsible for tuning some of the fastest cars ever made. Financed from the deep pockets of an enthusiastic owner, he now has his name splashed across a heavily modified a MC12; a car which many purists consider too sacred to personalize.

Edo is no newcomer to high-end tuning, his 911 conversion blew the socks off the Carrera GT's lap record around the famed Nurburgring. When considering the MC12 he said: 'only the doors and the windows were right; everything else was absolute ****'. Edo was referring to the restricted power and limited aerodynamic abilities of the original car below 150 mph. These faults were a result of racing regulations that forced the homologated MC12 be outfitted like its race equivalent. Edo's mission was to fix these problems and create an MC12 in his own way.

According to Edo, probably the best modification is the replacement of the standard Pirellis with Bridgestones. And matched with a new fully adjustable suspension, the MC12 is likely headed to the Nurburgring to fetch a lap time that would make every Ferrari owner think twice.

Aside from the shoutout paint scheme, one of the first noticeable Edo touches is the faired-in headlights which Edo gently melted Macrolon covers for. As a next step, he is trying to get a competition-spec wing, but Maserati Racing still promptly refuse.

Under the skin, this Maserati's claim to fame is a 700 bhp engine that screams louder than a Ferrari. Probably the largest improvement comes from a freelow and lightweight exhaust system. Included are keyfob-controlled valves which bypass any baffles and let the MC12 sing its deafening song. With the vales closed, the mufflers offer a quiet mode that still hollers louder than the neighborhood Mustang.

Along with its exhaust, the engine produces 70 more horsepower thanks to new management electronics and an induction system with a ram-air effect and better filtering. The gearbox was modified slightly to cope with these new forces, but the ratios remain intact.

Keeping the new Edo in check and in the 21st century are new ceramic discs measuring 15 inches up front. While the supplier remains anonymous, the discs fit inside the stock calipers and reduce unsprung weight on every wheel.

Even though the MC12 R would appear a complete package, Edo has plenty of revisions to go and plan to source a competition-spec wing as well as put the MC12 on a much-needed diet. Most likely when we consider this car again it will look a lot different.

 

http://images.apple.com/movies/universal/thefastandthefurious3/fastandthefurious-tokyo_h640w.mov

 

From July, Aston Martin will offer the option of a factory fitted ‘Sports Pack’ specification for the DB9 Coupe, combining revised suspension characteristics with a new alloy wheel design to give subtly different driving dynamics. The new five-spoke forged aluminium alloy wheels are lighter than the standard wheels, the springs and front anti-roll bar are modified and the ride height lowered. The package offers improvements to both high-speed body control and steering response

The DB9 Sports Pack’s spring rates are increased by 68 per cent at the front of the car and 64 per cent at the rear. The front anti-roll bar is modified, and the dampers are revised to support the new spring and anti-roll bar characteristics. Together, the changes optimise body control and front-end grip without compromising ride quality or adding weight. The ride height is reduced by 6mm, lowering the car’s centre of gravity and further reducing body roll while leaving ample ground clearance and backed up by modified bump stops.

The composite undertray is also replaced, by a load-bearing aluminium panel that performs the same function in managing underbody airflow while adding further structural stiffness, to resist larger lateral loads fed into the front of the car by the uprated front springs and anti-roll bar.

 

Jim Richards has taken the lead on Day Two of the 15th Anniversary Targa Tasmania rally, while the two Lamborghini Gallardos made famous at last year’s event by Paul Stokell and pro-golfer Stuart Appleby were today struck with a bout of bad luck, an engine fire forcing one to withdraw from the event at the hand of its new owner.

After contesting nine competition stages over 73.89km of Tasmania’s challenging North Eastern coastal roads, 58-year-old Richards and navigator Barry Oliver clocked consistently fast stage times in their 2003 Porsche 911 GT2 CS, which saw them gradually pull away from co-leader, South Australian Steve Glenney in his 2002 Subaru WRX, and secure a 15-second lead in the drivetravel.com Modern Competition. “Our car’s gone great, but the other guys are going well too,” said the ultimate ‘Gentleman’, Jim Richards. “We’re going as hard as we can but tomorrow will probably suit the smaller cars, but I think we’ll do alright, hopefully.”

Disappointment was had by the new owner of the ex-Appleby Targa 2005 Lamborghini when its engine caught fire on a transport stage, 4km shy of today’s Bicheno lunch break. South Australian Kevin Weeks and his navigator Rebecca Crunkhorn escaped injury as a convoying service crew extinguished the flaming Lamborghini. “The engine fire burnt everything under the bonnet, right down to the wiring. It’s incredibly disappointing, but that’s motor racing and we play the game,” said Weeks. “We are very fortunate that we still have a car and that it happened almost in Bicheno so we had water nearby. If not, the car would have burnt down to the ground.”

Tasmanian Jason White’s title defence is now in jeopardy due to clutch problems on his Gallardo that was purchased by his navigator and Uncle John White. The 2005 Targa champ was forced to contest the 7.70km long, third last stage in fifth gear. “Our clutch is completely knackered,” said White. “We’ve had a fear that this might happen from the first day, but we’ve just persevered with it and it has cost us a bit of time today. We can put another one in exactly the same but we’ve always known that was the car’s weak link, so there’s no guarantee the new one is going to be any better.” White finished today’s second day of competition in eighth position, a significant 1-minute 34-seconds behind Richards. Overnight work on the Italian beast will decide the Tasmanian team’s fate.

29-year-old Steve Glenney was happy to continue to shadow Richards’ and is confident that he can better his position tomorrow. “We’re looking forward to tomorrow because there are no hills and those big hills today killed us, we’ll just keep plugging away and hopefully not let them get too far in front, and maybe get a bit of rain.” Queensland driver Ray Vandersee today jumped to third in his Queensland-built 2004 Skelta G-Force, finishing 41-seconds behind Glenney and his navigator Bernie Webb. “I am very pleased to be in third place,” said Vandersee. “Today’s stages suited us more and we had a ball. I am pretty confident that I can stay on the pace tomorrow as day three is traditionally a bit bumpier and the Skelta has great suspension.”

Adding to today’s dramas was factory Mitsubishi driver Warwick Rooklyn. Due to a team tactical error, Rooklyn and his navigator Linda Long missed entry into the day’s third stage, the 6.33km Winnaleah stage. An unrecorded time placing him at the bottom of today’s results pole which has unofficially dropped him from contention. “We were at the back of the crew and under the pump, with fuel and couple of little service things the sweep car passed us and we just missed them going into the stage,” said Rooklyn. The New South Wales driver is currently applying to Event Organisers to have a derived time applied to his result. Despite the set-back, Rooklyn and his navigator Linda Long remained competitive proving him worthy of a podium finish obtaining top-five times on the stages following the lunch break.

Finishing only 7-seconds behind Vandersee and his navigator Jahmeil Taylor, in fourth position, is another Subaru favourite West Australian Dean Herridge who also packed some pace right throughout today, proving that the 15th Anniversary Targa Tasmania is anyone’s game. Finishing fifth behind Herridge is the event’s crowd-pleaser Peter Brock, who with the help of his navigator Mick Hone, finished the day’s stages 16-seconds further afield. “The day has worked out pretty well,” said Brock. “We have to watch a few little things like tyre wear, but we’re doing pretty well.”

Network Ten motor sport commentator Daryl Beattie is putting his on-road abilities mastered during his days as a 500cc motorcycle World Championship frontrunner to use, by moving up the field seven places and finishing 15th, 3-minutes 18-seconds behind today’s leader. “We did struggle a bit keeping the car with a good momentum going through the fast stages, but on the whole the day was pretty good,” appraised Beattie.

Tomorrow will bring Leg Three of the annual Targa Tasmania tarmac rally, the Bruny D’Entrecasteaux Southern Loop. Cars will start from the Official Hobart City Start in Salamanca Place and travel south of Hobart through the picturesque Huon Valley, covering 59.40km consisting of eight competitive stages – finishing back in the state’s capital. Leg Three begins with the 3.24km Bonnet Hill stage, situated just outside of Hobart, with the cars gradually making their way into the Huon Valley municipality via the tight and twisting Oyster Cove (12.02km), Woodbridge Reverse (6.60km) and Flowerpot Reverse (4.40km) stages. Cars will stop for a break at the Cygnet Sports Oval and then contest a final three stages (totalling 25.73km) on their way back into Hobart.

 

Like all 360 N-GTs, s/n 016M was originally built in 2000 as a 360 Challenge car s/n 118781 and was raced successfully in 2000 and 2001. In 2002 the owner had Michelotto convert his 360 Challenge car into a 360 N-GT racer s/n 016M at a cost of over 185,000 Euros. The very extensive and expensive Michelotto optional extras include a racing exhaust system that complies with US track noise standards, superlight carbon/Kevlar doors, a heated windshield for rain, state-of-the-art shocks, data acquisition and all the latest engine, gearbox and under panel aerodynamic updates, and more.

360 N-GT s/n 016M is the last of the enormously successful 360 N-GT Michelotto cars built, and was never professionally raced making it essentially an almost new car. 360 N-GT s/n 016M offers tremendous on track performance as a super-fast yet user friendly club racer that allows the owner to take a friend along for the ride or sit back and be thrilled by a professional driver.

Because 360 N-GTs were built to race, 016M comes with a comprehensive spares package that includes: 1 new alternator, 2 sway bars front and rear 26mm and 37 mm, 7 sets of springs, 1 set of used rotors with used hats, 1 new front splitter, 1 wheel socket, 1 new left and right wheel nut, 1 set of new rear half shafts, 1 set of new axle nuts, 2 new wheel speed sensors with cables, 1 new fuel pump, 4 sets of wheels and tires (1 wet, 3 slicks), 1 SD2 diagnostic computer and 1 air jack tool.

Priced to sell at $339,000 including the spares package.

 

Israel crosses the threshold

By Avner Cohen and William Burr
May/June 2006 pp. 22-30 (vol. 62, no. 3) © 2006 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists



n September 9, 1969, a big brown envelope was delivered to the Oval Office on behalf of CIA Director Richard Helms; on it he had written "For and to be opened only by: The President, The White House." [1] The precise contents of the envelope are still unknown, but evidence suggests it was the latest intelligence on one of Washington's most secretive foreign policy matters: Israel's nuclear program. The material was so sensitive that the nation's spymaster was unwilling to share it with anybody but President Richard Nixon himself. [2]

The now-empty envelope is kept inside a two-folder set labeled "NSSM 40," held by the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. (NSSM is the acronym for National Security Study Memorandum, a series of policy studies produced by the national security bureaucracy for the Nixon White House). The NSSM 40 files are almost bare; save for a handful of administrative notes, they contain mostly "withdrawal sheets" for the many documents that remain classified.

But with the aid of recently declassified documents, as well as interviews with some of the key figures during that era, we now know that NSSM 40 was the Nixon administration's effort to grapple with the policy implications of a nuclear-armed Israel. These documents offer unprecedented insight into the tense deliberations within the White House in 1969--a crucial juncture in history when international ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was uncertain, and when U.S. policy makers feared that a Mideast conflagration could lead to superpower conflict. The ramifications of the Nixon administration's decisions are still felt today.



Israel's nuclear program began more than 10 years before the big brown envelope landed on Nixon's desk. In 1958, Israel secretly initiated construction work at what was to become the Dimona nuclear research site. It wasn't until December 1960 that the United States identified what the facility was for. Months afterward, the CIA estimated that Israel could produce nuclear weapons within the decade.

The discovery presented a difficult challenge for U.S. policy makers: Only 15 years after the Holocaust, in an era when nuclear nonproliferation norms did not yet exist, Israel's founders believed they had a compelling case for acquiring nuclear weapons. From the U.S. perspective, Israel was a small, friendly state, albeit one outside the boundaries of formal U.S. alliance or security guarantees, surrounded by much larger enemies vowing to destroy it. Most significantly, Israel enjoyed unique domestic support in America. If the United States was unwilling to officially guarantee Israel's borders, how could it deny Israel the ultimate defense?

Yet, government officials also saw the Israeli nuclear program as a potential threat to U.S. interests. President John F. Kennedy feared that without decisive international action to curb nuclear proliferation, a world of 20-30 nuclear weapon states would be inevitable within a decade or two. Israel was at the divide between the uncontrolled nuclear proliferation of the past and the emerging nonproliferation prohibition. If the United States could not influence small Israel to not go nuclear, how could it persuade the Germans and other nations to not acquire the bomb?

The Kennedy and Johnson administrations fashioned a complex scheme of annual inspections at Dimona to assure that Israel would not develop nuclear weapons. But the Israelis were adept at concealing their activities. By late 1966, Israel had reached the nuclear threshold, although it decided not to conduct an atomic test.

By the time Prime Minister Levi Eshkol visited President Lyndon B. Johnson in January 1968, the official State Department view was that despite Israel's growing nuclear weapons potential, it had "not embarked on a program to produce a nuclear weapon." [3] That assessment, however, eroded in the months ahead.

In November 1968, Paul Warnke, the assistant secretary of defense for international security, was engaged in intense negotiations with Israeli ambassador (and future prime minister) Yitzhak Rabin. At issue was a forthcoming sale of F-4 Phantom aircraft to Israel. The NPT had already been completed and submitted to states for their signature. U.S. officials believed that the F-4 deal provided leverage that would be America's last best chance to get Israel to sign the NPT.

Yet it was clear that the two negotiators came to the table with completely different mindsets. Israel had previously pledged not to be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. But how does one define "introduce"? For Warnke, the physical presence of nuclear weapons entailed the act of introduction. Rabin, however, argued that for nuclear weapons to be introduced, they needed to be tested and publicly declared. By these criteria, he argued, Israel had remained faithful to its pledge. [4] When Warnke heard Rabin's interpretation, as he told one of the authors years later, he realized that Israel had already acquired the bomb. [5]



The question of what to do about the Israeli bomb would fall to Nixon when he came to office three months later. From the outset, however, it was clear that his administration had different views than his Democratic predecessors. The Nixon team was initially quite skeptical about the effectiveness and desirability of the NPT. Morton Halperin, who served on the National Security Council (NSC) staff during the early Nixon administration, recalls the sense of anxiety among arms control professionals over whether the new president would support ratification of the treaty. When he and his NSC associate Spurgeon Keeny went to lobby National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger on the matter, they were bluntly told that any country with major security problems would try to get the bomb and the United States should not interfere. [6] Meanwhile, Israeli officials were heartened. Rabin noted in his memoirs that he recognized that a Republican administration would be more sympathetic to Israel's security needs--including, presumably, the nuclear field--than the Johnson administration. [7]

While Nixon and Kissinger may have been initially inclined to accommodate Israel's nuclear ambitions, they would have to find ways to manage senior State Department and Pentagon officials whose perspectives differed. Documents prepared between February and April 1969 reveal a great sense of urgency about Israel's nuclear progress. Henry Owen, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, wrote in February to Secretary of State William Rogers, "Intelligence indicates that Israel is rapidly developing a capability to produce and deploy nuclear weapons, and to deliver them by surface-to-surface missile or a plane. Recognizing the adverse repercussions of the disclosure, the Israelis are likely to work on their nuclear program clandestinely till they are ready to decide whether to deploy the weapons." [8] That same month, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird advised Rogers, Kissinger, and CIA Director Helms that he also believed that Israel had made significant progress on its nuclear and missile programs and "may have both this year." [9] The next month, he wrote that he had received additional evidence that enhanced his earlier assessment. [10]

In early April, Joseph Sisco, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, echoed Laird's intelligence assessment, but he was even more specific: He saw little "doubt that the green light has been given to Israeli technicians to develop the capability to build a bomb at short notice." It was possible, Sisco opined, that Israel would follow a "last wire" concept, "whereby all the components for a weapon are at hand, awaiting only final assembly and testing." [11]

The intelligence that led senior officials to these dire conclusions remains classified. However, today we know of many telltale signs that revealed Israel was on the brink. Among the known evidence was the purchase of huge quantities of uranium (such as the 1968 Plumbat affair involving a shipment of large quantities of yellowcake diverted from Belgium to Israel). Also telling was information about nuclear-related aerial exercises and the advanced development (and preparation for deployment) of the Jericho missile, an Israeli version of the French-made MD-620 ballistic missile. Still, it is clear that the intelligence was partial and inconclusive. U.S. officials were uncertain as to whether Israel was only days or even hours away from possessing fully assembled and deliverable nuclear weapons.

Yet, the policy implications alarmed senior officials. As Laird wrote in late March, these "developments were not in the United States' interests and should, if at all possible, be stopped." [12] Sisco was not sure when or how Israel would "choose to display a nuclear weapon," but he agreed that a nuclear-armed Israel would have "far-reaching and even dangerous implications" for the United States, such as increased Arab-Israeli tensions (with a greater danger of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation), growing Arab disillusionment with the peace process, and encouragement of further nuclear proliferation in the Arab world and elsewhere. [13]

Although Sisco shared Laird's sense of urgency, they parted ways on what to do about it. Laird believed the United States should take measures, both carrots and sticks, to stop Israel from further nuclearization. Sisco was more dubious--some would say realistic--about what the Nixon administration could or should do about it. If the United States told Israel in unequivocal terms that its nuclear ambitions "would cause a fundamental change in the U.S.-Israel relationship," Sisco concluded that such an exchange would require open pressure and spark extraordinary domestic political controversy. And "halfway measures" such as using weapons deliveries "as leverage" would be "futile and probably counterproductive." [14] As it turned out, differences between Defense and State would lessen as the White House initiated the NSSM 40 exercise.



It's unclear exactly what prompted Kissinger to initiate NSSM 40, but we do know that he issued it on or about April 10, 1969. Quite likely, the memos from Laird and Sisco triggered a greater sense of urgency at the White House. Moreover, it is evident that Kissinger asked the national security bureaucracy for a review of policy options toward Israel's nuclear program. NSC staffers Halperin and Harold Saunders played a key role in drafting NSSM 40 for Kissinger to sign. [15]

NSSM 40, and the documents and deliberations that it generated, were all classified Top Secret/Nodis ("no distribution" without the permission of authorized officials) and distributed to a tiny group of senior officials at NSC, State, Defense, and the CIA. Significantly, neither the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), with its responsibility for nuclear proliferation issues, nor the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which conducted the visits at Dimona, were involved in NSSM 40, probably because Nixon did not trust their respective chiefs Gerard C. Smith and Glenn Seaborg (a holdover from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations). [16]

Sometime after issuing NSSM 40, a Kissinger-chaired Senior Review Group (SRG) took the issue in hand. Participation was restricted to a few senior officials, including Elliot Richardson (undersecretary of state), David Packard (deputy secretary of defense), Gen. Earle Wheeler (chairman of the Joint Chiefs), and Helms. Halperin recalls that he was to attend an SRG meeting on NSSM 40 until Kissinger prevented that, telling him that he could not have "two Jewish people" from the NSC on such a sensitive committee. [17]

The one available report of an SRG meeting on NSSM 40 suggests that the bureaucracy was willing to exert some pressure to halt the Israeli nuclear program, although Kissinger voiced his reservations. During the meeting on June 26, 1969, Packard suggested that if Israel "signs the NPT and gives appropriate assurances on not deploying nuclear weapons, we could live with a secret research and development program."

The apparent inconsistency of having both very advanced, secret R and D along with NPT commitments did not produce any demurs; others in the review group accepted the approach, seeking assurances that Israel would agree "not to carry forward any further development in the [nuclear] weapons field." That is, Washington should seek an assurance that Israel would not "develop a nuclear explosive device." [18]

How much pressure the United States should exert remained open. Kissinger wanted to "avoid direct confrontation," while Richardson was willing to exert pressure if a probe to determine Israeli intentions showed that assurances would not be forthcoming. In such circumstances, the United States could tell the Israelis that deliveries of the F-4s would "have to be reconsidered." As to the missile issue, there was less than full agreement. Some suggested pressing Israel to dismantle its missiles, others proposed an agreement not to deploy missiles but to store them away. (The CIA representative, Gen. Robert Cushman, noted that Israel already had "11 missiles and would have between 25 to 30 by the end of 1970, 10, reportedly, with nuclear warheads.")

The meeting ended with a general agreement to prepare an "issues" paper for Nixon that would spell out the U.S. options. Several days later, a six-page memo (whose authorship is unclear) titled "The Issues for Decision" was prepared for the president. The memo does not bear Nixon's initials on the decision lines, but other evidence, especially the record of a July 29 meeting with Rabin, indicates that he approved the course of action it proposed. [19]

The recommendations began with the premise that Nixon should authorize a major effort to keep nuclear weapons from being introduced into the Middle East: Dismissing "unrealistic" options such as pushing Israel to give up its weapons program, it "will be our stated purpose . . . to stop Israel from assembling completed explosive devices." Moreover, the United States would ask Israel to sign and ratify the NPT by the end of the year and to privately reaffirm its non-introduction pledge, interpreting "introduction" to mean physical possession of nuclear weapons.

A key issue was how to reach those objectives. There was broad consensus within the SRG, including Kissinger, on this point: The two deputies, Richardson and Packard, should summon Rabin and--in reference to an Israeli request to advance the delivery of the F-4s to August 1969--make the point that, while reviewing the details of the F-4 sale, the United States wanted "to tie up loose ends." This was a diplomatic way for the United States to say it first wanted to nail down the precise meaning of Israel's non-introduction pledge. There was much less agreement as to how much, and how explicitly, the United States should use the F-4 sale as leverage: "The issue is whether we are prepared to imply--and to carry out if necessary--the threat not to deliver the Phantoms if Israel does not comply with our request" [underlined in the original].

By mid-July Nixon had decided that he was "leery" of using the Phantoms as leverage, which meant that when Richardson and Packard met with Rabin on July 29, 1969, the idea of a probe that would involve some form of pressure had been torpedoed. [20] While Richardson and Packard emphasized the "seriousness" with which they viewed the nuclear problem, they had no big stick to support their rhetoric, except to the extent of implying a loose linkage by rebuffing Rabin's request for an August (one-month advance) delivery of the F-4s.

Richardson read a long talking paper expressing "deep concern" over the Israeli program--which would be a "tragedy for the Middle East and a direct threat to United States national security"--and Israel's troubling delay in signing the NPT. He then posed three issues for Rabin to respond to: the status of Israel's NPT deliberations; assurances that "non-introduction" actually meant "non-possession" of nuclear weapons; and assurances that Israel would not produce or deploy the Jericho missile for three years.

Rabin avoided any factual statements on any aspect of the nuclear program. On the NPT, he stated that the issue is still "under study" and that he was unauthorized to comment further. He refused to make any assurances or even express agreement with anything Richardson said regarding the definition of non-introduction. Alluding to the U.S. inspection visits to Dimona, however, Rabin pointed out that the United States had a unique arrangement that did not exist with other U.S. allies, which allowed Washington "a close look at what Israel is doing in the nuclear field." In this context, he claimed, "Everything seemed to be working as agreed." But Richardson did make the general point that the "Dimona visits do not obviate our concern about nuclear weapons, missiles, and the NPT."

The meeting ended with Richardson reiterating the seriousness with which the United States viewed the Israeli nuclear program. Rabin promised to convey the message to his government, but no deadline was given for a reply. Richardson notified Rogers (who was in Asia), Kissinger, and Sisco that the first step of the NSSM 40 exercise was complete. U.S. Amb. Walworth Barbour in Tel Aviv, who apparently was not conversant with the NSSM, was told only about Rabin's request to advance the delivery of the F-4s. [21]

Richardson had hoped for a démarche on Israel after one week, but the White House evidently did not support that. Whether Rabin realized that or not, he did not provide responses to the questions he had been asked. Indeed, when Richardson brought up the matter in late August, Rabin invoked a reason for a delay: Upcoming elections made the nuclear question a "difficult subject for his government." Prime Minister Golda Meir would have to address it when she met with Nixon in late September. [22]

 

Perhaps the most mysterious event of this tale (perhaps even of the entire Nixon administration's history) was Nixon's one-on-one meeting with Meir in the Oval Office on September 26, 1969. Kissinger was in a meeting with Rabin and Rogers at the same time and apparently remained only partially informed about the details of the talk with Meir, even after Nixon debriefed him. Senior officials with a need to know would never find out what happened. [23] Nixon later told Barbour that he dictated a record of the meeting, but if that record exists, it has not yet surfaced. [24] Nevertheless, some clues about the meeting are available that exemplified Nixon's inclination against a determined effort to roll back Israel's nuclear ambitions.

In the days before Meir's visit, the State Department produced an updated intelligence assessment suggesting that it was too late to push the Israelis to accept "non-possession" of nuclear weapons as the meaning of "non-introduction." Background papers prepared by the State Department for the meeting with Meir, including an intelligence update with clearance by all the relevant agencies (including the CIA, the Pentagon, and even the ACDA and the AEC), suggested that the horse was already out of the barn: "Israel might very well now have a nuclear bomb" and certainly "already had the technical ability and material resources to produce weapon-grade material for a number of weapons." If that was true, it meant that events had overtaken the NSSM 40 exercise; Israel most likely possessed nuclear weapons, a development that senior State and Defense officials had wanted to contain. [25]

Intelligence agencies also confirmed that Israel already possessed several prototypes of the MD-620 and could test-fire the Jericho. U.S. intelligence even had evidence that "several sites providing operational launch capabilities" were already complete. This meant that the demand that Israel neither deploy nor produce the Jericho was also already moot.

For the State Department, a nuclear Israel endangered U.S. interests, not least because if Israel "were to become known as a nuclear power, the United States would, however unjustly, be held responsible in the eyes of the great majority of the world community." The State Department advised Nixon to press Meir for assurances that "Israel would not possess nuclear weapons, would sign the NPT, and would not deploy missiles." [26] Whether he tried that--or even whether he shared the State Department's sense of danger--is unknown. Subsequent actions indicate that he did not.

In later years Meir never discussed the substance of her private conversation with Nixon, saying only, "I could not quote him then, and I will not quote him now." [27] Yet, we know that since the early 1960s, she always thought that "Israel should tell the United States the truth [on the nuclear issue] and explain why." [28] In his memoirs, Rabin indicated that the discussions between Nixon and Meir were highly sensitive; the understandings reached were informal and not recorded. [29] Some of the understandings concerned issues of procedure and communication, such as setting up direct channels between their offices to bypass their foreign policy bureaucracies. Naturally, the most sensitive and substantive understanding dealt with the nuclear issue.

Even without a record of this mysterious private meeting, informed speculation is possible. It is likely that Nixon started with a plea for honesty and openness on this most sensitive issue, as was appropriate to these two allies. Meir, in turn, probably acknowledged--in a tacit or explicit form--that Israel already had reached a weapons capability, which would have meant that pressing Israel to equate "non-introduction" with "non-possession" would be absurd. (Years later, Nixon told CNN's Larry King that he knew for certain that Israel had the bomb, but he wouldn't reveal his source.) [30] It is also possible that Meir assured Nixon that Israel thought of nuclear weapons as a truly last-resort option, a way to provide her Holocaust-haunted nation with a psychological sense of existential deterrence.

Subsequent memoranda from Kissinger to Nixon provide a limited sense of what Kissinger thought happened at the meeting. He noted that the president had emphasized to the prime minister that "our primary concern was that the Israeli [government] make no visible introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear test program." In other words, Nixon had pressed her to abide by Rabin's interpretation that the "introduction of nuclear weapons" would mean a nuclear test or a formal declaration. Thus, Israel would be committed to maintaining full secrecy over its nuclear activities, keeping their status ambiguous and uncertain. Meir also confirmed that the NPT issue would not be settled until after the elections and that missiles would not be deployed "for at least three years." [31]



Soon after Meir departed Washington, Rabin informally provided replies to all three of Richardson's questions and asked whether they were satisfactory in light of the discussion between Meir and Nixon. In an October 7, 1969, memo, Kissinger reported the questions and answers as follows:

"Q: Would the Israelis assure us that they would not 'possess' nuclear weapons? A: Israel will not become a nuclear power.

"Q: Would they be willing to affirm that they would not deploy strategic missiles? A: They will not deploy strategic missiles until at least 1972.

"Q: Would they be willing to sign the NPT? A: The NPT will be considered by the new government." [32]

The next day Kissinger signed a six-page memo to Nixon analyzing the meaning and the policy implications of Rabin's replies and proposing recommendations for the U.S. reaction. In his cover memorandum, Kissinger wrote that his paper was "much longer than the one-page analysis I had promised you, but this issue is so sensitive and has been held to such a limited group of individuals that I believe that it is essential that you be presented with all nuances of the problem." [33]

On Rabin's first reply, Kissinger admitted that he did not understand why Israel preferred to define its assurance in terms of not being a nuclear power, while leaving the issue of nuclear possession untouched. "When I asked [Rabin] how a nation could become a nuclear power without 'possessing' nuclear weapons, he simply said they 'prefer' their formulation." Kissinger's bottom line was that as vague as Rabin's response was, Nixon should accept it as a private Israeli commitment to language derived from the NPT because it sounded like an assurance roughly corresponding to Article 2 of the treaty, where non-nuclear states agree not to "manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons."

Nixon approved that recommendation as well as the next, on the missile issue. Kissinger would tell the Israelis that their response was acceptable, provided they agreed to further discussion of the subject with the United States in 1971 or prior to a decision to deploy the Jericho.

Regarding the NPT issue, Kissinger showed his uncertainty about the exact content of the Nixon-Meir meeting by observing, "Mrs. Meir may have made some commitment to you privately that would give this statement significance." His recommendation, which Nixon approved, was to tell Rabin that the president wishes that Meir make "a vigorous personal effort to win cabinet approval" of the NPT. Kissinger finally suggested that on this complex issue, Nixon should have the "opportunity for second thoughts," and that this should be known to the Israelis. Interestingly, Nixon left this recommendation unmarked.

After Kissinger communicated with Rabin, the ambassador met formally with Richardson on October 15 and officially replied to the three questions that he had been asked on July 29. [34] Rabin's formal answers substantially repeated what he told Kissinger, except that regarding "introduction," Rabin declared that it meant the "transformation from a non-nuclear weapons country into a nuclear weapons country." The strong language that Packard and Richardson had used in July had no impact; Israel rejected any language that touched upon possession.

When Kissinger briefed Nixon, he strained to find positive significance in Rabin's language defining "introduction" because he believed it paralleled the NPT's distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. That would allow Washington to be on record that it had Israel's assurances that it would remain a non-nuclear weapon state as defined in the NPT. Such assurances "would put on our internal record a rationale for standing down"; that is, they would effectively end the debate and discussion within the administration on pressuring Israel. Washington, Kissinger advised, had pushed the Israeli nuclear issue "as far as we constructively can." For Kissinger, for all practical purposes, the debate was over. [35]

While members of the SRG still raised the possibility of renewed pressure on Israel to sign the NPT, Kissinger waited for Jerusalem's formal response to the U.S. query on the treaty. On February 23, 1970, Rabin went alone to see Kissinger at his office. He came to inform him that Richardson had just called him in about the NPT, and he wanted the president to know that, in light of the conversation Nixon had with Meir in September, "Israel has no intention to sign the NPT." Rabin, Kissinger wrote, "wanted also to make sure there was no misapprehension at the White House about Israel's current intentions." He also sought an assurance that Washington would not establish any linkage between the NPT and arms sales to Israel. Kissinger ended his memo with one sentence: "I was noncommittal and told him that his message would be transmitted to the president." [36]

And with that, the decade-long U.S. effort to curb Israel's nuclear program ended. That enterprise was replaced by highest-level understandings that have governed Israel's nuclear conduct ever since.



That so little is known today about the tale of NSSM 40 is unsurprising. Dealing with Israel's nuclear ambitions was thornier for the Nixon administration than for its predecessors because it was forced to deal with the problem at the critical time when Israel appeared to be crossing the nuclear threshold. On top of that, Nixon and Kissinger lacked faith in the universality of nonproliferation--they differentiated between friends and foes.

Yet, even as Nixon and Kissinger enabled Israel to flout the NPT, NSSM 40 allowed them to create a "defensible record." [37] And, as was his typical modus operandi, Kissinger used NSSM 40 as a way to maintain control over key officials who wanted to take action on the problem. Not aware of the secret Nixon-Meir understanding, lower-level officials involved in the NSSM 40 exercise continued to believe that the Israeli nuclear issue was open and vainly tried to restart the inspection visits at Dimona.

Politically, the Nixon-Meir agreement allowed both leaders to continue with their old public policies without being forced to publicly acknowledge the new reality. As long as Israel kept the bomb in the basement--which meant keeping the program under full secrecy, making no test, declaration, or any other visible act of displaying capability or otherwise transforming its status--the United States could live with Israel's "non-introduction" pledge. A case in point: Even in a classified congressional hearing in 1975, the State Department refused to concur with the CIA estimate that Israel had the bomb. [38]

Over time, the tentative Nixon-Meir understanding became the solid foundation for a remarkable and dramatic deal, accompanied by a strict but tacit code of behavior to which both nations closely adhered. The deal created a "don't ask, don't tell" stance. And the United States gave Israel a degree of political cover in international forums such as the NPT review conferences. Secrecy, taboo, and non-acknowledgement became embedded within the U.S.-Israeli posture.

It is striking how much Israel has stuck to its part of the deal, at great expense and risk. To this day, all Israeli governments of the left and the right have been faithful in keeping secrecy over their nuclear weapons activities, making great efforts to assure that nothing would be visible, politically, technologically, militarily, or otherwise. Even during its darkest hours in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel was cautious not to make any public display in deed or word of its nuclear capability. [39]

Yet set against contemporary values of transparency and accountability, the Nixon-Meir deal of 1969 is now a striking and burdensome anomaly. Not only is Israel's nuclear posture of taboo and total secrecy anachronistic, it is inconsistent with, and costly to, the tenets of modern liberal democracy. At home and abroad Israel needs a better way to handle its nuclear affairs. The deal is also burdensome for the United States, not only because it is inconsistent with U.S. values of openness and accountability, but also because it provokes claims about double standards in its nuclear nonproliferation policy.

It is especially striking to compare the Nixon administration's stance toward Israel in 1969 with the way that Washington is trying to accommodate India in 2006. As problematic as the proposed nuclear deal with New Delhi is, it at least represents an effort to deal openly with the issue, rather than sweeping it under the rug. Without open acknowledgment of Israel's nuclear status, by Israel itself and by the rest of the world, such ideas as a nuclear-free Middle East, or even the inclusion of Israel in an updated NPT regime, cannot even be discussed properly. [40]

It is time for a new deal to replace the old Nixon-Meir understandings of 1969, with Israel telling the truth and in so doing finally normalizing its nuclear affairs.

The declassified documentary record that served as the primary source for this article is available on the National Security Archive website.

 

NEW YORK - After months of torment, Sayaka Kobayashi says, she walked into the office of her boss at Toyota Motor North America Inc. on Dec. 12 thinking that his sexual harassment would end. At the very least, she wanted him to apologize.

The meeting with CEO Hideaki Otaka, 65, Toyota's top executive in North America, had been arranged by Toyota's second-in-command, Dennis Cuneo. But Otaka did not apologize to his executive assistant. Rather, Kobayashi alleges that Otaka criticized and humiliated her, calling her ungrateful for his efforts to advance her career. The 42-year-old employee says Otaka groped her on a business trip and in New York's Central Park, showered her with unwanted roses and jewelry, boasted about his marital infidelity and wanted her to have his child. And she contends that Toyota stonewalled her complaints.

Kobayashi gave her account of the meeting in a sexual harassment lawsuit filed on May 1 in New York Supreme Court and in a telephone interview with Automotive News. She seeks $190 million in damages from Otaka and Toyota.

The lawsuit got wide media play last week, an unusual black eye for a company accustomed to positive press. A New York Post headline blared: "Oh, What a Feeling! Toyota Boss Groped Me," an acerbic recycling of Toyota's old advertising tag line.

"My meeting with Mr. Otaka went totally different from what Dennis (Cuneo) told me it was going to be," Kobayashi told Automotive News last week. "That was shocking to me. If Mr. Otaka ever said anything - that he regrets (what he did) or apologized - I would have accepted that apology."

Weeks after the meeting with Otaka, the lawsuit alleges, the company reversed Kobayashi's recent promotion and later offered her compensation to leave the company.

Toyota's New York office issued a statement saying that it has "zero tolerance" for sexual harassment, and that it followed proper procedures after the complaint. The automaker also says it is "reassessing the effectiveness" of its policies.

"Subsequently she received a previously scheduled promotion and a raise, and at her written request was reassigned to another position," the company said in an e-mail response.

The company said it would not comment further on pending litigation. It has until May 20 to respond to the lawsuit.

Steven Curtin, a Toyota spokesman in New York, declined to confirm a report in The Wall Street Journal that Otaka would leave his job to become an in-house auditor at Daihatsu Motor Co. in Japan.

Otaka is a short man with salt-and-pepper hair who likes to be called Harry in the office. In 2004 he was appointed chief executive of Toyota Motor North America Inc., the holding company for Toyota in North America, based in New York.

Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. and Toyota Motor Manufacturing North America report to Toyota in Japan.

Before 2004 Otaka was chief executive of Delphys, a marketing and advertising company owned by Toyota. He began his career with Toyota in 1965 and worked for Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. in Washington, D.C., and California in the 1980s.

Two dozen roses
Kobayashi, a Japanese who moved to America in 1989, earned a journalism degree from Eastern Michigan University in 1994. Three years later she got a job writing and editing and handling logistics at the automaker's technical center in nearby Ann Arbor, Mich.

In 2003 she transferred to a corporate planning department job in New York, and in March 2005 she was offered the job of executive assistant. She considered the post to be an honor even though she had little secretarial experience. She speaks flawless English with just a hint of an accent.

The trouble started last summer when Otaka restructured his department so Kobayashi would report directly to him. To the astonishment of co-workers, she says, he personally delivered two dozen long-stemmed roses to her on her birthday in September.

The lawsuit outlines several alleged incidents:

During a business trip to Washington on Sept. 6, Otaka called Kobayashi to his room at 10 p.m., "forcibly grabbing her body and attempting to engage in sexual contact with her."

In October, Otaka sent an apologetic card and a garnet necklace to Kobayashi at her desk and proposed lunch.

A second groping occurred Nov. 14 in Central Park.

Later that month Kobayashi filed a sexual harassment complaint with Ko Takatsu, Toyota's vice president of human resources.

"The company obviously did not take any action to correct this problem," Kobayashi said in a telephone interview from her lawyer's office in New York. "It has been a very lonely procedure."

She says she did not turn to friends or colleagues for help "because I was still respecting Toyota's dignity and Mr. Otaka's dignity.

"Those three months for me were hell. I was living in a world of fear."
Did Toyota fail to act?
The lawsuit alleges Toyota's human resources department did not launch an investigation into the complaint.

On Dec. 6 Kobayashi turned to Cuneo, who runs human resources, accounting, advertising, public relations and investor relations.

After the Dec. 12 meeting in Otaka's office, Kobayashi felt some relief when Toyota announced her promotion on Dec. 22 to assistant manager. She got a raise but was still reporting to Otaka.

"I was thrilled," she said. "That was my first promotion in my entire career at Toyota."

But Kobayashi grew increasingly frustrated by Cuneo when her complaints against Otaka seemed to go nowhere. "Suddenly he wasn't responding to me anymore," she said. "Instead, the corporate attorney came to speak to me as instructed by Dennis."

Toyota declined a request to interview Cuneo.

According to the lawsuit, Alan Cohen, Toyota's North American general counsel, contacted Kobayashi on Jan. 4 with an offer of compensation to leave the company. She refused his offer to leave.

"My goal was to regain my old position (in planning) or to get away from Mr. Otaka," Kobayashi said. "So when the corporate attorney came and offered 'some kind of arrangement so you can go back to school full time,' that implies money."

Without explanation, Toyota subsequently reversed the Dec. 22 promotion and put her back into corporate planning, the lawsuit alleges. Kobayashi says she believes Toyota retaliated against her.

Kobayashi still is employed at Toyota but said she is on medical leave because of what her doctor diagnosed as a mild heart attack.

She says she believes Otaka behaved the way he did because she is Japanese. "Growing up in Japan, you will see discriminatory behavior against women all the time," she said. "It is an underlying culture in the society, and that reflects in the workplace, too."