777 crash at SFO

As a private pilot, and an aviation defense attorney, I wouldn't ever go near an automated plane. What happens when one instrument, such as a pitot tube, malfunctions or freezes over?


Mark

 

THIS IS YOUR ANSWER. THIS IS ALL CAUSED BY COMPUTER.
The Pilots were trying like hell to power up and pull the nose up and the computer denied them Final Flightdeck Authority.
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kHa3WNerjU]Air France Flight 296 | Airbus A320 Crash - YouTube[/ame]

 

I'm not defending anything. I asking why no one has commented about the autothrottles not functioning and what could cause this (or at least at the time I posted "crickets")

But I guess pilot training methods more "sexy" to discuss.

You don't think that maybe.... just MAYBE ... it could be a software problem? I mean... there's NO possibility in your mind?

No, let's not do an investigation. Pilot error. Let's all go home now.


BTW KKSBA: Thanks for your answer. Very helpful.

 

Air France 447

 

The most common scenario is that they were never SET (correctly) by the pilots during the decent.

Software problem, possibly but less likely. The system has multiple redundancy.

 

Right, that's what I mean, although a bad example. With an automated plane, it's assured death. With a person behind the yoke (or stick in the airbus), experience can, and has, saved lives.


Mark

 

Well... even if flight automation works 99,999 times out of 100,000 of situations, 1/100,000 is about one crash a day.

 

They ARE doing an investigation and a thorough diagnosis of OVER 100 parameters recorded by the black boxes that indicate all control movements and system activations.

A quick read of a third data source has already indicated that the airplane was doing the job it was told to do BY THE PILOTS.

 

Actually, that was my thinking.

It is quite possible that the crew thought and actually believed something that in reality was not true. It's not lying, it's just the way the brain works. In their heads, it was one way when in reality is the opposite.

It happens with people with unintended acceleration in cars who swear they were stepping in the brake when the evidence is quite clear it was the gas. In their mind, it's impossible.

 

And I totally agree. That's my point about pointing automatically at the pilots or their training as "the cause" just hours after the event.

It might be pilot error. It probably is pilot error. But it's total speculation what those errors are what caused them. For example, what is this "lateral deviation" the NTSB says happened. How does that play into this?

It's the investigation that matters right now. Not putting blame on things that may have nothing to do with it.

 

Yes, agreed.

 

It hasn't been hours, it's been days and the many of the possibilities have been eliminated.
Causes can be categorized by levels probability; the least probable have been and continue to be eliminated.
The arrows are pointing to the more obvious and probable, like pilot error (possibly).

 

It really boils down to systems failure.

Right now pilots fly planes with instruments that derive their information from sensors. The autopilot uses the same sensors.

What happens when a sensor goes bad? Good system design has redundancy. But, even with triple redundancy there have been some cases where all sensors failed.

Humans are good at seeing the "big picture". Computers can only "see" the scenarios they've been programmed with. No out of box thinking with a computer. Maybe in 30 years.

Right now, the latest aircraft have autopilots that can fly a plane from liftoff to landing. If there is a system failure or non-redundant sensor failure the autopilot sounds an alarm and switches off. It's up to the humans from that point on.

Engine failures, fires, bombs, and a host of other things cannot be dealt with by an autopilot. When artificial intelligence makes it to the scene this will change, but that's decades away.

A lot of the automation that exists in planes today has been paid for "by blood"... Previous accidents that were investigated led to the creation of automation systems that help the pilot with workload during stressful phases of flight. These developments have helped to make aviation safer and safer.

But, there is a double edge sword to all of this. As automation makes it easier and safer for pilots, it also causes atrophy of their piloting skills if the automation fails. The only way to counter this is to train very well and include training that makes pilots proficient in manually flying an airplane with all automation offline.

When the Asiana flight crashed, a bunch of airplanes in the landing pattern had to go around. How would automation have dealt with all of that. All those planes, if they were on autopilot, immediately were switched off and/or put into a more manual mode that allowed the pilots to make the last minute changes necessary to comply with the surprise development. Before you can automated airplanes you would need automated ATC to deal with this type of problem. I wouldn't trust airplanes voice recognizing ATC instructions in garbled radio transmissions. How does automated ATC deal with bomb threats, hijackings, errant pilots etc... It will take time to sort out all the scenarios and programming. It will require strong artificial intelligence (aka human level artificial intelligence).

We are transitioning. One day, we might get to fully automated planes. But, there's a lot of work to do.

Cars will get automated someday, but I for one, will take some time before I'll get in an autocar and tell it where to go and climb in the back and take a snooze.

 

"....the aircraft struck a sea wall at the end of runway 28L, began turning counterclockwise, then went into a full spin, Hersman said...."

Still sounds pretty much like a cartwheel to me.....

 

No, I mean the posts there were put up on Saturday afternoon automatically blaming the pilots and their training.

 

The deviation was again pilot error, or rather poor skills. They were landing on a runway that I believe had a good crosswind that day.

The wind was blowing the plane of course. That's not a big deal for a good pilot, he just corrects with manual input to counteract the wind.

At SFO there are two parallel runways. 28 right and 28 left. 28 stands for the compass heading of the runway. 28 is Westerly. I believe the wind was mostly North-South that day, and usually for that matter.

They were drifting, and were interested in making sure they stayed on heading so they didn't land on the wrong runway. It has happened many times before that a plane lands on the wrong runway. It is extremely embarassing and can lead to FAA enforcement. There is something much worse than landing on the wrong runway though.......... Like CRASHING...

It's not the first time a crew became obsessed with one thing (like the crosswind drifting) and forgot to verify speed and altitude. But, before we turn someone loose in hundreds of thousands of pounds of Aluminum they are expected to be able to juggle all of that.

A very famous accident, which was also on an aircraft, the wonderful L1011, that had never had an accident, was Eastern Air Lines 401.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The pilots became obsessed with the landing gear indicators, that they didn't notice the autopilot had been disconnected inadvertently.

As they kept screwing around with whether the bulbs were burned out or not, the plane slowly descended into the everglades and wasn't noticed until they began hitting the ground.

In their defense, it was at night and it was pitch black over the everglades.

It is absurd to think the Asiana crash could occur during broad daylight on a nice day.

 

Thanks again KKSBA. Great analysis.


Didn't a guy on Korean Air literally fly a 747 into the ground in Guam?

My understanding is that there's a cultural things with Koreans that it's disrespectful for the crew to question or alert the captain.

Is this a "Korean" thing?

 

I thought, based on the NOTAMS posted on page 2, that the PAPIs were out. Maybe they were working. Thoughts?

The last comment about the autothrottles being in the armed position....they're always in the armed position. From preflight to shutdown. It doesn't mean they're active. In the 747, if you are overpowering the autothrottles, you know it. While its easy to do, you can feel the resistance.

Whenever I disconnect the autopilot on approach(or earlier), I disconnect the autothrottle as well. Most pilots I know do. A few don't. I think if you're going to hand fly the airplane, you should be in control of all of it. Power affects pitch, and it seems odd to leave it active. Oddly, I think on the MD11 it is active until flare...

 

I don't know if it's Korean only or Asian as a whole. There have been reports that similar things occur with Indian crews.

I have heard that your career ends either way. Question the Captain or crash the plane. At least you will always walk away from the former.

 

I have read discussion from 737 and 747 pilots that transitioned to the 777 that the resistance is imperceptible on the 777 compared to the 747 and 737 which are both similar. It is strange the system would be similar in two models but different in one.

 

Interesting. I wouldn't have thought that....

 

Let me get my reference (from PPRUNE) and post it.

 

I was off on my reference to the 747. There is a question of that similarity. But the 737's Autothrottle is more strenuous according to one below-

BTW, the Asiana pilot had a lot of Airbus time FWIW

"Just my two cents worth and maybe something investigators could consider. Criticise all you like but this happened to me when I converted from AirbusA330 to the 777. ( fortunately in the sim) it may be relevant as the trainee on this flight previously flew a320'and may well have been converting from Airbus to Boeing.

As the thrust levers on the bus do not move throughout the approach until you here " retard" , I used to rest my hands on the thrust levers. When I was converting to the 777 I did exactly the same , being a little tense during one of the sims I held the thrust levers a little tight. Therefore not allowing them to move. As we continued the approach I did not " feel" the autothrottle trying to move against my stiff grip , as I was focusing on other things( fortunately my scan.)I was effectively inhibiting the autothrottle by holding the thrust levers in a position. The next thing I noticed was the speed bleeding off below vref+5 . As l took my right hand off the thrust levers to point this out to the instructor the autothrottle immediately advanced the levers ( as I was no longer inhibiting them physically). The instructor pointed out that it was a common mistake he had seen on airbus pilots converting to Boeing. A valid learning point , learnt where it is meant to be learnt , in the sim.

Could it be that our colleague was so loaded by being hi on the approach that he like me , held the thrust levers too tight , and was unable to feel the autothrottle trying to physically override his grip. If you are not familiar with this , force. Would you recognise it ? Remember it only came up in my training as a result of a mistake.

Criticise all you,like , I am happy to share my screw ups if as an industry it helps someone , just a little bit."


...



"Auto Throttle Resistance
Just a thought but I too experienced a lack of thrust in the sim on my 777 type rating due to my hand preventing auto throttle movement. I had come from the 737 and noted at the time that the resistance required to prevent AT movement was far less than on the 737. I have never flown the 747 so cannot comment on this type. I wonder if 744's have the same "resistance" as 748's for example?

This occurrence would never prevent the ability to resolve the issue with an adequate scan/FMA awareness etc but it may cause the onset."

 

As of 8:15 pm today. (Excerpt)
National Transportation Safety Board chairman Deborah Hersman said the autothrottle was set for 157 mph and the pilots assumed it was controlling the plane's airspeed. However, the autothrottle was only "armed" or ready for activation, she said.

In the 777, turning the autothrottle on is a two-step process - first it is armed, then it is engaged, Boeing pilots said. Hersman didn't say whether the Asiana's autothrottle was engaged.

Bob Coffman, an American Airlines captain who has flown 777s, said the only way he could think of for Asiana plane to slow as quickly at the NTSB has described would be if somehow the autothrottle has shifted into the idle mode.

Only moments before the crash did the training captain realize the autothrottle wasn't controlling the plane's speed, Hersman said.

"This is one of the two hallmarks of complexity and challenge in the industry right now," said Doug Moss, an Airbus A320 a pilot for a major U.S. airline and an aviation safety consultant in Torrance, Calif. "It's automation confusion because from what Deborah Hersman said, it appears very likely the pilots were confused as to what autothrottle and pitch mode the airplane was in. It's very likely they believed the autothrottles were on when in fact they were only armed."

 

Based on USA Today, the instructor in the right seat was PIC, as he should be. It also said it was his first trip as an instructor. Probably his last, too.