Fair enough. I certainly agree that I want the guys up front to be in control, not the S/W. Aren't they all pretty much 'fly by wire' these days? I vaguely recall the crash in France (?) where it seemed the airplane 'overrode' the pilots commands, which definitely isn't right. But I thought they learnt a lot of (expensive) lessons from that one and changed things quite a bit? The airplane will now do what the pilot asks, no? Cheers, Ian
But you could, Pete! Thirty years later, I am still fuming about it, like many people here, and still feel ashamed that someone could even have thought about doing such a thing. Not the place to talk about it, but what a disgrace! Rgds
This I understand, of course (even not being a pilot and not being in the aviation business). Among a lot of different opinions, I very well remember half-an-hour spent in the cockpit of a 747 with the pilots, above Siberia, coming back from Beijing (almost twenty years ago, when you were still allowed to ask to be invited in the cockpit by the pilots...). This is precisely what the two pilots told me in no uncertain terms that night. And I have to say that it makes sense to me. Rgds
Holy-moley! That was *thirty* years ago!? Another of those "I remember where I was" moments when that story broke. Dayum! Guess we're all getting old. Cheers, Ian
Yep, Ian: July 10th, 1985. I was 25. I am now 56..."funny" how times fly. I still feel ashamed about this, I can't forget it and can't even joke about it; this is disgraceful (and there was a death), dishonest and unforgivable. And it was done with the full knowledge of the President, contrary to all the lies that followed immediately. The act itself was a shame: to attack a NGO in the territorial waters, and in a harbor (or is it "harbour" in N.Z), of a sovereign friendly nation can only have been imagined by imbeciles. And after that, our official authorities treated us, and the world, as imbeciles. Can't forgive them for this, and never will. (Not only was the whole thing disgraceful, but they also managed to fail their ill-conceived operation lamentably; I told you they were w.n.k.rs) Rgds
This is getting almost spooky - I was born July 9th, and we're exactly the same age! While I, & I'm sure many others, "appreciate" (for want of a better term) your sentiments, by todays standards it's ancient history. "The Cambridge five" had the same kind of impact back in the day I guess. Your command of the English language is impressive! Cheers, Ian
Jan. 29th, 1960 as for myself. Yes, the "Cambridge five" had the same kind of impact in their days (I say "days" because the fifth man was only identifed much later) BUT they were well educated, highly intelligent, and - it could be argued - they did it because they had beliefs... Rgds
Another hijack alert - Hope nobody objects too much. July 9th 1959 here.... For sure. You're obviously much more knowledgeable on the subject than me, but they genuinely, honestly, believed they were doing "the right thing" - They sincerely thought communism was the way of the future. W.n.k.r.s Cheers, Ian
Reading your post, I get the sense that you're suggesting that France is not engaged in an industrial espionage program? I'm not an expert on the subject, but I think it's hard to deny it's happening. Espionage? Moi? | Foreign Policy Perhaps I misunderstood your post, though. Don't get me wrong, I think lots of countries engage in it opportunistically, but from what I've read about it, France, China and Russia are the big three culprits. CW
Frankly, knowing how clumsy we usually are at spying other countries, I find this hard to believe. Now, the Russians, on the other hand, have a rather good record on the matter... Rgds
I have done a bit of thinking about some of the comments re espionage and one comment that Boeing was a monopoly. How did they become a monopoly? I started with company 5 years after the war and they had a reputation for their excellent airplanes and impeccable corporate operations. Not all of their offerings were successful, like the model 377 and 247 but they were known as an honest company to deal with. In the 60's when competitions heated up Boeing was chided for being politically naive' when they lost some of the contests. That began to change when the 367-80 started and the KC-135 was produced. Then when the 707 came into international prominence , the company realized the importance of public relations and "opened up" and promoted much more contact with the world. I worked in most of the programs that followed and could see the company grow and flourish and they did it by designing and producing better products ON THIER OWN. They didn't have to steal anything from another company because they were setting the pace and other companies were copying them. As we know, one by one fell out of the competitions; Lockheed, Convair, and Douglas in this country. In Europe, Britain and France produced some airplanes that were not runaway winners and Boeing forged ahead with the 720,727,737,747,767 and 777. All became good sellers and all were designed and produced BY BOEING. i suppose there will be some comments that Boeing had assistance with taxes and other stuff but they did not have access to the funds of five countries. Boeing had to sell their products and make a profit and all of a sudden here's an outfit coming on line that didn't have to make a profit but only had to get their product on the market and at a lower price than the other guy. And they gave support equipment and all kinds of freebees to boot. They pulled anything that they could think of to undercut prices or over- provide their prospective customers. So, I guess that I'm trying to explain how and why Boeing WAS a monopoly and how the competition gained a foothold. To emphasize Boeing's contribution to the jet transport industry, take a look at ALL OTHER airplanes and notice that the basic configuration is what Boeing initiated 62 years ago.
Bob, I am not going to argue for the sake of arguing here, but I simply note that the appealing body of the WTO has stated in May 2012 (the case is still not closed) that the state advances to Airbus, which are reimbursable, are fully compliant with the 1992 WTO rules, whereas 5.3 billions of aids to Boieng are not, and nor are the tax deductions. Not going to discuss the excellence of Boeing aeroplanes either, which is obvious. You know as well as I do that the podded engine concept comes from the B-47, a military contract, and that before launching the "dash 80" project, Bill Allen led a company delegation to Britain in the summer of 1950 to have a look at the DH Comet. They bettered it, no question, but inspiration to the dash 80 came at least in part from a military project, supported by public funding. No acrimony here. It is obvious that there is room for interpretation, and that, as a company, you have every reason to state that they were honest. Nothing like the bad memories of Lockheed ( some Europeans were stupid enough to accept the bribes, after all ) but let's not be naive. Rgds
I suppose there will always be some blurring of the lines in this industry, as there's such a strong connection to (and trickle down from) the military. Boeing has indeed benefited from large contracts with the AF, among others. That said, there is also a justifiable interest in a strong national defense capability and companies that produce products that sustain that. And, of course, the public benefits in other ways (GPS, Internet, etc.). There were lots of products that were spun out of the space program, too. I'd guess that Europeans want to further their own Continental interests and independence from American companies, though. Too much reliance on Boeing can put them at a disadvantage if our relationship grows more distant. Regarding monopolies, from a legal perspective (and, I must admit that Antitrust was my weakest subject in Law school), the FTC's presumption is that if you have a market share greater than x%, it's unlawful. However, it's rebuttable, and the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that that market share is a result of "superior skill, foresight and industry." I think it's fair to say that Boeing has received benefits in ways (indirect). I think it's fair to say Airbus has received benefits in other ways (direct), too. But, for me, the troubling aspect is that Airbus' benefits come in the form of ownership (which virtually precludes failure). OTOH, would we allow Boeing to fail, or is it so important to our national defense that we would have to prop it up, if it ever came to that? I'm sure there were many reasons why Airbus was created, but at least one (rumored?) reason was so as to extract better pricing from Boeing. In other words, to cause Boeing to have to compete. Generally, I view competition as a good thing, but doesn't Airbus' success comes at the expense of Boeing? Of course, even competition can turn sour when it's not legitimate (for example, loss-leader pricing so as to win market share, drive competitors out...and then raise prices back up). So, competition's impact is not inarguably positive. The ultimate beneficiary of competition is (or ought to be) the passenger, which is a good thing. Lower prices. Better technology. Whatever. Airline (and military) contracts are hotly competed, but it's also not easy to change fleets over from one product line to another. These are highly complex machines and have rigorous maintenance and high spare parts demands. So, the fact that Airbus has been able to achieve such market share success is remarkable. It's not because Boeing made (or makes) a bad product, though. So, it prompts the question of whether Airbus' success was legitimately-earned. I suppose their products have a good record, but I am aware of some of the design philosophies and differences and how they may have an impact on the end product's safety. Personally, if I have a choice, I choose to fly on a Boeing AC. All of this, however, doesn't really get at the industrial espionage aspect. And, if EADS/Airbus was able to get competitive by reverse engineering Boeing's products, I think that's fair and legitimate (to the extent it does not infringe on protected IP). If, however, they obtained their knowledge through espionage, I would feel otherwise. Don't get me wrong, I think the Chinese and Russians are far more sinister in their objectives. Still, economic warfare can be undermining. CW
Thanks, I know that I have a rather myopic view of the past and a sophomoric grasp of business. I was describing my impressions from the narrow view of an ant in the anthill and vented some frustrations. I understand the subsides that Boeing is receiving and all the other stuff so I'll quiet down, sit in front of the fire, pet the cat, and think about flying and painting, I can control those things. I enjoy the educated and clear responses in this forum.
I think you have probably forgotten more about the aerospace industry than I will ever know. So, I always defer to the experts, and my comments are certainly never to silence a good discussion. An insider's perspective is far more informed than mine could be. CW
Well, perhaps it turned towards that goal later, but I don’t think you could say Airbus was created to extract better price from Boeing; at least, not at its begining. It was created mainly to better satisfy the European carriers needs and in so doing, help to consolidate the European aircraft industry which had too many builders fighting for too few small orders. It is of course a very short summary, but in a nutshell, the european airplane constructors had more or less all individually decided at about 1964 / 1965 that they should not seek to compete for the long distance airplane’s market against Boeing, Lockheed and Douglas, because it would not make economic sense. So they had decided – each in its own place, individually - to leave the long distance market to the said American manufacturers; in so doing, they would avoid frontal confrontation, and could rather work on other short to medium range projects, which were more adapted to the domestic routes flown inside Europe. As an aside, many of these “paper projects”, notably in Germany, were already identifying the plane as an “Airbus” in 1965. In 1965, most European aviation builders had a collaboration agreement with – at least -another european industrial aviation partner; but it is during a symposium organized by British Airways in October of 1965 that the concept of the airplane itself began to be consolidated, and that manufacturers and carriers agreed that most of them had in mind broadly the same type of airplane. Then the British, French and German governments, seeing that most European carriers had requested specification corresponding to the same type of aircraft, that many aircraft manufacturers were not only working on the same projects, but already had collaboration with others, decided that in would make economic sense to seek to obtain scale effects, and created a common structure to work on a sole answer to that “Airbus” project. Remember that there already was a movement of consolidation inside most European countries within their aviation industries: Britain for instance began its consolidation in the fifties, France at the end of the same period: the governments of both countries knew only too well that they had to do the utmost convince the manufacturers to merge, because they were too many small manufacturers that could not be supported by too few small orders. The british government decided later to walk out of that structure (even if Hawker Siddeley still got 20% of the work), leaving France and Germany as the sole shareholders at first, but soon to be joined by Holland and Spain; British Aerospace came back later in 1979 as shareholder. It is well known that the first airplane, the A300, was for many reasons actually slightly too big for the requirements of most European carriers, and so did not sell well, almost not at all during the first years; Airbus was ironically saved by an order from the United States, when in April 1978 Eastern Airways ordered 23 A300B4, an order signed by its then CEO Frank Borman. At that time, Airbus was already working on the development of an airplane that was closer to the European carriers needs, the A310, and it is this one that set the ball rolling. What is rather a quirk of history is that it was an order from America that saved the Airbus consortium, whereas selling the plane on that market never was considered as a priority at first, at least when the consortium was created. This order from America, of course, opened frontal competition with the american manufacturers, and on their market; but Airbus’ decision to manufacturer long-range airplanes (A340 and A340) and therefore open frontal competition with Boeing not only on the short/medium range segment, but also on the long range one, came about twenty years after the consortium was created. Rgds
In the Airbus constitution, you mean? Not really: Concorde was a very different mode of collaboration between Sud-Aviation and British Aerospace, that may have influenced the constitution of Airbus because it proved that a collaboration between two different aviation industries was possible, but it was not driven by economics, as many were to discover. For Concorde, it was the technological challenge that was the driver, the sales were supposed to come almost naturally if the aeroplane would achieve the performance. Which it did, but sales never materialised. In Airbus, Germany was one of the two main forces behind the partnership, along with France; Britain as a government hesitated, and finally left (to come back ten years later)although Hawker-Siddeley stayed as a contractor (for the wings). The "Airbus" was more market driven, even if today most analysts consider that the A300 was flawed, because it was the first wide-body designed for short to medium haul, and its capacity was simply too large. The A300 was a success more or less by accident, thanks to Asia first, and to the fact that it was well suited to extended range when ETOPS were redefined. It is the small-bodied A320 family (A319/A320/A321) of the eighties that really suited the needs of the european carriers. Rgds
The “Concorde” development has many fascinating facets, but it has to be said that when the british works on supersonic transport aircraft theory and development concluded that it was indeed feasible, and that they have to build one, the british government and industry, minding the costs, always had a partnership with a foreign industry in mind; but they favored America and US Industry initially. It is only when America and its industry answered that they were already working on their own projects and not interested in a partnership, than the British accepted the French propositions. It is also well known that the british politicians also hoped that the collaboration on the supersonic transport would somewhat help them to get General de Gaulle support towards the U.K candidature to the “Common Market”, the precursor of the E.U, but they were to be disappointed in that matter. The british technicians at B.A.C, later BAe, where very suprised to discover later that the french project had a strong resemblance with their own. It has been supposed that some british officials arranged the leak of plans towards the french industry, to facilitate the willingness for a collaboration. The British were rather apprehensive at first, and when the original treaty of collaboration was signed, they insisted that it has dispositions for severe penalties for the one government that would leave the project. But it is a not-so-well-known fact that it was the british government itself who actually decided that the U.K had to leave the project, in November 1964, after the general elections in Britain; So France was alone, but for two months only: Britain changed its mind and came back two months later, in January 1965, in time for the actual construction of the prototype to begin. Rgds
+1 Some great insights. The whole project always amazed me; The Brits & French working together! Who'd a thunk that would ever have worked! Cheers, Ian
Yes, I think that not only was the project a major technological achievement, but it was an enormous cultural challenge. One of the greatest advocate of the program on the french side died six weeks ago: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9_Turcat Rgds
And, to be fair, there is a German to whom a great deal of the credit for the technical achievement must be given, and who is too often forgotten: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dietrich_Kuchemann Rgds
