Ethiopian 737-8 MAX down. No survivors.

If it weren't for the fact that one or more airlines rejected delivery of some airplanes I would pass this off as union agitators. Maybe Boeing needs less management and more QA inspectors.

 

It appears that Boeing already has less(er) management and they want to get rid of the QA people. That should work out really well and save a ton of money.

 

I sense a touch of sarcasm, Bob. Where is T. Wilson (or Alan Mulally) when you need him?

 

Having family and many friends still working at the Big Kite Factory, I have much firsthand information. But, I speak not since I have a name floating around in cyber space . In the 707, 720, 727, 767 , and 747 days when I was in Employee Development, new-hire shop people were given several weeks of pre-assignment training which included all aspects of their jobs AND responsibilities. We also had a pre-assignment QA program. They went to work with an understanding that what they did was not only critical to the safety of the flying public but to a thing called job retention. The last I heard was that they don't have that sort of thing anymore...."a waste of money." Another cost cutting move is to lay off the grey beards because they cost too much money. The newer crowd of course gets paid less but also knows less and they invent a lot of square wheels that...costs a lot of money to fix. Been there, done that.

 

When I first arrived at Grumman in 1974, they had recently discontinued a program which I think I might have liked. It was called SIFE, which stood for Shop Indoctrination For Engineers. The new hires were assigned to a program and given a drafting table and the necessary supplies, but then they were sent to work as a mechanic in the shop for six months, where they would learn how modern aircraft were assembled. Then when they went back to their drafting tables, they had some first-hand knowledge of the necessary relationship between the design engineers and the line mechanics, as well as some knowledge of materials, fasteners and shop practices.

This was a big deal back in the 60s when lots of young engineers were hired to design the Lunar Module and then the F-14, but by the time I got there they were hiring so few new engineers that they felt the program was too costly to continue. I suppose the program was only possible at Grumman because, unlike most of its competitors, it was a non-union shop; that would probably have been verboten at Boeing.

 

I developed a course for new hire engineers and taught it for two years. It was quite an experience. There were engineers from UK, India, and Poland. Most, however, were from U.S. schools. Those from the UK seemed to look down on us Colonials and had a good grasp of the English language and the engineering disciplines. Those from India were more interested in how to manipulate more money out of the companies that were hiring. Many of them left to hire on with other companies to get more moving expense money. The Poles were resolute and focused and good students and people. Their hatred of the Nazi's and Russians was always at the surface. The most qualified in the actual and functional design procedures were from the U. of Michigan and Texas A. & M. where they had been adequately trained in the use of the standards manuals and detail parts design. Some from other schools were appalled that they were relegated to "drawing little things on the drafting board". They were destined to produce real big things right off the bat and "other people" did those little parts. It was quite interesting. Thirty years later I saw some of them in very high positions when I was almost finished . It gave me a perspective of what and who I was then. And I have no complaints .

 

Seems to be the same QA inspection defective procedures with the KC-46 (again...).
I have to say I'm rather surprised by this. I'm not saying this as a French and European prejudiced towards Airbus, I have always had a lot of respect for Boeing's achievements. Rather, I wonder if it is specific to Boeing, in which case it would be a question of procedures or people's management, or if it is "the times that are changing", in which case the only "comparable" competitor (= Airbus...) would have the same problems. Never heard about something like this, but will look at it.

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/04/02/air-force-again-halts-kc-46-deliveries-after-more-debris-found/

Rgds

 

I had the opportunity to have student co-op's work on programs for me and some were good and others weren't really engineers... When I was interviewing one he said "I plan on doing engineering for a couple of years, but then I want t move into management"... My response was "If you don't know what the hell they're doing how do you expect to be able oversee the people you're managing"... He didn't have much of a response and I told him that what we were doing probably wasn't a good fit for career aspirations as I expected my guys to get the engineering job done properly and that any students I had were doing real engineering work and that this wasn't a kindergarten, and if parts they worked on broke that things would blow up on the test stand.... I had a couple that took the job really seriously and become really good engineers.... One last thing that I always did when interviewing an engineer was that I asked them what their hobbies were... If they were into fast cars (like modding and racing) or airplanes (models or the real thing) or other things like race boats, I was pretty sure I was getting someone that would be a good engineer. If they weren't it generally didn't work out as well. You have to have a engineering mindset and if you don't you probably won't be very good at it...

 

From some disappointing experience I have watched QA's mentality that may be part of the problem. QA people were at one time a mechanic on the floor; likely not the best but not totally incompetent. But what they wanted was to be able to sit in the quiet and comfortable air conditioned office where they got to play with paperwork. At a point the aircraft is a figment because what exists is if the documents have the correct reference noted or attached, the worker sign off is in the correct spot with date and such. That QA person basically has no interest in leaving their comfy office since (a) it will be too hot or cold out in the aircraft, (b) too noisy, (c) its a bother to leave their office, (d) it is an exertion of unnecessary energy that might mean their coffee is cold when they return. If the facility's QSM doesn't require physical inspection before close then that QA person won't leave their seat.

 

Sadly, this seems to be a very common mindset. Although I think most folks aren't stupid enough to tell that to an interviewer, its very obvious from the way alot of folks act. I see a lot of new hires who are clearly much more interested in networking with the higher ups and making a name for themselves than actually doing the real engineering work. What's even worse is that this mentality seems to be encouraged by management, and the people that focus on it tend to be the ones who are quickly promoted. The engineers who are buckling down and doing the real work are always overlooked. "Leadership" is something management is always saying everyone needs to have. Somehow they forget that there have to be people actually doing the work and that everyone can't (nor should) be leaders.

 

If only Boeing was the only organization following that path.

Today we seem to strive for mediocrity in everything. It has been reclassified as a lofty goal.

 

My late brother was a physician who lived by the absolute. There was never something that was "almost". It either was or it wasn't. If you were supposed to meet him at eight o'clock, you better be there at eight. Ten after eight was late. Forty seconds after eight was late. He never executed any reprimands or commented loudly about it but it was something that he lived by. "You aren't a little bit pregnant, you are pregnant! You're not a little bit late, you are late!" So, I think that this kind of mind set is desperately needed now. Correct is not sort of correct, it is correct! or it is incorrect! I'm fortunate that I grew up with him as my big brother. I'm not as smart as he was but he left me, and others in the family ,with some of his valuable assets that I have tried to pass on to my offspring. I'm happy that some of it has been instilled in them but I'm worried that some of my idiocy has also been passed on.

 

Bob, your last two posts belong in your next book!

When I hired on as a structural designer at Grumman, I was just the opposite of the people described by solofast. As I looked around the room (easy in those days before cubicles), I could tell that the happiest individuals were the run-of-the-mill engineers like myself, while the most frazzled were the managers, with the engineering leads somewhere in between. I decided at that time that I wanted to go through my entire career as a run-of-the-mill engineer, with no authority over anyone else and the apparent problems that resulted in. I might not make as much money, but at least I could go home on time (usually) and be happy. I knew there'd be other "gung-ho" designers who you knew were headed for management positions; I'd say, more power to them, but that was not for me.

When I retired 16 months ago after 40 years in the biz, I'm happy to say that I achieved my goal. In all that time, I was never a lead, a supervisor, a manager or anything like that. Some might decry my lack of ambition, but I don't care. I had a good career, one that I'm proud of, and I'm still happy. At 66 I have nearly all my hair, and only a little of it is gray!

 

If this was intended to "enhance handling qualities" rather than be a stall prevention system, this intended "enhancement" ended up invoking a nose down command that was deadly. It acted like a stall prevention system for the pilot and invoked commands that the pilot did not approve. That is a BIG DEAL, rather than just providing a warning t the pilot to do something! I can't think of other instances of this (the autopilot does what the pilot tells it to do).

And then with a bad sensor, the system tried to prevent a pending stall that was not occurring. The software should compare AOA against other inputs (airspeed, pitch angle, vertical velocity, altitude, flight path angle, etc) to evaluate if a stall is pending and if a sensor is giving bad information. Of course that complicates that software and requires more testing, but if it is taking over for the pilot in any way, that should be tested thoroughly.

Even so, is this "enhancement" or "stall prevention system" even necessary? Has the margin to stall reduced so much that a system is needed to prevent a stall for the pilot? There is more normal force from the bigger engines that have more thrust and are farther forward of the CG and center of lift, that causes a small nose up pitching moment. Of course, that will vary as power settings change and the pilot should be able to sense that and counteract it. Is that change so significant that we need a system to make it fly like the older 737s?

Let the pilot fly the airplane rather than putting in software to do something the pilot did not command/approve!

 

Earlier 737s had a warning for AOA sensor malfunction. That was eliminated in the 737 Max apparently because they thought their band-aids would obviate the need for the warning. Not so, it turned out.

 

I think I've tried to explain this before, but let me give it another shot.

You are flying along, the airplane is trimmed for a certain speed, and you take your hands off the yoke. The airplane should more or less stay pointed in the same direction.

Now, you pull back on the yoke. The airplane should want to return to the trim speed, and you should have to hold force on the yoke to hold the nose up. The more you pull up, the more force it should require. In fact, this is a certification requirement-- I believe it's something like 6 pounds of force for every knot away from trim speed.

In the case of the 737 Max, in certain conditions, as you pull back, it doesn't require 6 pound of force for every knot. I don't know how much force it requires, but it's less than that, and in some cases may even want to rise on it's own!

So, the fix was the MCAS system, which in those situations uses the trim to ensure that you need to keep pulling back (with at least 6 pounds of force per knot) to keep it off of the trim speed.

Thus, it does "enhance handling qualities" but those handling qualities happen to be mandated by certification requirements.

Lots of airplanes have similar systems, including earlier versions of the 737. The Learjet 35 had a very similar system, only it activated at high speed and pitched up rather than down. And it was designed in the 1970s.

 

So what happens when you then push back to level flight? Does MCAS restore the trim to the level flight value, or just leave the plane in a nose down trim condition that needs to be corrected by the pilot. If the latter then I wouldn't consider that an enhancement.

 

Boeing safety system not at fault, says chief executive

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47980959

 

I'm not a 737 guy, but my assumption would be that the MCAS system would remove the trim as you lowered the nose. From a certification point of view, that would be a requirement, I would think. Otherwise you would be violating the 6 pounds/knot requirement in the other direction.

The point of it is that you don't know it's even there working-- everything just feels normal to you. As you pull the nose up, you feel the stick forces increase. As you lower the nose, they reduce.

 

Muilenberg said today that the AOA indicator is an optional item......don’t think that is beingreported correctly...... What did he really mean to say?

 

He meant to say that the AOA display and comparator between the two AOA indicators is an option. All 737 Maxs have two physical AOA probes.

 

This is management/enginnering oversight failure. Yes in theory MCAS was not flight critical, but then anyone with half a brain engineering and flight experience might have seen a that system that resets every 5 secs and can go to full nose down trim can crash a plane, mimicking runway trim only worse, and all off a single sensor failure, with no speed cutouts, and no info to pilots.
After the first crash, 8 months for sofwaree update which was not ready before the next crash is criminal given what we know,, and there seems clear evidence that the new software being developed was suppar and that Boeing didn not understand the extent of the problem untill maybe last week, assuming they do now..
,
Mullenberg first deflected Boeign's repsonsibiity by saying MCAS was FAA aporved which frankly is a cop out, and last week looked like an ass in Q and A with the press, whereupon he walked out when he couldnt handle the questions..
From a pr perspective its the worst disaster management I have ever seen, and indicates yet again management failure and failure at the very least to understand the gravity of the situation.

I was at dinner last night with 3 people, who all question whether the max can ever be made safe, and have pretty much said they will avoid any 737. One was an art direcrtor the other computer tech and the last a mechnical egineer, the mechy was at least open to flying a 737 but pointed out that if they missed this much easy stuff, how much else have they missed on this aircvaft upgrade. Serriously this plane is getting the DC10/corvair reputation.

The only saving grace boeing has is that the'yre back ordered 7 years and airbus even longer, so airlines and passengers have nowhere else to go. I would, say its time for Boeing to rebrand the 737 "max" which sounds as appealing as a "maxi pad," what genius thought up that name to start with. Boeing needs to call this plane sometihing else give it a new identity, once they have the details worked out. They can then use the 7 year backlog to develop a new plane. That is assuming the current boeing is capable of developing a new plane with the attributes the Boeing was famous for.

A Pilots friend who trasitioned tot he 777 from an A320 told me that in training they were told the last great plane Boeing made was the 777, which was the last plane built by those who cut their teeth on the 707-747 era, and that the 787 is called the clip together plastic plane designed by kids.

Boeign has serious problems. If I had a say I would be firing top management and moving managmeent out of Chicago back to seattle or Nc on the shop floor where they belong.

Because of the backlog Boeing may seem Ok for now, but they have sucgh serious internal issues highlighted by this and their lack of mea culpa and candor not to mention mamangement weakness I'm not sure what their long term prospects are short of a significant internal change.

I do not belive for one second that the people who were responsible for the B52, Kc135/707 727 737200-400 747 and 777 would have allowed MCAS as installed to go ahead, makes me wonder what else has been missed and how many peopel will die as a result.

Mullenberg is touting this a s a teaching moment to make planes even safer. But this is not teaching moment, there is no sigificant new aircraft knowledge that has been gained here, just poor process and relearning lessons learned long ago, at the cost of what 300 lives...

 

Exactly what I'm talking about, near total managent failure, they still dont get it. This guy has gotta go.

 

He just survived a vote to see whether he should be removed. From a shareholder point of view, he is doing great. Wall Street was tickled pink is was only going to cost $1B to fix the problem. They had estimated $3B.

 

Lot of truth in that statement. On the 777 there were a lot of 'old-timers' acting as principal engineers in all departments. The new crop of engineers on the 777, after 10yrs of experience, became the new principal engineers on the 787. But also, there always seemed to me a big separation between the Everett (wide-body's) and Renton (narrow-body's) workforce. Not a lot of cross-over between staff that I recall.