1st A380 in Service Now Scrapped | Page 2 | FerrariChat

1st A380 in Service Now Scrapped

Discussion in 'Aviation Chat' started by Jacob Potts, Nov 26, 2019.

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  1. Jaguar36

    Jaguar36 Formula Junior

    Nov 8, 2010
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    I have no particular love for the A380, but still those pictures make me sad.
     
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  2. Jeff Kennedy

    Jeff Kennedy F1 Veteran
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    I wonder how many of the A380s sold have residual value backstop guarantees from Airbus. If there are some/very many, then Airbus gets another financial hit on an already money loser.

    Airbus was/remains the backstop on the Singapore A340-500s.
     
  3. tazandjan

    tazandjan Three Time F1 World Champ
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    That thing is a lot of beer cans.
     
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  4. Hannibal308

    Hannibal308 F1 Veteran
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    My pop flew Huns for a while...said they were crap. Then again, having Mustangs, Lightnings, Dog Sabres, and Vipers as comparisons, no wonder.
     
  5. tazandjan

    tazandjan Three Time F1 World Champ
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    The early F-100s had a lot of problems, but they were pretty much fixed by the time they retired them from the Guard. Our local Guard unit, the Tacos (150th FW) flew them before they converted to A-7s. The F-100Ds with the taller vertical stabilizer worked pretty well. I flew with a lot of Hun drivers and they all complained that after they finally fixed the Hun, they retired her. The Hun was the last fighter my father flew after P-47Ds in WW-II, P-51Ds postwar, and straight wing F-84s as his last operational fighter assignment. He also got to fly P-38s (and P-322s), Spitfires, and tons of other WW-II vintage aircraft. They were pretty lax about who could fly what back then as long as you were a pilot. Of course the accident rate was around 70 times higher than what we have now.
     
  6. Rifledriver

    Rifledriver Three Time F1 World Champ

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    One of Jack Broughton's books, I think it was Thud Ridge had a few chapters about flying and surviving early jet fighters. Several had pretty serious issues. Both his books were good reads. I really liked the stories of F84 and F101's. Kept me in stitches.
     
  7. Etcetera

    Etcetera Two Time F1 World Champ
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    They should have converted it to a fighter jet just for the yucks.
     
  8. Bob Parks

    Bob Parks F1 Veteran
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    Brian. You in stitches ?
     
  9. Jeff Kennedy

    Jeff Kennedy F1 Veteran
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    1. BACK TO AIR TRANSPORT
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    Why Airbus Was Chasing The Wrong Enemy When It Launched The A380
    Jens Flottau February 20, 2019
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    Credit: Dubai Airports
    Explaining the air transport industry is usually very difficult—the sector is complex and unpredictable, dependent on external factors and the availability of technology—and not always rational. But Airbus summarized the last 30 years well in just two sentences: “The A320 program is on track to reach the monthly targeted production rate of 60 aircraft by mid-2019 with rate 63 targeted for 2021. . . . As a consequence of [Emirates’ decision to reduce its order] and given the lack of an order backlog with other airlines, deliveries of the A380 will cease in 2021.”

    What Airbus described in its update on future production is a fundamental shift in air travel patterns that began long before Airbus committed to building the A380, a change that contributed markedly to the slow death of the world’s largest commercial aircraft. The industry became more fragmented and compartmentalized, as seemingly contradictory trends began to overlap each other. Beginning in the 1980s with the introduction of ETOPS flying and the first true twin-engine long-haul aircraft, the Boeing 767, widebodies are becoming smaller.

    It is true that the 1988 relaunch of the Boeing 747, the 747-400, was a major advance, with new engines, wings, cabin and two-pilot cockpit that extended the commercial success of the aircraft by another decade and a half. But it can be argued that the 1995 introduction of the Boeing 777 was actually the transformative event of its time. With it, large widebody twins began to dominate long-haul flying.

    Airbus terminates A380 program only 12 years after service entry

    Last aircraft will be delivered in 2021

    Emirates cuts back key order by 39 aircraft

    Not to be forgotten is the 1987 launch and 1993 introduction of the Airbus A330, which did not start as the long-range aircraft to which it has been upgraded. Its success to date is in sharp contrast to the failure of the four-engine Airbus A340.

    In short, long-haul aircraft now generally have only two engines, and many are smaller than those that dominated the segment earlier: the 747, McDonnell Douglas DC-10 or the Lockheed L-1011. Even the largest versions of the Airbus 350 and 777X are not in high demand and have not been for some time. But both could benefit from the disappearance of the A380 as large operators seek to replace in-service fleets over time.

    The latest-generation twins are so efficient they can match or now even exceed A380 unit costs. There is no cost incentive for larger aircraft. They are more expensive, and the risk of having to fill all the extra seats cannot be discounted.



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    Departed: Emirates has given up the idea of building its future on the A380. Credit: Dubai Airports
    Airbus liked to argue that sooner or later airlines would have to operate larger aircraft, because there is no other way to handle increased traffic volumes. For long-haul flying, that has turned out to be true only in very few markets between big hubs, although the average size of narrowbodies has been trending up for years. And even if that eventually filters through to widebodies, it would be too late for the A380, even if Airbus found ways to keep producing it for much longer.

    Given the shift in fundamentals and airline preferences, the decision to stop production of the world’s largest civil aircraft does not come as a surprise. Having to cancel the multibillion-dollar project a little over 18 years after it was launched in December 2000 shows how far Airbus was off in its demand forecast for very-large aircraft. Instead of the 1,500 orders Airbus expected in that category over 20 years, only one-sixth materialized.

    The A380 termination leaves Airbus about where it was before the launch, although the size gap between its largest aircraft and Boeing’s is lessened. Boeing soon will again be building the world’s largest commercial aircraft, the 777-9, with space for around 400 seats, not dissimilar to the 747-400. The largest Airbus, the A350-1000 will have around 50 fewer seats, depending on specific airline configuration.



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    Airbus has considered stretching the A350 further to match the 777-9’s capacity, but that decision may not be made soon—at least until there are clear indications 777-9 sales are taking off at the expense of the A350.

    Airbus was even further off with the A380 than is apparent at first glance: What is known today as the A380-800 was planned as the baseline aircraft, but really the stretched -900 was going to be the top seller as airlines sought to expand their hubs. And then there was a cargo version ordered by FedEx that was never built, the planning for which had a detrimental impact on the aircraft’s structural weight. The wings were designed for the -900, which is why they are too large and too heavy for the smaller variant, adding to its weight problem. The A380-800 is like an A319 or 737-7 in the narrowbody world, suboptimal and therefore very hard to sell.

    The exceedingly large wings, combined with the heavier-than-needed aircraft structure and the large tailplane (which could have been smaller for a stretch), would have required so much change for a potential Neo done right that the project was a no-go right from the start. New engines would have meant lower fuel burn, but the structural design flaws would have persisted.

    More than two decades ago, the European aerospace industry was obsessive about competing with the Boeing 747. The Europeans suspected that its rival’s largest airliner generated profit margins that allowed it to aggressively market other programs, like the 737, against similar Airbus products. They overlooked an important aspect, that the 747 itself was already past its peak. Europe was sinking multiple billions into chasing the wrong enemy and initially did not pay attention to the real threat, the 777, for which the four-engine A340 was not an adequate challenger.

    One of the many painful ironies of the A380 is that Airbus reached its strategic target of 50% of the world market despite the program’s misfortunes.

    Airbus executives like Fabrice Bregier, former president of the commercial aircraft division, argued the A380 was launched 10 years too early. While that may be true, one might also contend it was launched 10 years too late, otherwise it might have captured part of the last big wave of 747 orders. Of course, Airbus was not ready for such a huge project in the early 1980s.

    Work on several different layouts started in the late 1980s. In 1993, Boeing and Airbus partner companies launched a feasibility study into the development of a very-large commercial transport. Airbus pursued the plans even after Boeing dropped out of the project, initially naming it the A3XX. In 1996, Airbus created the large-aircraft division headed by Juergen Thomas, later called the “father of the A380.”



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    Better times: a busy A380 final assembly line in Toulouse. Credit: Airbus
    The program was formally launched with firm orders for a total of 50 aircraft from Virgin Atlantic, Qantas Airways, Air France, International Lease Finance Corp., Singapore Airlines and Emirates. Shortly after the launch, Lufthansa, FedEx (for the freighter version offered at the time) and Qatar Airways were added to the customer list.

    The political, industrial and emotional aspects of the launch should not be underestimated, as Europe considered it the final step out of Boeing’s shadow. Possibly the one lasting achievement of the A380 is as a major contributor to the European aerospace sector’s consolidation. The loosely linked players discovered such a gigantic project could not be pursued with the industry as fragmented as it was.

    And so the year 2000 not only saw the A380’s launch, but also the creation of EADS. Initially a fragile, politically charged and highly delicate project, it since has morphed into a fairly well-integrated and less politically influenced, more normal company called Airbus. That achievement is closely tied to one man, Tom Enders, ironically the same Airbus CEO who shut down the A380 19 years later.



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    Source: Airbus
    Few in the aerospace industry are immune to the fascination of something big flying. The amazement of finally being able to build something bigger than what the competition is offering cannot be underestimated, whether it makes sense or not. When Harry Stonecipher, Boeing’s CEO at the time, was asked in 2000 why EADS launched the A380, he needed only three words to answer: “Too much testosterone.”

    Entry into service, initially foreseen for 2005, was delayed until 2007 after Airbus discovered that wiring layout in aircraft sections produced at different sites did not match. With politics prevailing at the start, EADS integration had not progressed far enough. The problems led to the departure of senior executives, including Noel Forgeard as EADS co-CEO and Gustav Humbert as Airbus CEO, and the launch of the Power 8 restructuring program.

    In the face of the billions in additional costs and lost revenues Airbus incurred through the A380 production disaster, the OEM made a decision in 2006 that would be more crucial for its future than was then obvious. Almost at the peak of its industrial and financial crisis, it launched the A350.

    That launch allowed Airbus to participate in the success of smaller widebodies, at the expense of the large quads. Without it, Boeing’s long-haul dominance, which Airbus sought to break with the A380, would have been even firmer. Some Airbus insiders assert that the A350 launch also marked the end of aggressive A380 sales efforts, but not everyone shares that view.

    Airlines also did not buy into the argument that the A380 would be needed to ease hub congestion. The aircraft’s operators found that it in fact contributed to congestion because of the need for so many feeder flights.

    The company tried numerous times to rescue the program, and it worked at least once: Emirates bought 50 more A380s at the 2013 Dubai Airshow; the end of the type would likely have come much sooner without that deal. Emirates Airline President Tim Clark, the world’s biggest A380 fan, was key to keeping production going. Aviation Week & Space Technology chose Clark as its Person of the Year at the time for exactly that reason (AW&ST Jan. 13, 2014, p. 36).

    Half a year later, Airbus announced a partnership with lessor Doric Lease (now called Amedeo). The strange arrangement, announced at the 2014 Farnborough Airshow, saw Amedeo “order” 20 aircraft. But it only had to commit to production slots once it had placed aircraft with an airline. Of course, Amedeo did not market a single aircraft, temporarily considered setting up an A380-only airline that never took off and then dropped the deal at program termination.

    Not only were orders from new operators sparse, but apart from Emirates, existing A380 customers showed little enthusiasm for enlarging their fleets. In fact, quite the opposite happened. Air France and Lufthansa took fewer aircraft than their original commitments. Qantas took only 12 from an order of 20. And retirements have been accelerated. Singapore Airlines added an order for five A380s beyond the 19 it bought initially, but it has retired six, according to Airbus statistics; two are already being scapped.

    Air France has said it will reduce its A380 fleet, and Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al Baker announced the airline will retire its 10 A380s when they turn 10 years old, in five years. China Southern Airlines is apparently unhappy with the aircraft, which it considers to be too large for its Guangzhou hub. Malaysia Airlines has been looking for better ways to use its A380s and appears to be focusing them on a pilgrim-charter operation. The erosion has begun.



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    The A380 flies for the first time, on April 27, 2005, over its hometown of Toulouse. Credit: P. Mascelet/Airbus
    Chief Financial Officer Harald Wilhelm says Airbus has limited exposure to residual value guarantees it had to grant customers. Airbus took a charge of close to €500 million ($570 million) for the termination. Still, over time many airlines will be facing the lack of a secondary market. Just one aircraft has been picked up so far, by Portuguese wet-lease specialist Hi Fly.

    A380 production peaked in 2012 and 2014, when Airbus delivered 30 aircraft each year, way short of its earlier initial ramp-up target of 45 per year. Airbus delivered 15 A380s in 2017 and only 12 last year. Before the program’s cancellation, production was planned to be reduced to six a year starting in 2020, a rate at which program losses would have became wider rather than smaller. Airbus stopped publishing development costs, initially specified at close to €10 billion. Industry observers believe the real costs are around €25 billion, a portion of which has been picked up by European governments through reimbursable launch aid that now will not be entirely reimbursed.

    Emirates announced Feb. 14 it will only take 14 more A380s instead of the 53 it had on firm order and yet to be handed over. The order has been revised and now includes 40 A330-900s and 30 A350-900s, according to a new heads-of-agreement.

    “As a result of this decision, we have no substantial A380 backlog and hence no basis to sustain production, despite all our sales efforts with other airlines in recent years. This leads to the end of A380 deliveries in 2021,” says Enders. “The consequences of this decision are largely embedded in our 2018 full-year results.”

    The CEO was never the biggest A380 supporter. He was not directly involved in the launch or the politics surrounding it. Still, he praises the aircraft: “The A380 is not only an outstanding engineering and industrial achievement. Passengers all over the world love to fly on this great aircraft. Hence today’s announcement is painful for us and the A380 communities worldwide. But, keep in mind that A380s will still roam the skies for many years to come, and Airbus will of course continue to fully support the A380 operators.”

    “Emirates has been a staunch supporter of the A380 since its very inception,” says Chairman and CEO Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum. “While we are disappointed to have to give up our order, and sad that the program could not be sustained, we accept that this is the reality of the situation. For us, the A380 is a wonderful aircraft loved by our customers and our crew. It is a differentiator for Emirates.” According to Al Maktoum, Emirates will continue to operate the aircraft “well into the 2030s.”

    The airline had ordered 70 A350s, but canceled that deal in 2014. The future of its 2017 commitment for 40 Boeing 787-10s is now unclear: “We continue to evaluate our fleet options, including the 787,” the airline says.

    If it keeps the 787, Emirates would go back to a more complex fleet that also includes the A380, A350, A330neo and 777/777X. That it is moving to smaller aircraft opens up growth options to more secondary routes. It also raises questions about if and when the proposed Dubai World Central Airport will be built.

    Emirates had signed a firm order with Airbus for more A380s in January 2018, which had been included in the backlog. But the airline never reached an agreement with engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce over the terms and performance guarantees for an additional Trent 900 order. The carrier had been unhappy with performance shortfalls it has seen on engines on its existing fleet.

    In addition to Emirates, only All Nippon Airways (ANA) will take more A380s (three) before production ceases. ANA placed the 380 order in late 2015, after having bought a minority stake in bankrupt Japanese carrier Skymark Airlines, a move for which it needed Airbus support. Among others, from an order for six A380s placed by Skymark, Airbus was a major creditor in the bankruptcy process.

    The A380 entered commercial service on Oct. 25, 2007, with Singapore Airlines. The first flight from Singapore to Sydney was operated as Flight 380. Since then, Airbus has delivered a total 234 aircraft.

    Orders for the A380 stood at 313 aircraft at the end of January, but the backlog came down to 251 upon program termination. With orders for 123 A380s, Emirates is still by far the largest customer for the aircraft. At the end of January, Emirates operated 109 A380s.
     
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  10. boxerman

    boxerman F1 World Champ
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    Airbus got snookered by Boeing into developing the A380.
     
  11. jcurry

    jcurry Two Time F1 World Champ
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    The use of large commercial aircraft converted to 'aircraft carriers' of drones and missiles is not fantasy.
     
  12. tazandjan

    tazandjan Three Time F1 World Champ
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    Arsenal aircraft are definitely something USAF is considering. Especially with the development of medium range, air-launched hypersonic weapons. The B-52H is in that role in a high threat environment.
     
  13. BJK

    BJK F1 Rookie

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  14. norcal2

    norcal2 F1 Veteran

    at the same time airbus has the BelugaXL, ugly aircraft but seems to have a market...
     
  15. boxerman

    boxerman F1 World Champ
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    Just rode to U.K. on what must be one of the last Ba 747s and then on to South Africa on a 380. The 380 is really quiet but the 747 is Cadillac of the skies.
     
  16. Tcar

    Tcar F1 Rookie

    Market???? there are only 4 or 5 of them....
     
  17. Jeff Kennedy

    Jeff Kennedy F1 Veteran
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    German Investors Mull A380 Fate
    Alex Derber January 31, 2020
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    German firm Dr Peters has reached an agreement with Air France over the return of one of its Airbus A380s.

    The deal will see Air France make a maintenance payment due to the aircraft not meeting its lease return conditions, and continue to lease its GP7000 engines.

    As a result of those agreements and previous lease payments, investors’ capital will be preserved, although the fate of the aircraft, and any residual value, is uncertain.

    Disassembly is the most likely option, although this needs the approval of three-quarters of shareholders in Dr Peters fund DS 135.

    German investors have invested around €1.6 billion in 21 A380s through closed-end funds.

    Shareholders in another Dr Peters fund agreed to part out its first A380 once the lease expired in 2017.

    In 2018 Dr Peters predicted parts revenue of around $70 million from each A380. Two dismantling events have been completed thus far, including one from DS 129, with the parts sales process expected to take two years.

    At the end of 2019, however, each scrapped A380 had generated only $19 million, with the prices of parts awaiting sale only likely to fall as more A380s head to the chop shop.

    Nonetheless, part-out seems the best option in a market where onward demand for the A380 is almost non-existent.

    “Interestingly, the prices of funds whose A380s are already in a part-out – selling the aircraft for their parts - have risen slightly from previous lows: the process has provided investors with greater certainty in the context of the expiry of the aircraft leases,” wrote Frank Netscher, an analyst for Scope Ratings, at the end of last year.
     
  18. boxerman

    boxerman F1 World Champ
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    Friends daughter works at Airbus as an engineer. She told me the problem with the A380 is that the wing spars are cracking.
     
  19. jcurry

    jcurry Two Time F1 World Champ
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    That was a fairly recent development, i.e. last summer. While it may hasten some retirements it was not the reason for ending production and lack of overall success of the program.
     
  20. boxerman

    boxerman F1 World Champ
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    Maybe nothing to do with the prgrams lack of sucess, thats more about conceptualy wrong.

    Or to put it more acuratly with efficient twins and RSVN seperation the reason for such a large aircraft and its attendant hub and spoke is not of primary interest or necessity to airlines. The efficient twins have more or less the same seat cost per mile, can fly full more often(so actualy lower over seat cost per year) and be used on shorter routes when necessary. Plus the twins go point point, which is more efficient all around and more desireable for passengers. With modern ATC the skies are not too crowded so can handle the extra flights a fleet of smaller planes creates

    Could be in a decade or two there really is a big landing slot issue at major airports and a yge plane will be needed, even then the 777 can fill that role.

    So the A380 has very limiuted application which meant there was not enoughg interest to buy more or develop a neo version.

    Even if there had been demman, the spar cracks would have been a major hurdle to overcome. Now it seems its not worth doing the expensive checks and repairs to the existing fleet, rather just scrap them.

    Compare that to 757's which are still flying because theyre comercialy viable and durable. Even the 747 is still in action, at least at BA.

    Seems liek going forwards the a321 xlr and some 777s will be all the airplane any airline needs.
     
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  21. Bob Parks

    Bob Parks F1 Veteran
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    Not that I'm an expert but my thoughts from the beginning were that the concept was wrong and cumbersome. Also remember being told that it was always extremely tricky to figure stress in a gull wing or a wing with severe sheer.
     
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