Is a Boeing 737 MAX the safest plane in service?

Take look at the current crop of airliners and almost all have swept wings and dihedral. One way to stabilize an airplane is to sweep the wing back. The other way to stabilize the airplane is with dihedral. Put the two together on one vehicle and you get dutch roll from over-stabilization.

 

ANOTHER whistleblower?

 

Bob, it's a good thing we worked at Boeing when we did. Today's Boeing is looking more and more like a train that is wrecking continuously and is unlikely to ever get back on the tracks.

 

I was chatting with someone who works for Boeing today, actually, and thought of Bob's words. Things have not gotten better, that is for sure... and much of the problem is in the lack of people like Bob who helped the new engineers get started.

 

I agree, Jim. It makes me sad to see how the company has deteriorated into a disoriented gang of selfish, self serving people that have no attachment to the company. all the time and energy is spent on manipulating funds and building their portfolios.

 

A Boeing executive made the statement that he could get plenty young engineers to fill in behind those old timers that were being moved on. I can recall many incidents where new engineers asked things like," What are the scissors for on the landing 'strut legs?" "Why does the entire horizontal tail have to move when you have elevators?" "Why can't you put an electric motor on the aft segment of the triple slotted flap to operate it?" Too many others to list.

 

Can't blame them Bob. Its what business schools have been teaching for some time now.

 

Fundamentaly Boeing is run by MBA's not engineers or production people. What Boeing needs is as team who understands manufacturing in charge. The current management has no clue and their textbooks and spreadsheets cant teach them.

 

One of my buddies in engineering read my resume' one day and said that he had read novels that were much shorter. Nothing to brag about when someone has been at it for as long as I have.
i started in 1950 as a flight line mechanic.
Went into Tool Design and Production Illustration. 1952
Went into Employee Development to design and teach courses for new-hire engineers. 1960
Laid off 1970
Hired back as an Electrical Systems Planner 1977
Transferred to Engineering as a configurations draftsman 1978
On loan to the Environmental Control System to help design a three pack system 1984
On loan to the Hydraulics Group to help with over-load 1986
Upgraded to Technical Designer 1987
Transferred into first group of configurators to start the 777 design under Alan Mulally, worked on ECS, hydraulics, lofting, and systems installations 1989
Retired the first time in 1992
Went back in 1994 as a contract employee in 777 advanced configuration modifications

And for all of that I have 4 framed letters of achievement....and some pretty nice memories.

 

I'll throw mine in. Unlike Bob, I started as an engineer. I was working for Grumman and was on loan to Boeing Commercial both times:
Worked in Everett on 767 structural design from 3/79 to 9/80, on the lower section 45 (wing center box).
Worked in Renton on 777 structural design from 6/91 to 1/93, on the inboard flaps.
In both cases Grumman was to build the components I was working on under subcontract. They eventually sold off that part of their business, but to my knowledge the current holder of the subcontract is still building those components for Boeing.

In the 1984-86 timeframe I did the same at Boeing Helicopter in Ridley Park, PA, on the prototypes of the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor. Grumman built the tail surfaces for the prototypes but lost the production subcontract.

I think Bob and I have determined that on the 767 we were sitting fairly close to each other, perhaps even within sight, but we never met!

 

Ok, non-engineer here... I'd guess scissors for struts would provide better reinforcement against torquing of landing gear, such as when coming in on a cross wind and touching down not straight on the runway. I'd guess entire horizonal tail moves to have better/greater input on pitch that can't be managed by fine input from elevators.

That last one I haven't a clue. Wouldn't that be the trailing edge? How would you possibly put a motor there? Help?

All the best,
Andrew.

 

Your logic is right on! The movable horizontal stabilizer takes over when the elevator can no longer apply input in the transonic and super sonic changes in airflow. The airflow is diverted to below the horizontal tail, making it and the elevator ineffective in stabilizing the airplane So, the entire trim-able horizontal tail becomes the only pitch control element.
The main shock absorbing strut is composed of two tubes. The upper tube is massive and is attached to the wing swivel fitting, also the retraction mechanism is attached to it. The lower tube slides up and down inside the upper tube and since there isn't a spline to maintain alignment, this must be accomplished with an arm with a hinged end and attached to the upper tube. The lower tube is attached to the landing gear assembly that can be a simple two-wheeled axel or a massive six wheel truck. The free ends of the two arms are joined together with a hinge so that when the two tubes lengthen or shorten, the arms , or scissors, maintain the alignment of the wheels. '
I'm a pencil guy and I feel that I am making a mess of this but I gave it a try.
The electric motor on a delicate flap segment thing was the brain child of a new engineer from N.Y.C. When I told him that his idea was totally off the environment, he became combative and would not accept the "non-engineer" giving him any advice. I was not the only one that he clashed with. I'm not a racist and i can get along with anybody but this young man was a Jew that had a chip on his shoulder and he was soon let go. He just couldn't work with anybody.

 

Not the only manufacturer that has made huge costly mistakes and lied about it until the bitter end.

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Once upon a time, prior to making a career change, I was an engineer for about a decade. I was employed by a government contractor at a DOE lab which was responsible for design, support, and disposal of stuff for the Navy. Every single engineer who managed anything technical, to include all upper management, started off as as an associate engineer. It’s mind boggling to me that it isn’t this way at every engineering company. The place I worked didn’t have to answer to shareholders, but it just seems wise to have someone with a technical background signing for technical work. Also on a slightly related note, I’ve always found it interesting that very few people in airline upper management are pilots.

 

I wouldn't say being able to fly has much correlation with being a good airline CEO. Possibly the greatest airline CEO of all time was Herb Kelleher, and he was a lawyer.

On the other hand, another one of the greatest CEOs of all time was Eddie Rickenbacker, who certainly was a pilot but never worked as an airline pilot (although he did fly Eastern's airplanes on occasion).

 

Boeing Has Confessed to Committing Its Deadly Crime … and Should Now Plead Guilty
Boeing has no defense to the charged crime of defrauding the FAA. Rather than go through a pointless trial with a preordained result, it should plead guilty straightaway.


Yesterday Judge Reed O'Connor of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas set a trial date (June 23rd) in United State v. Boeing. The case concerns a long-pending federal criminal charge filed against Boeing for conspiring to defraud the FAA. Boeing has reportedly been dragging its heels about pleading guilty. Boeing has no defense. It should do the right thing and plead guilty as soon as possible.

As I've blogged about previously (see here, here, here, and here), the criminal charge pending against Boeing arises out of two deadly crashes of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019. A Justice Department investigation uncovered the fact that Boeing had lied to the FAA about the safety of the aircraft—lies that led directly and proximately to the crashes killing 346 passengers and crew. On January 7, 2021, the Justice Department filed a criminal information with a one-count conspiracy charge against Boeing, alleging that
"""From at least in or around November 2016 through at least in or around December 2018, in the Northern District of Texas and elsewhere, the Defendant, THE BOEING COMPANY, knowingly and willfully, and with the intent to defraud, conspired and agreed together with others to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, defeating, and interfering with, by dishonest means, the lawful function of a United States government agency, to wit, the Federal Aviation Administration Aircraft Evaluation Group ("FAA AEG") within the United States Department of Transportation, in connection with the FAA AEG's evaluation of the Boeing 737 MAX airplane's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System …."""


https://reason.com/volokh/2025/03/26/boeing-has-confessed-to-committing-its-deadly-crime-and-should-now-plead-guilty/

 

I read that yesterday. What specifically did Boeing do to defraud the FAA? Did they know that the software or other aspects of the aircraft were defective and lied about that?

 

From the article...there's also an issue w Boeing not "notifying" families of victims in a timely manner re: lawsuits
Depressing.
Whatever happened to "if it ain't a Boeing I ain't going"

((A Justice Department investigation uncovered the fact that Boeing had lied to the FAA about the safety of the aircraft—lies that led directly and proximately to the crashes killing 346 passengers and crew. On January 7, 2021, the Justice Department filed a criminal information with a one-count conspiracy charge against Boeing

 

My recollection from data a long time ago (might not be remembering exactly right) was that they had to use crazy control parameters to pass the test. The expected range was something like 1-5, and they ended up having to use values like 50 or 100 to pass the test, and that was never disclosed. Using wild values outside of the expected range in control systems can cause wild instability under certain conditions. Again, I don't remember exactly, but I think one of the fundamental issues was something along those lines. I thought they'd never fix it because that issue was a result of the physics change of moving the wings/engines, and I don't think they changed the physics in the "solution". My guess is that their solution was just disengage MCAS sooner and put it in the pilot's hands rather than hit that unstable condition (that is a complete guess on my part).