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Discussion in 'AviatorChat.com' started by Bob Parks, Oct 11, 2019.
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It is very analogous to that situation
The Whiz Kids did the same to the AF and Navy.
I was working on the SST and C-5 during those days and the TFX (LBJ) when MacNamara (spl) was stomping around. Good God, what a mistake he was and what a mess he made of everything. Another case of the wrong guy in the wrong place. A banker?
I think he became a banker later. He was one of LeMay's statisticians, the group who believed we could win war through Bombing because satistical analysis showed that the Nazis couldnt produce weapons with the Bombing.
He wanted kill ratios during Vietnaam because thats how we were winning the war.
TFX was going to be a one size fits all plane that was going to save money, kinda reminds me of the F35 but I digress.
These statistical analysis certainly have their place in many things, as do financial engineers, however they should not lead a process, especialy when youre sellign an emotive product or a product with strong emotive pull.
If statistics should lead emotive product inspiration, then computers could create great origional art.
He should have been buried (When he was still alive) at the base of the Wall with his head sticking out. A lot of names up there due to him. I really hope he is in the hottest corner with his pal LBJ.
Back to the issues with the Starliner software. During yesterday's press conference the discussion turned to whether this was illustrative of a cultural issue within Boeing. The speakers tried to downplay that but from where I sit, it does seem like there is a cultural issue within the company.
Specifically, the culture at Boeing has gone from do it right no matter what, to build it and ship it as fast as possible so we can get that revenue flowing. I'm also thinking about the quality issues seen at the Charleston factory where quality was overtaken by speed and delivery schedule.
There are too many examples within Boeing to say this isn't related to a widespread cultural issue.
In any organization, culture starts at the top and flows down the org chart. Given that, the Board MUST be reshuffled. Boeing is not in a good place right now.
Opinion: Airbus Can Coast On Its Product Line; Boeing Cannot
Richard Aboulafia February 05, 2020
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One of incoming Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun’s first actions has been to order a rethink of the company’s new midmarket airplane (NMA). This is the right move. It has never been clear how the NMA, a twin-aisle design, could match the economics of the single-aisle A321neo.
Yet Calhoun should keep in mind three realities that weigh on Boeing’s new product strategy. First, the middle market is booming, and Airbus is winning it with the A321neo. Second, Airbus can expand and update its single-aisle and midmarket product line. The third is that Boeing cannot do that. There is a lot at stake for Boeing and not much time.
First, airlines clearly want midsize jets. Last year, there were just 673 net orders for all Airbus and Boeing jets; 476 of these were for the A321neo. This is more than just upgauging; much is due to increasing airline route fragmentation, a trend that will keep growing for years to come.
This midmarket growth also reflects a shift away from twin-aisles (Boeing’s strongest position) and toward single-aisles (where Airbus is strongest). Airbus has sold 3,255 A321neos since the type was launched in 2011, or three times as many as the 1,049 Boeing 757s sold over 25 years. By contrast, Boeing has sold around 650 737 MAX 9/10s (the company does not break out variant orders). The A321neo is winning by a 5:1 ratio.
While the 737 MAX 8 has done well against the A320neo, as the A321neo continues to grow in popularity, it will bolster Airbus’ smaller single-aisles, as airlines seek commonality across their fleets.
Second, Calhoun should remember that there is quite a lot that Airbus can do with its single-aisle product line. In addition to increasing commonality between the A220 and A320 families, it could stretch the former C Series, creating a 145-150-seat A220-500, likely offering lower seat-mile costs.
While an A220-500 would take away demand for the A320neo, Airbus could compensate by making the A320neo and A321neo more capable models. The A220’s wings use resin transfer infusion (RTI) composites. Adapting this technology for the A320/321neo, perhaps with an engine update, would produce 150-240-seat jets with greater range and superb economics.
Most intriguingly, if the A321neo can be stretched, Airbus would have an even greater midmarket category killer. With new RTI wings and new, more powerful engines, an A322neo would be a true global route-fragmentation machine, building on the Boeing 787’s remarkable work in creating new thinner routes.
Third, by contrast with this incredible menu of Airbus possibilities, Boeing can do nothing more to the 737. The MAX 9/10 and MAX 200 are clearly outclassed by the A321neo, and there is probably nothing that Boeing can do to make them more competitive.
Most of all, the 737 family has clearly reached the end of its evolutionary line. After the MAX program, there will not be a fifth 737 incarnation. Boeing needs a new clean-sheet, single-aisle model eventually.
Analysts, including me, point to the McDonnell Douglas experience as an example of what can happen when a jetmaker neglects new product investment. But there is a difference. When McDonnell absorbed Douglas in 1967, it inherited a single-aisle jet—the DC-9—that proved reasonably well-suited to updates. And its MD-80 series was a success, staying in production through 1999. This also allowed McDonnell to address the core of the single-aisle market, albeit in a declining way, without having to launch any new products.
But if Boeing is to copy McDonnell and neglect investment in its jetliner business, it will not have 30 years to coast. The 737 MAX will have 10-12 years before it needs replacement.
And unlike during the McDonnell sunset years, the market is shifting upward. If Boeing does not build a clean-sheet midmarket airplane, it will lose at least 15%, and perhaps 20%, of the market. What was a 50/50 duopoly will become a 65/35 duopoly, or perhaps even a 70/30 one. In an industry that is heavily dependent on volume to achieve the lower costs that airline customers demand, such a market-share decline would be tough to recover from.
Whether Calhoun remains as CEO or not, Boeing needs to digest the clear conclusion from these three realities: Product development inaction is a recipe for Airbus market dominance, possibly for decades to come.
It's better to deliver the right thing late than the wrong thing on time.
Whatever the answer is, Boeing needs to take its time to ensure what they deliver is the right answer and is something customers can trust.
Boeing, take your time, don't rush it, design, build, and ship the right product. Even if it takes longer and sucks up more resources.
I dont think he was evil per se, althought he results were and thats why he lost his mind. It is a very cautionary tale though of what happens when people get wrapped in numbers/atatistics as the ultimate answer. Things let lost really fast and the outcome is never whats desired. In the case of of a company they loose market share(harely), or worse kill people(boeing) or even way worse in war kill lots of people negligantly and destroy a nations belief in itself(vietnaam war)
On the evil point though, at the time of the trials of the Japanese generals Le-May remarked to Macnamerra, just remember if they had won we would be the war criminals.
On last thought. The bombing Germany showed two contradictory outcomes from numbers analysis, During the Bombing in fact German war material production under under Speer increased many fold, not least because he utlized good analysis, while our won staistical analysis as provided by the whiz kids said the oposite should happen. In the end whether the bombing worked as intended or not we needed to strike at Germany and that was the only methodology, and it was important to bring the fight to them, which eladers such as Churchill and Rooseveldt understood.
Staisticaly one A bomb did relatively little compared to fire bombing a city, emotionaly it brought Japan to the table .
Real leaders often understand what statisticians do not. Boeing needs a new single isle aircraft asap.
I understand from reading the french press this morning that the appeal court of the WTO has confirmed in April 2019 that Boeing still receives at least one "illegal subsidy" from the Washington state and that the EU is authorised to retaliate with sanctions, which should be defined for the spring. Don't get me wrong, I'm not happy over it (and besides, the conflict between Airbus and Boeing over subsidies is vey complex and not clear-cut) but surely it will not help...
Found one reference to this in english here:
[...] “Also last year, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that U.S. still had one illegal subsidy in place—a Washington State tax break for Boeing that Airbus claims is causing $15 billion in annual harm. A ruling authorizing the EU to impose sanctions on the US may come in the next few weeks.” [...]
The WA State tax breaks are not limited to Boeing. While they were designed around Boeing the actual tax laws apply to any aerospace business operating in the State, of which there are many. There are several classifications that include both engineering and manufacturing. While Boeing if obviously the biggest beneficiary of these State tax laws there are many small businesses, mine included, that also benefit from lower B&O taxes.
Something that some didn't understand or appreciate was the destruction of the ball bearing industry and the cessation of the oil production in Germany and its satellites. They continued aircraft production, as stated, but with no oil and the depletion of their trained pilots due to expending all their experienced pilots with no reserves was fatal. Germany couldn't train new pilots when they didn't have the fuel and in some cases , airplanes. Those pilots that were trained to fly were woefully decimated by the allied pilots who had not only been thoroughly trained but experienced. When the tide was turned it was overwhelming.
I know that Boeing has turned up the heat with the best people they have. Stay tuned.
Adolf Galland In His autobiography speaks volumes of the incompetence of hitler and goering when it came to fighter protection.
first during the Battle of Britain when they wouldn’t let the fighters roam, made them stick to bombers penetrating at slow speed l.thereby eliminating the surprise and hunting advantage of fighters
later on their inability to understand that Germany needed to maintain a fighter umbrella over its cities and industry. Instead they sent the best to Russia opening Germany to heavy bombing desstriction.
yes the bombers had an effect, as you point out ball bearings and syngas. But that was late in the war and German arms production was at an all time highs in 43 to late 44. basicaly bombers had an effect but not he deal sold.
we dropped more bombs on NorthVietnnam than in all of ww2. At best it forced them to the table In Paris. Yes we crimped where and when we could bomb.
my point is though that mass bombings neve really achieves their promised goals.
The A bomb did though, not because of its destructive power which was less than a good firebombing but because of its shock value.
Bad news in WW-II was that the bombers could not actually hit much with dumb bombs dropped from medium altitude. Problem existed all the way up to the B-52 raids in Desert Storm. If you did not have PGMs in Desert Storm, you did not kill much. A bit different now with all the fighters and heavies outfitted for PGMs.
The strategic bombing was later in the war because it took that long to get the bomb groups operational but once they did get up to speed they had good effect on transportation systems and oil refineries. Perhaps the effect of the tactical air assaults had as much effect when they attacked airfields and railroads and road operations. In the later stages of the war the shortage of fuel severally impacted the training of new pilots when they did have airplanes that were produced in dispersed sources. There were several huge dog fights in 1944 that eliminated several units of the Luftwaffe because the new German pilots were un- trained and faced USAAF fighter units that were at their peak. One fight over Clasteres , France involved something close to 75 combatants and resulted in the loss of 34 FW-90's, wiping out one entire German squadron. My late friend, Larry Blumer a P-38 pilot , shot down 5 FW-190's in less than ten minutes in that fight. On the way back to his station he shot up a train. When the tide turns....
Yes when the tide turn indeed.
Didnt realize that the P38's continued to fight in Europe, I thought they were withdrawn from there.
367th Fighter group.
Googly Wiki says P47s.for 367th in Europe.
Carpet/saturation bombing with large elements. Accuracy, as in <100m CEP, was not required. PGM allows for individual elements to get the same result.
The 367th was equipped with Bell P-39's from 1943-1944 and transitioned to P-38's from 1944 to 1945. The P-47's from 1945-1945. Larry told me about purposely tumbling a P-39 when he was stationed at Tonapah, Nev. He also told me about inadvertently shooting up the town's water tank when he thought that his 20mm was turned off and out of ammo. Boyington was a boy scout compared to this guy.
When Blumer returned from his big fight over Clastres his airplane was out of commission for several weeks to be repaired not from enemy fire but from the debris of the enemy airplanes that he obliterated and then flew through . Both engines were replaced because he forgot to take them off war emergency during the fight. The name of his last airplane was "Scrap Iron IV". There were three previous airplanes with appropriate names. He told about being jumped by a Spitfire one day over Germany. When I asked him what happened his answer was, "I shot him down!" Me, "What did you figure ? Mistaken identity?"Answer, "I didn't bother to ask." When he got back to station he instructed his crew chief to destroy the gun camera film. The vagaries of war.
Jim- Saturation bombing did not do much damage except on area targets. Errors up to 1500' can result just from differential ballistic winds at medium altitude. WW-II medium altitude bombers got nowhere near 100 m CEP.
Intersting, i always thought a P38 would have had trouble with something like a well flown spit simply because the P38 was a big twin and wouldnt be able to turn as well. But then p38s were tangling with zeros. Kelley Johinbson knew his stuff. Aparently the U2 stll uses the same control wheel as a p38.
I think were were lots of vagaries of war back then.
A lot of them got overstressed and came home with a kinked wing turning with Zeros too. I don't think 109's or 190s would turn with a Zero either. I think it was more a matter of skilled pilots than equipment. F4F, F6F F4U, P38, I don't think any of those was turning with a Zero. Tougher airplanes and better pilots. That Spitfire pilot was outclassed or just having a bad day and paid the price.
Yea, I'll say. I grew up listening to all the Dads tell war stories around a camp fire. Lots of stuff happened that no one ever "saw". But then they also had a sympathetic press corp and no one was confused about who the enemy was. .