FAA lifts grounding. FAA order formally lifts Boeing 787 grounding Other country flight regs will prolly follow suit.
Therein lies the critical fault with outsourcing design. A vendor has little, if any, incentive to design beyond the spec. Whereas in the past Boeing engineering went above and beyond the regulatory requirement, building a superior product in all respects.
Exactly! That's why I HATE the entire concept of mass outsourcing, especially when there have been way more than a few cases of the work going to under-qualified and unqualified contractors on the program. I'll say it again, What made Boeing a great company WAS three things: Best design Best performance Best quality It used to be that the airplane was over-designed and over-built. Now it's the "How cheap can we get this built for?" culture. Why should a supplier go "above and beyond" when they are getting full price for "just good enough"? Needless to say, I am disappointed at the direction the Company has gone. NOTE: Opinions expressed above are solely my own and in no way are representative of the Boeing Company and it's policies.
United just 'officially' announced that they'll start 787 flights from here (DEN) to Tokyo in a few weeks. They will start 787 flights to Houston sooner. I wonder if Boeing has learned (and will put into practice) anything from this mess.
Update on electrical systems. PUBLIC DOMAIN SOURCE. Electronics outsourcing weakened Boeing’s control over 787’s crucial systems | Business & Technology | The Seattle Times Electronics outsourcing weakened Boeings control over 787s crucial systems Boeing once had a division that designed electronic controls and managed suppliers of related components, but as the company geared up for the 787 it outsourced that work and weakened its control over crucial systems. By Dominic Gates Seattle Times aerospace reporter Ten years ago, Boeing had a unit of 1,200 engineers in Everett designing electronic controls for all its airplanes, and a plant in Texas where another 1,200 people built the hardware. The company created the unit in the early 1980s because all the systems on a modern jet including the electrical, hydraulics, engine, fuel, cabin air and flight-control systems are managed by electronics. It was a strategic move to control the electronics itself, said Dwight Schaeffer, a former senior manager at Boeing Commercial Electronics (BCE). Yet as Boeing launched the 787 Dreamliner program in 2003, management dispersed all those Everett engineers, outsourced their work, then sold off the Texas plant. Part of a broad handoff of control to airplane-systems suppliers, the move was intended to cut Boeings costs. On jets before the 787, BCE integrated components from many different suppliers so they worked together properly. And if suppliers got in trouble, BCE stepped in and got the job done. Now they dont have that capability, said Jerry Packard, another former BCE manager. Thats all lost. In contrast to Boeings well-known move to let global partners design and manufacture the 787s wings, tail and fuselage, the way it handed design control to 787 systems partners, including management of subcontractors, received little attention at the time. After this years costly three-month grounding of the plane from Januarys battery problems, that approach is getting new scrutiny. Longtime industry analyst Richard Aboulafia worries it may bring the 787 more grief in future. Without complete oversight of the subsystems, they might be finding systems glitches for years, said Aboulafia. Stitching together In the aftermath of a rash of 787 systems problems in its electrical power-distribution panels and generators as well as its battery system the dissolution of Boeing Commercial Electronics offers a case study in how Boeing dealt away in-house expertise and relinquished control over systems suppliers. BCE designed and built electronic boxes and circuit cards that controlled a multitude of crucial systems on all Boeing planes before the 787. As a senior manager at BCE, Schaeffer managed the budgets for about 230 employees and ran research and development, business development, project management and product support. He said BCEs role as an integrator of different subsystems gave it a clear overview of how a jets systems were coming together. No supplier would trust another, said Schaeffer. But the suppliers would trust us not to give away their secrets. On the 777 program, for example, Honeywell supplied a system to detect when the weight of the plane was on the landing gear; Allied Signal supplied a smoke-detection system for the cargo hold; Hamilton Standard (which later became Hamilton Sundstrand) supplied an electrical anti-ice system; Fenwal Controls supplied a system to detect leaks in air ducts; Walter Kidde supplied a fire-detection system. These all fed into and were controlled by a single BCE-designed electronics box, as were other systems designed and built by BCE itself including the hydraulics monitoring and the passenger cabins environmental controls. To make it all work together, BCE controlled both the physical format of this vital communications nexus, as well as the electrical and software standards for each system. Another key BCE role was bailing out suppliers that got into trouble. Lead engineer Ed DSouza recalls the example of Vickers, a Grand Rapids, Mich.-based supplier of the system for loading and unloading cargo for the 767 freighter. On previous contracts, Vickers had built only the hardware. Failing miserably at designing the electronic controls, the company appealed to Boeing for help, DSouza said. They only wanted to do the mechanical stuff. They were more than happy to turn the electronics over to us, he said. We essentially brought the job back in-house and did the entire design and delivery ourselves. 787 systems different? Schaeffer, Packard and DSouza, now all retired, trace some of Boeings 787 problems to a loss of control of systems design and the disbanding of BCE. Its uncommon for retired Boeing managers to speak out publicly against company policies, but they agreed to do so in hope that Boeing will reverse direction for future jet programs. As Dreamliners entered scheduled service in numbers last year, problems surfaced initially with the 787s electrical system. At least four times, electrical arcing in circuit boards inside the power panels caused airline-service disruptions, including a Dec. 4 flight diversion by United Airlines. On Dec. 17, an electrical generator on a United 787 failed after a flight attendant reported a loud bang under the floor. According to a Federal Aviation Administration incident report, mechanics found a flash mark behind a power panel. The Wall Street Journal recently cited an internal Boeing report that revealed a total of 350 Dreamliner service disruptions before January. That figure is comparable to the incidence of glitches in the early days of the 777 program, but a person with knowledge of the data said a greater proportion of the 787 problems were electrical. Then in January, problems with the battery system a battery fire on the ground in Boston and a smoldering battery in flight in Japan grounded the entire Dreamliner fleet. Were these teething problems or signs of an underlying systems vulnerability? Boeing insists that the way it outsourced 787 systems was not significantly different from what its done in the past. Instead of relying on multiple suppliers sending in pieces Boeing integrated, the jet-maker had its major systems partners design, build and integrate subsystems, said spokesman Larry Wilson. We streamlined our approach, Wilson said. Mike Sinnett, Boeing senior vice president and 787 chief project engineer, told a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigative hearing into the battery failures last month that the company maintained both tight oversight and overall control over its systems partners. Compared with the radically new role for 787 airframe suppliers, Boeings relationship with 787 systems suppliers was more traditional, he said. Batteries, power panels Some suppliers saw the changes as more radical . Clay Jones, chief executive of Rockwell Collins, which supplies the 787 cockpit avionics suite, said in an interview last year that on the Dreamliner Boeing fairly dramatically changed its attitude of how to work with suppliers. He said Boeing elevated the role of suppliers like his company to that of true partners. Some of those suppliers would have liked to work with BCE, said Schaeffer. Before Boeing selected its systems suppliers for the jet, the Hamilton Sundstrand division of United Technologies approached Schaeffers group and asked to partner with BCE in making its bid for the electrical systems. They were weak on software, and we had helped them out before, Schaeffer said. But with BCE already on the chopping block, Boeings leadership nixed that idea. Boeing ultimately chose Hamilton Sundstrand to design the 787s electrical system and to integrate subsystems such as the power-distribution panels. The panels, which have proved so troublesome on the 787, were designed in-house on jets before the 787, said Schaeffer. For the 787 battery system, Boeing selected Thales of France to do the design and integrate subsystems built by subcontractors, including battery-maker GS Yuasa of Japan, and Securaplane of Tucson, Ariz., which made the charging system. That would never have happened in the old days, Schaeffer said. The battery-component suppliers would have been contracted directly with Boeing. At the NTSB investigative hearing, testimony revealed that information from the subcontractors such as the analysis and testing of certain battery failures for the most part flowed indirectly to Boeing, through Thales. Ive no problem with outsourcing the build portions, meaning the making of the hardware, said Schaeffer. But he said he believes Boeing ought to have kept the design in-house and be responsible for integrating the various components from suppliers into a working system. When they outsourced that to the people that make the equipment, like Thales, thats what really broke the back, Schaeffer said. The 787 is the first Boeing jet with all its electronic components sourced from outside suppliers. Schaeffer said eliminating BCE from the supply chain meant many subsystem suppliers were out of sight, out of mind, no longer working directly with Boeing. Just by getting rid of us, Boeing outsourced its systems-design responsibilities more on the 787 than on other airplanes, he said. Risk-sharing partners At the start of the 787 program, Boeings leadership in Chicago insisted on the need to reduce the development cost by bringing in risk-sharing partners who would take on and help pay for more of the development work. Hans Weber, a leading aviation-engineering consultant, calls this the fundamental weakness in the 787 program from the start. This was ultimately a financial invention. Its not done for technical reasons, Weber said. Internal documents obtained by The Seattle Times in the early days of the program showed Boeing planned to spend just $5 billion to develop the 787, a figure Weber calls unrealistically low and that later ballooned to at least triple that as production problems mounted. Once design work had been outsourced, Weber said, an inevitable consequence was that in-house design expertise became surplus and had to go. We know of the problems on the structures side. We are learning more and more on the systems side, said Weber. These are problems that could very well be traced to a lack of sufficient oversight and inadequate transfer of corporate-engineering expertise. Boeing has upgraded both the battery systems and the power panels on the Dreamliners, and airlines around the world expect to resume their full 787 services by next month. If more systems problems arise for Boeing in future, one mitigating factor is that fixing them is generally much cheaper than making major structural changes to the airframe. Correcting systems faults may require only swapping out an electronics box or making software changes. More than ever, though, Boeing must look outside the company for that expertise.
Thanks, Spasso... just unbelievable... To paraphrase Lee Iacocca: "That's what happens when the bean counters, instead of 'airplane guys' are in charge." Lee said 'car guys', but... Outsourcing all the electronics on Boeing's first all-electric plane (no bleed air)???? Nuts. Doesn't Airbus build planes mostly the way the 787 was built?
Well... JAL just cancelled a 787 flight... a pressure sensor for the 'new and improved' battery box wasn't working properly. Also, both ANA and JAL are now talking strongly about buying Airbus instead of Boeing... is it related?
No. Both carriers have largely been all Boeing (ANA ventured out not long ago for A320s but they've since been retired, and JAL retired all the older JAS acquired Airbus planes). However, when you factor in that they have been largely all Boeing, and that the 787 has been very late, plus the occasional strikes at Boeing that affect delivery schedules, they no longer want to be dependent on one manufacturer any longer. Sucks, but may be smart. Smart that by spreading the risk, you insulate yourself to a degree. Maybe not smart because it's more expensive to maintain multiple types that don't share the same parts. JAL is a good candidate to break ranks to buy Airbus (A350s). ANA I think will end up holding out for the 777X. Time will tell.
And this was posted today (from Reuters): "The A350-1000 can be a good candidate for us," Osamu Shinobe told Reuters on the sidelines of an airlines conference. "It is realistic to consider this as a replacement for the 777. In the near future, when we look at the replacement candidates, this can be a very good and strong candidate.""
Of course, some of this talk is also 'political', aimed at keeping the screws to Boeing to get these problems fixed.......or else! Not unheard of when fleet planning is concerned, even absent major problems...
^^^^ Boeing helps keep the Japanese economy afloat with major subcontracts on 767/777/787 lines. The quid pro quo is that JAL and ANA buy Boeing. Of course that doesn't mean they can't bargain for the best prices.
The inaugural United 787 non-stop from Denver to Tokyo leaves here just after noon today. 15 hour flight. Onboard will be Denver's mayor, radio and TV press, a high school band, etc., etc.
New 777 will not have even begun, or only barely begun, FSD when the A350 enters service. Some airlines will wait, while others want something sooner rather than later.
There's been talk that the new 777-9 may just be too big for most airlines. Not my opinion, but what's been talked about.
Also, it might dry up demand for the 747-8 pax version. It would be bigger (more pax) than the biggest proposed A350, I think.
The death knell is sounding for 4 engined aircraft. The twins are coming up with better numbers with fewer engines.
The 787 landed... in Tokyo, it was an 11 hour flight. A local (here) radio talk guy was doing his talk show from Tokyo this morning. He interviewed the Captain, who said they used less fuel than they expected, and quite a bit less than the 777 he had been flying prior would have.
Sadly, there is no demand for the 747-8 outside of the freight market, and even then, its days are numbered. I think Korean Air will be the last airline to take delivery of a 747-8i. A shame, but reality.
Yep. Did see an 8i just inside the doors last week. Another 8F for Lou was outside the paint hanger last week as well (think it moved to the flight line this week). Another airline just cancelled 5 8F's last week (converted orders into something else I believe). Amazing thing is that 200F's are still in service while a lot of 400F's are being parked.
